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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
This report provides an overview of the different initiatives and policies devised at EU level 
to foster competitiveness and growth, and their assessment by selected stakeholders and 
experts.  
Key findings  
The report finds that there is renewed interest in industrial policy in general, and at EU 
level in particular, but there is not always a clear-cut and explicit idea of what purpose an 
EU industrial policy would serve. There are general references to objectives such as 
competitiveness, growth and jobs, but sometimes without explicit mention of possible 
tensions or overlaps between such objectives and how exactly an industrial policy can help 
to achieve these objectives.  
Parallel to some uncertainty around the very notion of industrial policy – its definition, 
objectives and target, there are new developments suggesting alternative frameworks of 
analysis. Indeed, theoretical developments and recent practices point to new units of 
analysis and action frameworks for outlining an industrial policy, such as industrial systems, 
production chains, networks, global value chains, “eco-systems”, smart specialisation, etc. 
They are all notions that offer an opportunity to overcome old dichotomies at the origin of 
seemingly irreducible and unproductive controversies characterising the debate between 
proponents of an industrial policy and critics. In particular, they question the validity of the 
opposition between horizontal and sectoral approaches to industrial policy, between top-
down and bottom-up policy developments, and between industrial policy targeting 
manufacturing in the strict sense and industry at large.  
In this context, new paradigms are proposed like the “new industrial policy”. In contrast to 
the “old” approach characterised by top-down initiatives pursuing clearly defined (sectoral) 
priorities, the new industrial policy is implemented through a process of trial and error, 
implying institutionalised dialogue between public authorities and private agents, pragmatic 
public–private partnerships, and the ability of policymakers to learn from mistakes (which 
in turn requires monitoring and evaluating). The capabilities of both policymakers and 
businesses acquire a special relevance in this context.  
In concrete terms, significant resources are mobilised by policies and programmes 
contributing to an “EU industrial policy”, and the policy coverage is extremely wide. Some 
of the initiatives with a budget envelope are (in order of importance): Cohesion Policy, 
Horizon 2020, Connecting Europe Facility and COSME, representing slightly less than €200 
billion. Two recurring priorities across these programmes are SMEs and innovation. In 
addition, the EU exercises regulatory power in a number of areas, which contributes to 
levelling the playing field and facilitating business in Europe: competition, internal market, 
business environment, intellectual property rights, trade and energy. 
The stakeholders reviewed in this study generally call for better integration of initiatives 
and programmes in order to best exploit synergies. In particular, some suggest better 
aligning conceptual underpinnings and intervention logics at the basis of policy 
developments in some areas, including, for example, environmental policy and other 
initiatives aimed at fostering competitiveness. The majority of respondents believe that a 
proper mandate in the field of industrial policy should be more clearly defined at EU level.  
Stakeholders appear to place quite distinct expectations on an EU industrial policy. Business 
associations acknowledge the fundamental role that the EU plays - and could further play – 
in terms of “levelling the playing field”. Another added value of EU action put forward by EU 
EU Industrial Policy: Assessment of Recent Developments and Recommendations for Future Policies 
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policy stakeholders is when the EU fulfils the role of knowledge-broker, or knowledge 
platform.  
A review of practices and approaches in six Member States shows quite distinct positions. 
Distinct socio-economic institutional features determine different growth paths, and 
contribute to shaping specific responses to varying types of challenges. This means that 
there are different incentives for Member States to take part in an active EU industrial 
policy. “Peripheral” Member States dependent on Cohesion Policy, for example, place high 
expectations on an EU industrial policy. The fact that these countries were hardest hit by 
the crisis and that they are experiencing relatively more rapid de-industrialisation calls for 
specific attention and possibly distinct approaches in their cases.  
Recommendations 
The EU should fully endorse its role of knowledge-broker and facilitator of interaction in 
order to stress its added value. In particular, the promotion of pragmatic public-private 
partnerships could acquire greater and institutionalised importance. A possible model could 
be the existing Specialised Partnerships. Another area where the EU could improve current 
practices is in the field of monitoring and evaluation, for example on the basis of experience 
accumulated through the implementation of Cohesion Policy.  
A proper governance setting should be in place at EU level. For instance, the most should 
be made of the newly established vice-presidency for “Jobs Growth Investment and 
Competitiveness” in order to ensure optimal coordination among the concerned DGs, 
building on synergies and complementarities between programmes and initiatives.  
A Strategic Document could be adopted that would not be so much about what to do, but 
about how to do it. This Document could make explicit the mission of a facilitator endorsed 
by the EU, indicate clearly who’s in charge, spell out the adopted approach and method, 
clarify the preferred overarching strategic options, and delineate possible specific priorities 
or policy domains where appropriate actions should be decided at relevant levels of action 
(i.e. not in the Document itself). In this way, such a Document would propose a sound 
strategic and action framework as well as a menu of possible areas of initiatives or 
priorities, which would be picked up by relevant stakeholders at appropriate levels of 
action. The Document should take a clear position with respect to the very distinct national 
expectations placed on an EU industrial policy and the differentiated needs of Member 
States. It is also necessary for the Document to explain how the current policies, 
programmes, initiatives and arrangements at EU level articulate and form a coherent policy 
system contributing to the overarching objective. As to specific priorities, these could range 
from eco-innovation, to digital infrastructure, to SME support, to innovation financing, etc.  
This Document would be the result of an intense consultation process bringing together 
different stakeholders, in particular Member States, business organisations, trade unions 
and other non-governmental organisations, at the EU level, but also from the national, 
regional, transnational, cross-regional and local levels. Such consultation should foster 
ownership around the strategy. It is conceivable that a process of ramification, comprising 
a series of related Documents deepening issues in some of the identified policy domains, 
could be adopted at relevant levels of action, following a variable geometry.  
The European Parliament should validate the Main Document and scrutinise its 
implementation (which entails the formulation of a monitoring/evaluation process). The 
European Parliament should also be actively involved in monitoring the progress achieved 
through specific actions.  
Without relinquishing their prerogatives, and while pursuing their own strategic lines, 
Member States should acknowledge the added value of the EU action thus defined in the 
Policy Department A: Economic and Scientific Policy 
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area of industrial policy. They should endorse the EU mission, which they themselves 
contributed to forging and validating, indeed a necessary condition for an EU industrial 
policy to develop and be successful. They should also throw their weight behind the recent 
investment plan decided at EU level to foster public and private investment. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
While in the 1990s European institutions were focusing mainly on the creation of a Single 
Market, the start of the Monetary Union and European enlargement, industrial policy has 
recently returned to the European vocabulary and has attracted the attention of 
governments. Interest in European industrial policy resurfaced at the turn of the century 
and played a specific role in the shaping of the Lisbon Strategy. However, a renewed strong 
appetite for industrial policy did not emerge until the effects of the credit crunch and the 
ensuing prolonged economic slowdown became manifest with dramatic consequences on 
the manufacturing industry in some EU countries. Nowadays, we observe a complete 
change of mood towards industrial policy intervention, as a result of a combination of 
factors such as: fear of rapid de-industrialisation following the crisis, limited European 
growth, new opportunities and constraints related to climate change, competition from 
emerging economies where significant planning is taking place, etc. Overall, great 
expectations are placed on industrial policy, which is seen as a central tool for promoting 
economic transformation and sometimes even as a way of helping Member States to 
recover from the global financial crisis.  
Aware of the extent of the challenges faced by the European economy, the European 
Commission has taken a number of steps in the context of its 2020 strategy in order to 
promote an “industrial renaissance”. These include a “flagship” entirely dedicated to 
industrial policy (and three others closely related), and several Communications delineating 
an “Industrial Compact”. Not least, the objective was set for EU industry to represent 20% 
of EU GDP by 2020 and the new President of the European Commission announced an 
ambitious investment plan of more than €300 billion in 2015-2018.  
The objective of this report is to establish state-of-the-art industrial policy at EU level: why 
is it attracting renewed interest, what is its form, instruments and underlying thrust and 
what are its expected and recorded effects? In the following, we look at ideas, interests and 
institutions shaping industrial policy at EU level. “Ideas” refer to the scholarly and public 
policy discussions, “interests” are about the gainers and losers from policy shifts, and the 
“institutions” are the forums in which negotiations take place, with the resulting policy 
arrangements forming an EU industrial policy. Chapter 1 presents the nature and extent of 
the challenges facing Europe in terms of competitiveness, together with different options 
justifying the activation of an EU industrial policy and a set of available instruments; it 
reviews ideas at the basis of the development of an EU industrial policy. Chapter 2 
establishes the contours and contents of the current initiatives, programmes and policies 
that contribute (or could contribute) to the formulation of an EU industrial policy: as such it 
deals with the institutional and policy framework where an EU industrial policy could 
develop. Chapter 3 draws a conceptual map of the positions of stakeholders on the merits 
and weaknesses of the present arrangements and desired improvements; it tries to 
determine where interests could sway policy developments. A concluding chapter sums up 
the main findings and puts forward some suggestions for the future.  
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2. THE CHALLENGES FACING AN EU INDUSTRIAL POLICY: 
THE TERMS OF THE DEBATE 
KEY FINDINGS 
 Industry is the backbone of the European economy. Although declining in the overall 
economy, manufacturing accounts for a disproportionate share of exports and R&D.   
 The decline in manufacturing’s share of GDP is a worldwide trend that has 
undergone rapid deterioration following the financial crisis. This is especially true in 
some European countries. 
 Member States are characterised by marked differences in terms of overall level of 
competitiveness as well as share of manufacturing in GDP. Regional variations are 
also pronounced. 
 An industrial policy could in principle deal with negative trends in industrial 
employment and output. International practices show that there is a range of 
objectives assigned to industrial policy, there are multiple orientations, and many 
different policy instruments are available. 
 A new paradigm of industrial policy is emerging. It emphasises the role of the 
public-private partnership and blurs old dichotomies such as the opposition between 
horizontal and vertical/sectoral industrial policies, top-down and bottom-up policy 
designs, and manufacturing vs. broader targets. 
 
This chapter is intended to set the scene in which the debate about an EU industrial policy 
takes place. It examines factual evidence on the nature of the challenges that an EU 
industrial policy needs to tackle in terms of growth and competitiveness, opens the toolbox 
available in principle to policymakers wishing to develop an industrial policy at EU level, 
and reviews different arguments in literature on the need for an industrial policy that could 
be used to justify an EU industrial policy. 
2.1. The challenges at stake 
This section provides concise and up-to-date evidence on the state of EU competitiveness in 
general, and of that manufacturing in particular.  
As reported by several studies, industry1 is the backbone of the EU economy and a driver 
for its international competitiveness. It significantly contributes to economic growth, 
employment and innovation activities and, thanks to its spillover effects on other sectors, it 
benefits the overall economy2.  
The role of industry as the hub of the European economy and competitiveness is underlined 
by the fact that the manufacturing sector accounts for 49% of intermediate input 
transactions in the EU economy, while its shares of the total EU value-added and 
                                           
1  For the purpose of this study, a broad definition of industry is adopted, which means that it is defined not only 
as manufacturing, but it covers a broader set of activities, including mining, quarrying and energy activities. 
2  Business Europe (2014), Industry Matters: Recommendations for an Industrial Compact, Brussels. Institute der 
deutchenWirtschaft Köln (2013), Industry and a Growth Engine in the Global Economy, Cologne. European 
Parliament (2014) How can European Industry Contribute to Growth and Foster European Competitiveness?, 
Study for the ITRE Committee. 
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employment amount to 15% and 14%, respectively.3 Regarding employment, 
manufacturing directly provides 32 million jobs in the EU and indirectly accounts for an 
additional 20 million jobs in related sectors.4 The productive level of the manufacturing 
sector is about 15% higher than in the service sector (an hour generates nearly €32 of 
added value). Moreover, it is responsible for 65.3% of R&D and 49.3% of innovation 
investments and, accounting for 75.6% of merchandise exports and 57% of total exports, 
industrial companies clearly drive Europe’s international economic performance.   
Several indicators show unfavourable or negative trends, which are particularly worrying 
given the importance for the EU of industry in general, and manufacturing in particular. 
However, the picture is variegated. First, as far as measurement of competitiveness is 
concerned, the WCYB2014 results5 show that EU28 countries such as Sweden, Germany 
and Denmark are significantly competitive by ranking 5th, 6th and 9th, respectively, among 
the 60 countries considered.6 Conversely, there are countries such as Croatia, Slovenia, 
Greece, Hungary, Portugal and Italy, which still lag behind in the WCYB competitiveness 
ranking. Interestingly, there is also a regional dimension to differences in competitiveness 
levels.  
The 2013 edition of the Regional Competitiveness Index (RCI) developed by the European 
Commission reveals substantial differences in competitiveness within some countries. The 
map below shows a polycentric pattern with strong competitive capital and metropolitan 
regions in many parts of Europe. With the exception of the less developed Member States 
in Central and Eastern Europe, some capital regions are surrounded by similarly 
competitive regions.  
Figure 1: Figure 1: Regional Competitiveness Index, 2013. Results across 
EU Regions 
 
Note: The higher the class, the higher the level of regional competitiveness. 
Source: Annoni P. and Dijkstra L.(2013) 
                                           
3  Calculations by Institute der deutchenWirtschaft Köln (2013) on the basis of Eurostat (2013), OECD (2013), 
WIOD (2013), WTO (2013). 
4  Including Agriculture (3,737), Mining (180), Utilities (513), Communication (362), Financial Services (405), 
Private and Public Services (6,483), Business Services (4,092), Logistics (4,339) and Construction (293). 
Calculations by Institute der deutchenWirtschaft Köln (2013) on the basis of Eurostat (2013) and WIOD 
(2013). 
5  IMD World Competitiveness Centre (2014), IMD World Competitive Yearbook 2014, Lausanne, Switzerland.  
6  60 countries are ranked from the most to the least competitive. 
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In what follows several key features characterising the added value of the EU industry 
sector, and manufacturing in particular, are briefly presented.  
A first remark concerns the continuing long-term shift from agriculture and manufacturing 
towards services. This is a worldwide trend, which has accelerated in the last decade, but 
the largest decline is recorded in the EU. Market services have grown to a point where they 
account for nearly half of the EU gross value-added. The share of non-market services7 
increased in 2013 to 23% of EU28 GVA, while manufacturing activities declined to around 
15%. Construction, and mining and quarrying remained roughly stable at 6% and 1%, 
respectively.  
Figure 2: Growth in value-added, by sector (2000-2013)  
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Source: Eurostat. 
Data from the World Input-Output database (WIOD) allow for a comparison between the 
European economies and those of other countries. They show that Asian economies (China 
and Japan) and BRII countries (Brazil, Russia, Indonesia and India) are more specialised in 
manufacturing than European countries (see Figure 3 below).  
Figure 3: Specialisation in EU and in other countries, 2011 
EU28* BRII USA Japan China Rest of the World
Agriculture, Hunting, Forestry and Fishing 0.53 1.93 0.43 0.38 1.54 1.41
Mining and Quarrying 0.15 1.14 0.45 0.09 0.73 2.65
Manufacturing 0.92 0.99 0.65 1.03 1.70 0.90
Electricity 1.16 1.18 0.49 1.12 1.22 1.00
Construction 0.95 1.19 0.54 0.89 1.31 1.17
Market Service 1.17 0.91 1.33 1.08 0.52 0.89
Non Market Service 1.11 0.84 1.53 1.19 0.47 0.82  
Source: WIOD  
Note: *Croatia not included.  
                                           
7  They include branches covering general public services, non-market education, research and health services 
provided by general government and private non-profit institutions, domestic services and other non-market 
services.  
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A large variation can be observed in the percentage of EU Member States’ output claimed 
by manufacturing and market services. Generally, many European economies (e.g. 
Romania, the Czech Republic, Hungary and Ireland) boast relatively large manufacturing 
sectors compared to the EU average. Conversely, there are countries such as Luxembourg, 
Greece, Cyprus and the UK that have a very small manufacturing sector and a large market 
services sector8.  
Manufacturing and services appear to be increasingly interlinked (e.g. by including activities 
such as R&D, software design, market research, etc.). The advantage of using services as 
part of their business processes (such as development of products, sales, accounting, 
logistics) means an increase in industrial competitiveness, thanks to the increase in 
productivity and the reduction in production costs (more efficient manufacturing 
processes).  
Figure 4: Gross Domestic Product per capita: historical overview across  
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Source: Eurostat 
 
As far as openness to international trade and the ability to integrate in global value chains 
are concerned, there is evidence that smaller countries tend to be more integrated in 
international trade, whilst the larger ones normally have lower trade-to-GDP ratios.  
 
                                           
8  European Commission (2013), Competing in Global Value Chains: EU Industrial Structure Report 2013,  
DG Enterprise and Industry.  
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Figure 5: Total exports as a percentage of GDP, 2012  
  
Source: European Commission (2013)9 
As shown in Figure 6 below, a rise in labour productivity occurred in Ireland, Sweden and 
Austria. Conversely, decreases were recorded for the Netherlands, France, Italy and 
Belgium.  
Figure 6: Labour productivity per hour worked (EU28=100) 
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Source: Authors based on Eurostat data. 
Note: Data are not available for Croatia or Luxembourg. 
 
Over the last decade investments in R&D have significantly increased across Europe, but, 
overall, the volume of human and financial resources devoted to R&D in European countries 
is relatively smaller than that of the EU’s main competitors (see Figure 7 below).  
                                           
9  European Commission (2013), Commission staff working document, Industrial Performance Scoreboard and 
Member States’ Competitiveness Performance and Implementation of EU Industrial Policy: A European 2020 
initiative, Brussels. 
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Figure 7: Human and financial resources devoted to R&D, 2012  
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Generally, the EU as a whole faces considerable challenges in terms of competitiveness, 
mainly arising from a worrying trend characterising the evolution of its manufacturing 
basis, which is so important as a source of growth and development. That said, there 
appear to be considerable variations within the EU at country and regional levels, which 
show distinct diagnoses and would possibly call for distinct remedies.  
2.2. An industrial policy: what is it for and how does it work?  
Against the background depicted above, what could an industrial policy do? What are its 
main objective(s)? Is it competitiveness, growth, jobs? What are the intermediate 
objectives to reach these main objectives? Is it a new specialisation profile, structural 
changes? What are its targets? Is it just manufacturing? And what are its main 
instruments? This section reviews different possibilities and options – as identified 
empirically through an examination of international practices – to establish a sort of ideal 
toolbox at the disposal of policymakers wishing to develop an EU industrial policy.   
A valid starting point is to acknowledge that no generally accepted definition of industrial 
policy exists in literature. Some definitions are very broad, like “all policies designed to 
support industry” (Pinder, 1982)10, while others are quite narrow, such as “set of 
                                           
10  Including fiscal and monetary incentives for investment, direct public investment and public procurement 
programmes, incentives for investment in research and development, major programmes for the creation of 
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governmental actions designed to support industries that have major export potential and 
job-creation capacity, as well as the potential to directly support the production of 
infrastructure” (Reich, 1982)11. Differences can be found in the definitions adopted by 
international organisations. For instance, the UNCTAD12 defines industrial policy as a 
“concerted, focused, conscious effort on the part of government to encourage and promote 
a specific industry or sector with an array of policy tools”;13 the World Bank considers 
industrial policy as “government efforts to alter industrial structure to promote productivity-
based growth”14.  
A commonly used and widely cited definition is that of Pack and Saggi (2006),15 which is 
adopted and slightly revised by the OECD in order to encompass the variety of uses that 
are commonly made of the term industrial policy. In the spirit of a broad and inclusive 
definition, the OECD identifies industrial policy as “any type of intervention or government 
policy that attempts to improve the business environment or to alter the structure of 
economic activity towards sectors, technologies or tasks that are expected to offer better 
prospects for economic growth or societal welfare than would occur in the absence of such 
intervention”16.  
Bearing in mind this definition, a large number of variations are observed. For a start, it is 
possible to classify industrial policies on the basis of objectives such as a) economic 
objectives: improving the efficiency; b) social objectives: enhancing equity; c) 
environmental objectives: ensuring sustainability; and d) political objectives: protecting 
specific interests (Pianta 2009). However, policies often have multiple aims and may not fit 
neatly into one category or another. A useful classification looks at whether the instruments 
used for industrial policy operate mainly on the product market or whether they are 
focused on factor markets – labour, capital, land and technology. Other differences are 
found in the orientation of the policies: whether they are horizontal/functional or 
vertical/selective, time-constrained or longer term, strategically targeted or in response to 
market pressure, conditional or unconditional, dealing with comparative advantages or 
exploring new areas, etc.  
It is still conventional to distinguish between ‘horizontal’ and ‘selective’ industrial policies 
(Crafts et al., 2013)17. The latter are aimed specifically at improving the performance of 
particular industries, firms or sectors (e.g. manufacturing, tourism, creative industries, 
business services, etc.), while the former are designed to benefit the economy more 
generally and to improve the ‘framework conditions of the policy’. However, this distinction 
is not always clear-cut. The OECD report stresses that horizontal industrial policies often 
have a selective equivalent, e.g. targeted inward investment promotion or targeted skills 
                                                                                                                                       
“national champions” in strategic sectors, and policies to support small and medium-sized enterprises.  
See Pinder, J. (1982), Causes and Kinds of Industrial Policy, in J. Pinder (ed.), (1982), National Industrial 
Strategies and the World Economy, Croom Helm, London. 
11  Reich, R. (1982), Making Industrial Policy, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 60, No. 4. 
12  The United Nations Conference on Trade and Development was established in 1964 as a permanent 
intergovernmental body of the United Nations. See UNCTAD and ILO (2014), Transforming Economies: Making 
Industrial Policies Work for Growth, Jobs and Development.  
13  UNCTAD (2009), The Relationship between Competition and Industrial Policies in Promoting Economic 
Development, TD/B/C.I/CLP/3, available at http://unctad.org/en/docs/ciclpd3_en.pdf. 
14  OCED Private Sector Development Synthesis Note: Industrial Policy, August 2013. World Bank (1993), The 
East Asian Miracle, Washington DC: The World Bank. 
15  Pack and Saggi (2006), The Case for Industrial Policy: a Critical Survey, available at 
http://www.ycsg.yale.edu/focus/gta/case_for_industrial.pdf. 
16  Warwick, K. (2013), Beyond Industrial Policy: Emerging Issues and New Trends, OECD Science, Technology 
and Industry Policy Papers, No. 2, OECD Publishing. 
17  Crafts, N. and Hughes, A. (2013), Industrial Policy for the Medium- to Long-term, Centre for Business 
Research, University of Cambridge Working Paper No. 455 
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policies, or sector-specific advisory services. Also, horizontal policies may turn out to be 
highly selective in their impact. For example, general support for an input or activity that is 
used more intensively in some sectors than others (e.g. the impact of R&D tax credits is 
highly concentrated in the manufacturing sector).  
Generally, the instruments used in industrial policy range from direct and indirect support 
to specific firms and industries (e.g. grants, subsidies, loans and tax credits) to support for 
knowledge institutions, infrastructure and skills. Various attempts have been made to 
categorise the instruments used in industrial policy. For example, it is possible to 
distinguish between three sets of instruments: (a) external market interventions, including 
import tariffs, quotas, licensing and local content programmes, and export promotion 
measures such as export subsidies, export processing zones and subsidised credit; (b) 
product market interventions aimed at promoting competition in domestic markets, 
competition policy and law; and (c) factor market interventions: FDI performance 
requirements and restrictions in the capital and finance markets, labour market and equity 
objectives (Pangestu, 2002)18. A list of possible policy instruments contributing to an 
industrial policy is proposed below. 
Table 1. Classification of instruments for an industrial policy  
  
Economic signals and 
incentives 
Intellectual property rights 
Price regulation 
Exchange rate policy (e.g. under-evaluation) 
Monetary (interest rate) policy 
Countercyclical fiscal policy 
Tax breaks 
Scientific and 
technological innovation 
Scientific policies 
High-tech lead projects 
Funding university research 
Establishment of research centres 
R&D subsidies and/or tax credits 
Learning and improving 
technological capabilities 
Education and training policies 
Foresight exercises (to identify national research priorities) 
Labour training subsidies and/or tax breaks 
Skill formation and upgrading schemes 
International educational and research collaboration 
Incentives for foreign direct investment 
Selective industry 
support 
Impose import tariffs and/or quotas 
Provide export subsidies/credit/support 
Establish special economic zones 
Use of state-owned enterprises/privatisation 
Create public utilities providing inputs (e.g., electricity) 
Directed finance/subsidies  
Provide public guarantee 
Direct state procurement policy 
                                           
18  Pangestu (2002). Mari Pangestu. Industrial Policy and Developing Countries. In Bernard Hoekman, Aaditya 
Mattoo, and Philip English (eds.) Development, Trade and the WTO: A Handbook. World Bank. Washington, 
D.C. 
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Selection mechanisms Entry and exit regulations for firms 
“live and let die” principle (political will to end support to failing 
firms)  
Anti-trust and competition policy 
Support national trading companies  
Preferential access to finance 
Long-term development finance 
Distribution of 
information 
 
Collective action mechanisms 
Promotion of standards 
Use of consultative forums  
Use of business chambers 
Encouraging firms’ cooperation/links 
Marketing of export industries 
Dissemination of successful experience  
Improving productivity 
of firms and 
entrepreneurs 
Providing or subsidising management training  
Firm (SME) monitoring and assistance 
Infrastructure, funding and management for incubators and 
cluster formation 
Promotion of public-private partnerships 
Location marketing and enhancement 
Upgrading of economic infrastructure 
Creation of venture capital funds 
Source: Authors based on Warwick, K. (2013). 
Defining the sectors an industrial policy affects is a delicate issue since its instruments 
cover a wide range of economic areas. In general, it is observed that industrial policy is not 
only about manufacturing, although it represents a key part of what it defines as industry, 
namely “a broad set of activities including also mining and quarrying and energy 
activities”19. There is evidence supporting the concept that industrial policy can apply also 
to agricultural or service sectors20. For instance, Dani Rodrik (2007)21 states that industrial 
policy “is not about industry per se”, but that “policies targeted at non-traditional 
agriculture or services qualify as much as incentives for manufacturers”. In particular, 
policies targeted at non-traditional agriculture or services, and non-traditional agricultural 
products - e.g. new crops such as pineapple or avocado, for call centres, tourism - are 
some examples. The rationale is that market failures that justify industrial policy can be 
found in virtually all kinds of non-traditional activities, and not just in manufacturing. 
Overall, there are multiple possible combinations of objectives, domains and instruments, 
which suggest one should refrain from adopting simplistic oppositions or trade-offs to 
define industrial policy and different types of it. There is little agreement even concerning 
the definition of the very smallest denominator since one of the possible criteria – the 
alteration of the economic structure, i.e. in other terms, the effect that an industrial policy 
would have on the specialisation of the economy - is not acknowledged by the proponents 
of a very liberal approach.  
                                           
19  See European Commission (2014), A Vision for the Internal Market for Industrial Products, COM(2014) 25/2, 
Brussels. 
20  OECD (2013), Industrial Policy – The Approach and Current Debates, Private Sector Development  
Synthesis Note. 
21  Dani Rodrik  (2007), Normalizing Industrial Policy, Harvard University. 
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2.3. Beyond old dichotomies: some arguments in favour of a “new” EU 
industrial policy  
This section puts forward a series of arguments found in economic academic literature in 
favour of a “new” industrial policy. These arguments question old distinctions and 
dichotomies, and could be used by proponents of the development of an active industrial 
policy at EU level.  
2.3.1. Beyond old dichotomies  
The failures of industrial policies have been emphasised from different perspectives in 
recent years22. The discussion of such failures echoes in the debate today, in particular with 
reference to excessive government involvement in the private sector leading to favouritism 
and rent-seeking. The failures arise from the fact that in the past industrial policy was 
picking the winners, by selecting and promoting national champions. Such an “old” 
industrial policy consisted of vertical or sectoral top-down interventions. This type of 
intervention is subject to the criticism that governments are not particularly good at picking 
winners. In addition, governments may be captured by vested interests. The disrepute was 
thus primarily due to the lack of knowledge and ensuing bad judgment of policymakers.  
In fact, the trade-off between a vertical and a horizontal definition of industrial policy is for 
many scholars a sterile controversy. There are different conceptual developments that 
suggest going beyond this apparent trade-off. A common way to overcome this dichotomy 
is to resort to notions such as systems or networks, which are increasingly pertinent to 
account for the organisation of economic activities at times of heightened worldwide 
competition. For example, in their analysis of innovation systems as a basis for policy in the 
science, technology and innovation policy domains, Lundvall and Borrás (2005) draw the 
familiar distinction from a system perspective between a neo-classical economic approach 
that focuses on market failures and a systems-based approach. In the latter a critical step 
is made by recognising that pure arm’s length and anonymous relationships between 
producers and users is logically incompatible with what they regard as the ‘real’ world of 
markets. In that world, markets are organised and “constitute frameworks for interactive 
learning between users and producers”. In turn, “technological systems” can be identified 
(Carlsson and Jacobsson, 1997), as well as “sectoral systems of innovation” (Malerba 
2004), where sectors are not defined in a classic way along traditional statistical 
nomenclature, but across them, where the systems of innovation are, i.e. where users and 
providers of knowledge interact.  
These different developments have direct policy implications. The interest for the regional 
level of action, in particular, illustrates such a shift in the units of analysis and actions. For 
example, one justification for industrial policy is the success of industrial clusters around 
the world. Some scholars suggest that promoting industrial clusters is a way to avoid 
favouring, in a discretionary manner, particular manufacturing industries. There are 
different ways of doing that, for example, by promoting architecture of institutions for 
bridging industries and universities (see Kline and Moretti, 2013 and Mazzuccato, 2013). In 
the same vein, more recent developments revolve around the notion of smart specialisation 
(see Chapter 2 below).  
Interestingly, these policy developments not only go beyond the old horizontal vs. vertical 
dichotomy, but they also illustrate strategies to eschew the traditional top-down designs 
seen as a mistake of the past. According to many authors, the new industrial policy will 
have to "be embedded in private sector networks” (Rodrik, 2006; Crafts and Hughes, 
                                           
22  See for example, Ades and Di Tella (1997); Krueger (1990); Pack and Saggi (2006).  
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2013). This is in sharp contrast to top-down economic models in which the government, as 
“principal”, provides the guidelines for the private sector, as “agent”.  
In a slightly different manner, the notion of “global value chains” also questions 
conventional units of analysis and action. As a reflection of the globalisation process, value 
chains are being reorganised across countries and continents (Crafts and Hughes, 2013, 
Berger, 2012). This motivates companies to invest in the valorisation of capabilities and 
calls for government intervention to sustain higher education and increase human capital 
skills. In this respect, a recent focus has been placed on capabilities. With the achievement 
of strong globalisation, companies are stressed by tougher competition, so competing in 
capabilities is one way of tackling the globalisation process. (Sutton, 2012). Companies 
should be able to pursue structural changes, this is possible by investing in capabilities, and 
it requires investments in higher education (D. Palma, 2014). This follows from the belief 
that increasing investment in education is necessary to compete in a globalised world, 
where human capital and the capabilities embedded in the workforce of each company will 
increasingly be the key assets with which to compete (Sutton, 2012). What are the 
company’s capabilities? Literature identifies one key source of a firm’s value in the 
organisational structure of the firm, as opposed to its proprietary knowledge, or its market 
position. In other words, capabilities consist of a team of people who work effectively 
together, within some framework of rules, routines and tacit understandings that have been 
put in place or have evolved over time23. The increasing role of capabilities as a competitive 
tool for companies shows the connection between investments in higher education and 
company performances. 
Another dichotomy that is being increasingly blurred and which is particularly relevant in 
the European case is the alleged opposition between pro-competitive and industrial policies. 
In the EU the recent pursuing of pro-competitive policies often failed to deliver remarkable 
results in terms of employment, particularly so in the years following the recent and far-
reaching financial crisis. Some scholars are finally considering competition and industrial 
policy as synergic tools as opposed to elements in necessary juxtaposition. The synergies 
appear attainable particularly in more competitive sectors (Aghion et al. 2011). The 
safeguarding of market competition is no longer perceived as an obstacle to sectoral 
industrial policy, rather it is acknowledged that in many cases it can have a positive effect 
on sectoral growth. An active industrial policy for the more competitive sectors can be 
growth-enhancing. This shows that in the longer run, especially, there is no conflict of 
competition and industrial policy, even when targeted subsidies are involved. This opens 
the door to one possible lever, namely the considerable weight and impact of public 
procurement on GDP. According to Florio (2005), a proper industrial policy at EU level 
should include huge public demand for infrastructure, high technology industries and 
services by revising the magnitude and the allocation of the EU budget, and learning the 
lesson of the impact of federal procurement on high-tech industries in the USA.  
2.3.2. New approaches to industrial policy   
Learning from these recent developments, new approaches to industrial policy are 
proposed. For example, some authors propose a “matrix approach” (Aiginger, Sieber, 
2006). This approach will no longer focus on a sequence of disjointed and narrow sectoral 
interventions. Rather, critical and challenging multi-sectoral interventions are proposed 
                                           
23  “To see what this implies, consider, for example, the Aquafresh company in Ghana (Sutton and Kpenty, 2012). 
This company began life in the clothi and textiles sector, but when this sector came under intense competition 
from Chinese imports, the firm reinvented itself as a maker of soft drinks. Its expertise in clothing and textiles 
was secondary to the fact that it was a well-functioning, medium-sized firm, which could reorient itself in the 
product market as market circumstances changed” (Sutton, 2012). 
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with specific incentives for a range of key macro-sectors24. This is to reduce the risks 
connected with intervening randomly in specific sectors and allow policymakers to take into 
account differences among countries in the EU (as different macro-sectors need different 
actions and different countries have specialisations in different macro-sectors). In this 
approach, an industrial policy for Europe should intervene holistically, focus on the 
environment and on innovation, and aim to generate systemic impacts25. This approach 
should affect the structure of the economy as a whole, not only the manufacturing sector. 
Industrial policy is a series of 'high-road competitiveness strategies' based on advanced 
skills, innovation, supporting institutions, ecological ambition and activating social policy 
(Aiginger, 2006).  
Focusing on the method of implementation of an industrial policy, the “new” industrial 
policy approach proposed by D. Rodrik also goes beyond traditional dichotomies (see Box 1 
for an illustration of specific implications on the possible methods adopted to carry out such 
a “new” industrial policy).  
Box 1. New experimental approaches to industrial policy 
One possible approach to industrial policy can be based on randomized trial and error 
experiments not supported by any other preliminary consideration aimed at identifying 
strategic priorities. This new approach requires processes of information discovery, policy 
experimentation and networking. These are partly built on the premise suggested by Rodrik 
that "...the task of industrial policy is as much about eliciting information from the private 
sector about significant externalities and their remedies as it is about implementing 
appropriate policies." These new approaches seek to tackle one of the main challenges in 
policy, namely the information asymmetry between government and business. In eliciting 
more information from the private sector, more informed policy-making is made possible. 
Examples can be found of the use of techniques such as random assignment in the 
industrial and innovation policy sphere.  
Source: Warwick, Nolan (2014). 
In the “old” paradigm, it is assumed that the solutions to problems are known. A set of 
sectoral priorities are defined, to which specific policy instruments are dedicated. Top-down 
interventions are carried out, which require high quality bureaucracy. Instead, in a modern 
model of industrial policy, the dialogue between public and private agents taking place 
through pragmatic public private partnerships becomes central. It is useful to identify 
constraints and opportunities, and to find solutions to specific issues on a case by case 
basis26. This framework justifies an industrial policy at the EU level that is no longer top-
down, but based on the interplay among networks, actors and institutions with a 
continuous interwoven learning process.  
2.4. Concluding remarks  
This chapter shows that in the face of the daunting challenges faced by the EU economy as 
far as its competitiveness and growth levels are concerned, there are numerous options 
available in terms of both strategic underpinnings and concrete instruments. Some, 
however, are possibly more promising routes than others. In particular, a move away from 
the traditional top-down centralized approach is probably desirable, if only in order to be 
able to deal with one marked feature characterizing the challenges to be tackled and which 
                                           
24  For example: food and life science, machine and systems industries, fashion and design industries, basic and 
intermediary industries. 
25  See Aiginger (2005, 2006, 2007, 2014), Crafts, Hughes (2013), (Malerba, (2004), Carlsson and Jacobs (1997).  
26  See a presentation by D. Rodrik at the First Industrial Economics Day organised by DG Growth in December 
2014. See also Warwick, Nolan (2014). 
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has to do with the extreme variability of national and regional circumstances within the EU. 
In such a context, the next chapter explores the actual responses and choices made at EU 
level to deal with the challenges described above.  
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3. CONTOURS AND CONTENT OF THE “EU INDUSTRIAL 
POLICY” 
KEY FINDINGS 
 Different phases characterise the strategic framework adopted by the EU in the field 
of industrial policy. Industrial policy came back in the 1990s pursuing horizontal 
priorities. In the 2000s renewed expectations were placed on it, and to an even 
greater degree following the effects of the financial crisis. It comprises a blend of 
horizontal and cross-sectoral or thematic initiatives. It is now considered to be a 
central instrument to achieve the modernisation of the European economy. An 
ambitious target has been set to reach 20% of GDP dedicated to industry by 2020. 
 The current policies, programmes and initiatives contributing to an EU industrial 
policy are numerous, covering a wide variety of fields. Some initiatives with a 
budget envelope are (by order of importance): Cohesion Policy, Horizon 2020, 
Connecting Europe Facility and COSME, representing slightly less than EUR 200 
billion euro. Two recurring priorities across these programmes are SMEs and 
innovation. 
 In addition, the EU exercises regulatory power in a number of areas, which 
contributes to levelling the playing field and facilitating business in Europe: 
competition, internal market, business environment, intellectual property rights, 
trade and energy. 
 
The objective of this chapter is to provide an accurate and factual account of the shape(s) 
that an industrial policy deployed at EU level may take. Evidence is provided on strategic 
orientations, dedicated budgets, initiatives that the EC takes to incite Member States take 
specific steps and endorse varying approaches, as well as available evidence on the 
performance of the different policies programmes and arrangements reviewed. All these 
issues are addressed in a dynamic perspective, i.e. identifying the evolution path that led to 
the current state of affairs.  
This chapter adopts the industrial policy perspective to account for different pertinent 
initiatives of the EU in this field that would normally be considered separately. Here it is 
impossible to capture the aggregate effects of the different initiatives reviewed27, but 
scattered evidence on the performances of single initiatives is drawn from available 
evaluation and impact assessment reports. This is to pave the way for an assessment of 
the different programmes and initiatives seen as forming an “EU industrial policy” as a 
whole on the basis of perceptions of stakeholders presented in the next chapter.  
3.1. The Strategic Framework: development and recent progress  
Nowadays, the role played by industrial policy at EU level is essentially considered to be the 
provision of framework conditions for enterprise development and innovation in order to 
make the EU an attractive place for industrial investment and job creation, taking into 
account the fact that most businesses are small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs). 
                                           
27  For example a document lists the main initiatives and records economic performance – but does not provide a 
proper evaluation of an EU industrial policy. See European Commission (2013), Commission staff working 
document, Industrial Performance Scoreboard and Member States’ Competitiveness Performance and 
Implementation of EU Industrial Policy: A European 2020 initiative, Brussels. 
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However, this strategic choice is the outcome of different redefinitions in the history of the 
EU which are worth recalling, as this helps to shed light on current tensions and evolutions. 
In fact, the concept of an industrial policy at EU level became explicit only in the 1990s, 
although some firsts attempts can be traced back to the Treaty establishing the European 
Coal and Steel Community (1951) and the foundation of EURATOM (in 1959). Five broad 
phases can be identified.  
 First Phase 
The 1951 treaty establishing the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) provided a 
first attempt to implement an EU-wide industrial policy, albeit in an implicit form and 
focusing only on one particular sector. The ECSC can be seen as the predecessor of today’s 
EU (J. Jolly, 1978). The principal aim of the ESCS was to improve the provision of coal and 
steel, which was then in short supply. To reach the objective of expanding supply, during 
this phase many interventions were allowed in the coal and steel market: minimum prices, 
quotas and trade protection. When the coal and steel sector later shifted to over-supply, 
the policy was maintained as a form of community coordination. 
 Second Phase 
The European Economic Community (1957) treaty marks the beginning of the second 
phase. The treaty does not mention industrial policy explicitly; however, this phase is 
characterized by remarkable interventionism and was labelled by many researchers as the 
phase of sectoral industrial policy or even “French industrial policy” with reference to the 
tradition of sectoral planning in France (Darmer & Kuyper, 2000, Owen, 2012). In this 
phase, sectoral restructuring and policies favouring specific sectors or even ‘grand projects’ 
dominated the policy scene in most countries. Such developments occurred even though 
one of the main goals of the 1957 treaty establishing the European Economic Community 
(EEC) was to increase competition and to promote the creation of an internal market with 
the free flow of goods. In order to do so, the treaty encouraged the lowering of tariffs and 
trade barriers alongside a reduction in subsidisation and in national assistance. 
The first steps towards an explicit industrial policy at the community level are mentioned in 
a memorandum on industrial policy dated 1970 consisting of two documents: (1) A first 
document outlining the principles that guided the Commission and setting out the general 
guidelines that it proposes; (2) A second document consisting of four parts. The first part 
describes the situation of industry in the Community. The guidelines put forward in the first 
document are developed and explained in the following three parts: the improvement of 
the conditions in which firms operate in the Community, the ability of the Community's 
industry to adjust, and the promotion of technologically advanced industries.” (Supplement 
to Bulletin 4 – 1970 of the European Communities, Brussels, 18 March 1970). 
 Third phase 
The third phase began in 1990 with the European Commission communication to the 
Council and European Parliament entitled "Industrial Policy in an Open and 
Competitive Environment: Guidelines for a Community Approach"28. This 
communication reflects a convergence of views and an implicit agreement between Member 
States on the guiding principles for Community industrial policy, namely “openness of 
markets”, “horizontal approach” and “subsidiarity”. In particular, it pointed out that sectoral 
                                           
28  Commission of the European Communities (1990), Communication of the European Commission to the Council 
and European Parliament: "Industrial Policy in an Open and Competitive Environment: Guidelines for a 
Community Approach, COM(90) 556 final, Brussels, 16 November 1990.  
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policies of intervention were not effective in fostering structural change29 and proposed that 
industrial problems be solved through horizontal measures. This phase seems to mark 
the end to the sectoral approach (Darmer & Kuyper, 2000), identified as a distortion of 
competition. The term industrial policy started to be  used in a purely functional sense that 
is very close to general competitiveness or productivity policy. Industrial policy in this sense 
is similar to growth strategy – or to what used to be referred to as supply-side policy.  
The Maastricht Treaty (1992) consolidated the achievement of the communication of 1990, 
and set up the legal basis for Community Industrial Policy. It established industrial policy 
explicitly as an area of Community responsibility and calls for the Union and the Member 
States to “ensure the conditions necessary for the competitiveness of the Union’s industry” 
(see Box 2)30.  
Box 2. Article 173.1 of the Maastricht Treaty  
“The Community and the Member States shall ensure that the conditions necessary for the 
competitiveness of the Community's industry exist. For that purpose, in accordance with a 
system of open and competitive markets, their actions shall be aimed at: i) speeding up the 
adjustment of industry to structural changes; ii) encouraging an environment favourable to 
initiatives and to the development of undertakings throughout the Community, particularly 
small and medium-sized undertakings; iii) encouraging an environment favourable to 
cooperation between undertakings; iv) fostering better exploitation of the industrial 
potential of policies of innovation, research and technological development. 2. The Member 
States shall consult each other in liaison with the Commission and, where necessary, shall 
coordinate their actions. The Commission may take any useful initiatives to promote such 
coordination. 3. The Community shall contribute to the achievement of the objectives set out 
in Paragraph 1 through the policies and activities it pursues under other provisions of this 
Treaty. The Council, acting unanimously on a proposal from the Commission, after consulting 
the European Parliament and the Economic and Social Committee, may decide on specific 
measures in support of actions taken in the Member States to achieve the objectives set out 
in Paragraph 1.  
This Title shall not provide a basis for the introduction by the Community of any measure 
that could lead to a distortion of competition.” 
Source: Maastricht Treaty. 
This phase is characterized by an acknowledgement of the importance of new technologies 
generally, and of information technologies specifically. Important documents on this subject 
are the publications on the global information society (published in 1994) and all the EU 
policy attempts to promote the information society. “Industrial policy and innovation policy 
were twin strategies during this phase” (Aiginger and Sieber, 2006) 
 Fourth Phase 
Starting approximately at the turn of the century, a renewed interest in industrial policy 
developed within Europe. This interest was stimulated by globalisation, EU enlargement, 
fear of deindustrialisation and slow European growth. Both the European Councils in Lisbon 
in 2000 and in Gothenburg in 2001 recognised the key role of industrial policy in helping 
                                           
29  “They have failed to make industry competitive by delaying the requirement to implement necessary 
adjustments, this led to grave misallocation of resources and exacerbated problems of budgetary imbalances…. 
Sectoral approaches to industrial policy can work for a period, but they inevitably entail the risk of delaying 
structural adjustments and thereby creating job losses in the future.” 
30  Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, Title XVII, Industry, Art. 173 (ex Article 157 TEC): 
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/resource.html?uri=cellar:ccccda77-8ac2-4a25-8e66-
a5827ecd3459.0010.02/DOC_1&format=PDF 
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the European Union meet its objectives. In this context, four main communications were 
issued31. During this phase a more sophisticated sectoral perspective was added to the 
horizontal approach, in a so-called “matrix approach”32 to industrial policy33. Thus, in July 
2005, for the first time, a Commission communication on ‘Implementing the Community 
Lisbon Programme: A Policy Framework to Strengthen EU Manufacturing — Towards a More 
Integrated Approach for Industrial Policy’ (COM(2005) 0474) set out an integrated 
approach to industrial policy based on a concrete work programme of cross-sectoral and 
sectoral initiatives. With this communication, the Commission committed to the horizontal 
nature of industrial policy and to avoiding a return to selective interventionist policies. The 
idea suggested by this communication is that for industrial policy to be effective, horizontal 
policies have to take into account the specific context of individual sectors and therefore a 
combination of horizontal and sectoral policies is needed. Seven major cross-sectoral 
policy initiatives (see Box 3) were announced in this communication in order to address 
the common challenges across groupings of different industries and to reinforce the 
synergies between different policy areas in the light of competitiveness considerations.  
Box 3. Cross-sectoral policy initiatives 
1. Intellectual Property Rights and Counterfeiting Initiative (since 2006) 
2. High Level Group on Competitiveness, Energy and the Environment (2006-2007)  
3. External Aspects of Competitiveness and Market Access (since 2006)  
4. New Legislative Simplification Programme (2005-2008)  
5. Improving Sectoral Skills (since 2005)  
6. Managing Structural Change in Manufacturing (since 2005)  
7. Integrated European Approach to Industrial Research and Innovation (since 2006)  
In addition to these cross-sectoral initiatives, a number of new political sector-specific 
initiatives were identified, based on their nature or particular importance (the full list is in 
Annex II of the Communication, COM(2005) 0474). Sectoral initiatives existing before the 
issue of this Communication include:  
- Follow-up to CARS 21 High Level Group on the automotive industry 
- LeaderSHIP 2015 
- Follow-up to the STAR21 report of the European Advisory Group on Aerospace and the 
STAR21 Communication (COM(2003) 600) 
- High Level Group on textiles and clothing 
 
As part of the renewed Lisbon Partnership for Growth and Jobs strategy (in 2007), EU 
industrial policy was geared towards more sustainable production and consumption, 
                                           
31  The first was a document regarding industrial policy in the enlarged EU “Industrial Policy in an Enlarged 
Europe” (European Commission, COM 2002, 714). The second document was a communication from the 
Commission on “Some Key Issues in Europe's Competitiveness" (European Commission, COM(2003) 704 final). 
The third document was a communication on “Fostering Structural Change: an Industrial Policy for an Enlarged 
Europe” (European Commission, COM (2004) 274). Finally, a communication dated 2005 (European 
Commission, COM (2005) 474 final), entitled “Implementing the Community Lisbon Programme: a Policy 
Framework to Strengthen EU Manufacturing - Towards a more Integrated Approach for Industrial Policy,” 
proposed a taxonomy of clusters of sectors to assess and fine-tune industrial policies. 
32  The term “matrix approach” appears for the first time in the Report on the Competitiveness of Manufacturing 
2005 provided by WIFO and partners for the EC. 
33  See Aiginger and Sieber, (2006), Warwick, K. (2013), “Beyond Industrial Policy: Emerging Issues and New 
Trends”, OECD Science, Technology and Industry Policy Papers, No. 2, OECD Publishing. 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/5k4869clw0xp-en. 
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focusing on renewable energies and low-carbon and resource-efficient products, services 
and technologies. In this regard, a number of measures were adopted by the Commission 
in the following years34.  
 Fifth Phase 
As of March 2010 industrial policy has been explicitly related to macroeconomics goals. 
Industrial policy is redefined for industrialised countries as a strategy to promote “high–
road competitiveness” understood as the ability of an economy to achieve “beyond-GDP” 
goals, (Aiginger, 2014). In March 2010 industrial policy became a flagship of the Europe 
2020 strategy (replacing the Lisbon strategy)35. The flagship initiative ‘An industrial Policy 
for the Globalisation Era’ aims to promote European industrial competitiveness, thus placing 
more emphasis on factors such as the growth of SMEs, the supply and management of raw 
materials and well-paid jobs. It encompasses a whole range of EU policies such as 
competition, trade, innovation and energy and puts special emphasis on industrial property 
rights.  
The main milestones are:  
1) The Commission communication ‘Industrial Policy: Reinforcing Competitiveness’ 
(COM(2011) 0642), adopted on 14 October 2011, calling for deep structural reforms 
as well as coherent and coordinated policies across the Member States points out 
several key areas: Smart Regulation, access to finance, single market etc.   
 
2) Commission Communication "A Stronger European Industry for Growth and 
Economic Recovery" (COM(2012) 582/3). Focusing on four pillars as means of 
promoting industrial competitiveness: investments in innovation, better market 
conditions, access to finance and capital, and human capital and skills. As far as 
investment in innovation is concerned, the focus is on six priority action lines 
selected after public consultation: advanced manufacturing technologies for clean 
production; key enabling technologies; bio-based products; sustainable industrial 
and construction policy and raw materials; clean vehicles and vessels; smart grids. 
For each of these priority lines, a specialised partnership, made up of relevant 
Commission services, and involving key stakeholders (industry, labour unions, 
observers, etc.) was established to ensure the timely delivery of reforms  
(see Box 4).  
 
3) a new communication was adopted on 22 January 2014 as a contribution to the 
2014 European Council debate on industrial policy, called ‘For a European Industrial 
Renaissance’ (COM(2014) 0014). One of the key messages of the new 
communication is that Europe needs to urgently lay the basis for post-crisis growth 
and modernisation. To achieve this, the Commission calls on Member States to 
recognise the central importance of industry for creating jobs and growth, and of 
mainstreaming industry-related competitiveness concerns across all policy areas. 
 
                                           
34  These include ‘An Industrial Property Rights Strategy for Europe’ (COM(2008) 465 final), ‘Sustainable 
Consumption and Production and Sustainable Industrial Policy Action Plan’ (COM(2008) 0397), ‘The Raw 
Materials Initiative’ (COM(2008) 0699), ‘Preparing for Our Future: Developing a Common Strategy for Key 
Enabling Technologies in the EU’ (COM(2009) 0512). 
35  Out of the seven flagship initiatives, four are especially relevant to making the EU’s industry more competitive: 
‘Innovation Union’ (COM(2010) 0546), ‘A Digital Agenda for Europe’ (COM(2010) 0245), ‘An Industrial Policy 
for the Globalisation Era’ (COM(2010) 0614) and ‘New Skills for New Jobs’ (COM(2008) 0868). 
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Box 4. Specialised partnership established in the context of  
COM(2012) 582/3 
 The task force on advanced manufacturing technologies address related issues by 
providing support for market oriented pre-competitive research in manufacturing and in 
process development via public-private partnerships (‘Factories of the future’ and 
‘SPIRE’)36. It also supports demand for advanced manufacturing technologies, e.g. by 
organising matchmaking events and awareness-raising activities on advanced 
manufacturing technologies for clean production. 
 The task force on clean vehicles is addressing these issues by contributing to policy 
initiatives such as  developing and harmonising at global level type-approval legislation 
for electric and fuel cell vehicles making them at least as safe as those with a traditional 
powertrain; by publishing guidelines on financial incentives that will serve as a reference 
for Member States wishing to introduce demand-side measures promoting clean and 
energy-efficient vehicles. 
 The task force on bio-based products started work by informing public purchasers and 
raising their awareness. A compilation of lists and databases of bio-based products is 
now available. Standardisation is in progress in different areas ranging from 
nomenclature, via measuring bio-based contents, to sustainability assessment and 
certification of bio-based products. 
 The task force of Key Enabling Technology aims to leverage the funding instruments at 
the EU’s disposal. The priorities of Horizon 2020, the Structural Funds and the European 
Investment Bank have been aligned to support the deployment of KETs into products 
and services. In February 2013 a memorandum of understanding was signed between 
the European Commission and the European Investment Bank with the aim of improving 
access to finance for investments in KETs. 
 The Task force on sustainable construction set up a high-level forum and five thematic 
groups, involving more than 150 representatives from national administrations and 
sector associations in order to streamline and coordinate various initiatives currently 
underway at EU, national and sectoral levels with respect to the strategy.  
 With the help of industry stakeholders, the smart grids Task force identified a number of 
areas requiring policy attention in order to speed up the deployment of smart grids and 
is in the process of recommending actions to be taken in these areas. Amongst others, 
the policy actions suggested by the members of the expert group include actions to 
promote investment in smart appliances and legislative action (Directive/Regulation) for 
low voltage side networks.  
 
“A number of key priorities are raised for consideration and for policy guidance at the 
highest political level, the European Council: to continue deepening the mainstreaming of 
industrial competitiveness in other policy areas; to maximise the potential of the 
internal market; to decisively implement the instruments of regional development with 
national and EU instruments in support of innovation, skills, and entrepreneurship; to 
encourage investment, businesses require access to critical inputs; to further facilitate 
the integration of EU firms in global value chains; to endorse reindustrialisation efforts 
in line with the Commission’s aspiration of raising the contribution of industry to GDP to as 
much as 20% by 2020.” (COM(2014) 0014). 
The new Investment Plan worth more than €300 billion proposed at the end of 2014 for 3 
years by the new President of the European Commission takes place in this context. Based 
                                           
36  SPIRE: Sustainable Process Industry through Resource and Energy Efficiency. 
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on initial public EU investment worth €21 billion (corresponding to funds already allocated 
to programmes such as Connecting Europe Facility, Horizon 2020 as well as a contribution 
from the European Investment Bank), it is expected to leverage private investment up to 
€300 billion. It raises expectations concerning the intention of the European Commission to 
engage an active growth strategy based on public and private investments.  
Overall, in this phase, industrial policy merged with innovation policy and environmental 
policy has become a subset of a broader design for post-crisis growth and modernisation in 
Europe.  
3.2. Policy fields and means of action 
This section carries out a detailed inventory of the different initiatives taken at EU level that 
contribute (explicitly or not) to an EU industrial policy. It distinguishes between policies and 
programmes for which a budgetary endowment is granted, and initiatives aimed at steering 
Member States’ actions on an imposed basis, but without any financial contribution. The 
result is a detailed picture of the areas of intervention, the means mobilised and the weight 
of the EC’s influence in these areas. 
3.2.1. Initiatives with a budget envelope  
The European Union has put an increasing share of its policy, regulatory and financial 
levers at the disposal of Member States, regions and industry to foster investment in 
innovation and to enhance competitiveness. For the period 2014-2020 the EU is committed 
to investing up to €960 billion37, of which around 87% will be addressed to implementing 
the EU 2020 strategy through the objectives of smart, inclusive and sustainable growth38.  
Figure 8: EU budget 2014-2020 by financial headings, in commitment 
appropriations (%), price 2011 
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Source: Authors’ processing of EU data39 
The EU 2020 strategy allocates a significant amount of resources to initiatives directly and 
indirectly contributing to the achievement of the EU industrial policy’s objectives.  
The table below provides a snapshot of the main programmes and initiatives expected to 
contribute to improving European competitiveness and which, as such, form part of an “EU 
industrial policy”.  
                                           
37  €908.4 billion in payments (0.95% EU GNI). Source: European Commission (2013), Multiannual Financial 
Framework 2014-2020 and EU budget 2014: the figures, Brussels.  
38  €450.7 billion will be allocated to smart and inclusive growth and €373.2 billion to sustainable growth  
(2011 prices).  
39  on http://ec.europa.eu/budget/mff/figures/index_en.cfm?viewas=table.  
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Table 2. Relevant programmes from an industrial policy perspective  
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Horizon 
2020 
 
77 
billion 
(56%) 
KET  6.6 
billion 
Research and 
Innovation 
Innovation  
SME instrument 2.8 
billion 
Research and 
Innovation 
SMEs/ICT 
Eurostars 287 
million 
Research and 
Innovation 
SMEs Internationalisation 
Fast track to innovation 200 
million 
Research and 
Innovation 
Research and innovation 
SILC II 20 
million 
Research and 
Innovation 
Technological/non-technological 
innovation 
Connecting 
Europe 
Facility 
19.3 
billion 
(15%) 
Energy infrastructure 5.1 
billion 
Connect Energy connections - Single 
Market  
Broadband infrastructure 1 billion Connect Digital connections - Single Market 
Transport infrastructure 13.2 
billion 
Connect Transport connections 
COSME 2 billion 
 (2%) 
Access to finance 163 
million 
Enterprise and 
Industry 
Loan guarantee facility, equity 
financial instruments, 
Access to market  
(e.g. EEN) 
57 
million 
Enterprise and 
Industry 
Internationalisation 
 
Framework conditions (e.g. 
SBA performance review, 
REFIT, etc.) 
34 
million 
Enterprise and 
Industry 
Simplification measures 
Entrepreneurship 9 million Enterprise and 
Industry 
Entrepreneurship  
EaSI 815 
million 
 (1%) 
Progress 497.1 
million 
DG Employment, 
Social Affairs and 
Inclusion 
Employment  
EURES 146.7 
million 
DG Employment, 
Social Affairs and 
Inclusion 
Employment services 
European Progress 
Microfinance Facility 
171.1 
million 
DG Employment, 
Social Affairs and 
Inclusion 
Microfinance  
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 EU 
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Urban Policy 
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Community 
Agriculture 
Policy 
(CAP) – 
Pillar II 
84.9 
billion 
(23%) 
European Agricultural Fund for 
Rural Development (EAFRD) 
84.9 DG Agriculture and 
rural development 
Diversification and development of 
non-agricultural SMEs in rural area 
European 
Maritime 
Affairs and 
Fisheries 
6.6 
billion 
(2%) 
European Maritime and Fisheries 
Fund (EMFF) 
6.6 billion DG Maritime 
Affairs and 
Fisheries  
Fishing industry – adaptation to 
changing conditions 
Source: Authors 
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In quantitative terms, the primary instrument at the disposal of the EU to foster European 
competitiveness appears to be the Cohesion Policy, under the heading Economic Social and 
Territorial Cohesion. In turn, the heading Competitiveness for Growth and Jobs includes 
initiatives relevant for industry such as the “Key Enabling Technologies” Programme, the 
SME instrument, the Connecting Europe Facility Programme and the programme for 
Competitiveness of Enterprises and SMEs (COSME). The most important initiatives are 
described in some details below.  
ESIF/Cohesion Policy 
A contribution to the achievement of EU industrial priorities is provided by the European 
Structural and Investment Funds (ESIF)40 under the headings of Economic, Social and 
Territorial Cohesion and Sustainable Growth and Natural Resources. Roughly 99% of the 
heading Economic, Social and Territorial Cohesion (around €322 billion) will be allocated to 
European regions in the framework of Cohesion Policy through the ERDF, ESF and Cohesion 
Fund41.  
Through the principle of thematic concentration, the Commission will allow the 
concentration of ESIF funds in the EU 2020 flagships initiatives, which include Industrial 
Policy. These investments will be guided by the concept of “Smart Specialisation”  
(see box below) to allow Member States and regions to concentrate investments on their 
competitive advantages and to encourage the creation of cross-European value chains. 
                                           
40  Including the European Regional Development Fund (ERDF), the European Social Fund (ESF), the Cohesion 
Fund (CF), the European Agricultural Guarantee Fund (EAFG), the European Agriculture Fund for Rural 
Development (EAFRD), and the European Maritime and Fisheries Fund (EMFF). 
41  Transnational Cooperation Regions will benefit from the support of the ERDF, while more developed, transition 
and less developed regions will be supported both by ERDF and ESF. The Cohesion Fund will only target 
Transition Regions. 
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Box 5. The principles of Smart Specialisation 
The notion of smart specialisation establishes a link between regional policy and the 
Innovation Union of the EU 2020 agenda. It is a strategic approach to economic 
development through targeted support for research and innovation. It was announced in 
the 'Innovation Union' flagship initiative of the Europe 2020 Strategy as the key action of 
Cohesion Policy in the field of innovation. The legal basis of the smart specialisation can be 
found in Regulation (EU) 1301/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 
December 2013, which provides the following definition:  
“Smart specialisation strategy means national or regional innovation strategies which set 
priorities in order to build competitive advantages by developing and matching research 
and innovation own strengths to business needs in order to address emerging opportunities 
and market developments in a coherent manner, while avoiding duplication and 
fragmentation of efforts. A smart specialisation strategy may take the form of, or be 
included in, a national or regional research and innovation (R&I) strategic policy 
framework. Smart specialisation strategies shall be developed through involving national or 
regional managing authorities and stakeholders such as universities and other higher 
education institutions, industry and social partners in an entrepreneurial discovery 
process”.  
The development of "research and innovation strategies for smart specialisation" was 
proposed as a pre-condition for countries and regions availing themselves of the ERDF and 
EAFRD with the aim of maximising the impact of EU investments. The idea is to focus on 
what regions (already) do best, and do it better by combining existing innovation from 
underlying regional strengths and assets (e.g. existing competitive advantages). It is not 
necessarily about specialisation, rather about helping to create innovation that may end up 
linked to an existing industrial structure and which focuses only on a few priorities and thus 
creates sufficient critical mass to actually make a difference. More than EUR 40 billion is 
expected to be channelled into Smart Specialisation from community funds, leveraging 
funds from the public sector and the private sector, too.  
Source: Authors. 
Of the ESI Funds, the ERDF will specifically focus its investments on the first four of the 11 
thematic priorities of the Cohesion Policy (see box below) that directly and indirectly relate 
to industrial policy, namely innovation and research, the digital agenda, support for SMEs 
and a low-carbon economy. Around €100 billion will be dedicated to these thematic 
priorities, of which €26.7 billion will support the shift to a low-carbon economy  
(energy efficiency and renewable energies).  
In particular, 80% of the ERDF allocation for more developed regions, 60% of that for 
transition regions and 50% of that for less developed regions will be concentrated on at 
least two of these four priorities. The Cohesion Fund will also support infrastructure projects 
(including digital infrastructure) under the Connecting Europe Facility, as discussed above. 
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Box 6.  Thematic objectives of Cohesion Policy  
THEMATIC OBJECTIVES OF THE 2014-2020 COHESION POLICY  
(1) strengthening research, technological development and innovation; 
(2) enhancing access to, and the use and quality of, ICT; 
(3) enhancing the competitiveness of SMEs, of the agricultural sector (for the EAFRD) and 
of the fisheries and aquaculture sector (for the EMFF); 
(4) supporting the shift towards a low-carbon economy in all sectors; 
(5) promoting climate change adaptation, risk prevention and management; 
(6) preserving and protecting the environment and promoting resource efficiency; 
(7) promoting sustainable transport and removing bottlenecks in key network 
infrastructures; 
(8) promoting sustainable and quality employment and supporting labour mobility; 
(9) promoting social inclusion, combating poverty and any kind of discrimination; 
(10) investing in education, training and vocational training for skills and lifelong learning; 
(11) enhancing the institutional capacity of public authorities and stakeholders and efficient 
public administration. 
Source: Authors 
The role of the ESF with regard to industrial policy will be to support the implementation of 
active labour market policies. The EC Communication on integrated industrial policy42 calls 
for close coordination between the public sector and industrial partners in education and 
training policies. The number of medium-skilled workers also needs to match the demand 
from fast-growing industries such as the environmental and energy sectors. 
Horizon 2020 
With a budget of about €70.2 billion, Horizon 2020 is the financial instrument (replacing 
the Seventh Framework Programme) addressing the implementation of the EU 2020 
flagship ‘Innovation Union’, and thus securing Europe's global competitiveness. The Horizon 
2020 Programme will contribute to the achievement of EU industrial policy43 goals through 
its industrial leadership pillar. Important programmes are the EU Strategy for Key Enabling 
Technologies (KETs)44 and the SME instrument.   
 Support for key enabling technologies. The programme is expected to redefine 
global value chains, enhance resource efficiency and reshape the international 
division of labour. A budget of €6.6 billion has been earmarked to finance KETs of 
photonics, micro- and nano-electronics, nanotechnologies, advanced materials, 
biotechnology and advanced manufacturing and processing. To facilitate the 
commercialisation of research results, Horizon 2020 is also committed to financing 
                                           
42  European Commission (2010), Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, 
the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions: An Integrated Industrial 
Policy for the Globalisation Era Putting Competitiveness and Sustainability at Centre Stage. COM(2010) 614.  
43 ‘ An Integrated Industrial Policy for the Globalisation Era’ (COM(2010) 614). 
44  Preparing for our future: Developing a Common Strategy for Key Enabling Technologies in the EU’ (COM(2009) 
512); and ‘A European strategy for Key Enabling Technologies – A Bridge to Growth and Jobs’  
(COM(2012) 341). 
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more closer-to-market prototypes and demonstration projects than to date. Also, 
space research is identified as one of Europe's 'key industrial technologies' with a 
potential for enabling EU innovation and competitiveness. In this regard, the 
programme is committed to fostering a cost-effective, competitive and innovative 
space industry (including SMEs) by supporting the development of innovative space 
technologies and operational concepts (from the project idea to demonstration in 
space). A key element of the Horizon 2020 Programme is to join forces with the 
private sector through public-private partnerships in key industrial domains, so as to 
leverage further private investments.  
 SME instrument managed by the Executive Agency for SMEs (EASME)45. More than 
€2.8 billion has been allocated for the SME instrument from 2014 to 2020, 
representing around 7% of the total budget of the Societal Challenges and 
Leadership in Enabling and Industrial Technologies (LEIT) blocks of Horizon 2020. Of 
this total amount, €90 million has been allocated for ICT in 2014 and 2015. The SME 
instrument comes in addition to the support provided through the participation of 
SMEs in collaborative projects continued within Horizon 2020, as well as other 
measures related to SMEs, such as the Eurostars programme.  
 
Other programmes are the Eurostars programme aimed at R&D-performing SMEs that 
wish to exploit the benefits that come with international collaboration; the Fast Track to 
Innovation (FTI) scheme, which provides funding for close-to-market, business driven 
projects that is open to proposals in any area of technology or application; and SILC 
(Sustainable Industry Low Carbon), a practical, industry-based initiative aimed at 
finding technological and non-technological innovation measures that would allow energy-
intensive manufacturing and processing industries to reduce the GHG emissions of their 
production processes while maintaining their competitiveness.  
Connecting Europe Facility 
The Connecting Europe Facility - with a budget of around €19.3 billion - is a further key 
EU instrument financing targeted infrastructure investments. Over the 2014-2020 period 
€5.1 billion will be allocated to finance energy infrastructures, €1 billion for broadband 
infrastructures and €13.2 billion for transport infrastructures (of which €10 million will be 
earmarked from the Cohesion Fund). Energy, transport and digital connections are 
expected to create a truly integrated Single Market enabling both citizens and businesses to 
be connected. In particular, as part of the ‘Digital Agenda’ flagship initiative of the EU2020 
strategy, the CEF programme supports the deployment of fast and ultrafast broadband 
networks and their uptake, including by SMEs. It also promotes the interconnection and 
interoperability of digital service infrastructures as well as access to such networks, 
including ‘Safer Internet for Children’, ‘eProcurement’, ‘Open Data’, ‘Multilingual’, ‘eHealth’ 
and ‘eID’. 
                                           
45  Over the period 2014-2020 EASME will manage, on behalf of the European Commission: most of COSME, 
including Enterprise Europe Network (EEN), Your Europe Business and the European IPR Helpdesk; part of 
Horizon 2020, and in particular the SME instrument; the Energy Efficiency part of the challenge ‘Secure, Clean 
and Efficient Energy’; calls for proposals in the fields of waste, water innovation and sustainable supply of raw 
materials under the challenge ‘Climate action, Environment, Resource Efficiency and Raw Materials’; some 
areas of the ‘Industrial Leadership’ challenge, part of the Leadership in Enabling and Industrial Technologies; 
innovation in SMEs; the Sustainable Industry Low Carbon Scheme (SILCII); the EU programme for the 
Environment and Climate action (LIFE); part of the European Maritime and Fisheries Fund (EMFF); the legacy 
of the Intelligent Energy – Europe programme; the legacy of the Eco-innovation initiative. 
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The latest European Commission Report on the targets achieved by the Digital Agenda46 
shows, for instance, that there are some areas where progress is insufficient  
(see Figure 9).  
 
Figure 9: How the EU scores on the Digital Agenda targets 
 
Source: http://ec.europa.eu/digital-agenda/en/digital-agenda-scoreboard.   
COSME 
In addition to Horizon 2020, another EU measure that is relevant for industrial policy is the 
COSME Programme managed by DG Enterprise and Industry, which aims to boost 
competiveness for growth and jobs in Europe. The Programme is expected to continue on 
the path set out by the Competitiveness and Innovation Framework Programme (CIP) 
during the 2007-2013 programming period47. With a proposed budget of €2 billion, it is 
                                           
46  European Commission (2014), Digital Agenda Targets Progress Report: Digital Agenda Scoreboard, 
https://ec.europa.eu/digital-agenda/en/news/scoreboard-2014-progress-report-digital-agenda-targets-2014 
47  CIP included three sub-programmes – the Entrepreneurship and Innovation Programme (EIP), the Information 
and Communication Technology Policy Support Programme (ICT-PSP) and the Intelligent Energy Europe 
Programme (IEE). According to the CIP Performance Report (published in March 2012), with an overall budget 
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estimated that COSME will contribute to an annual increase of €1.1 billion for the EU’s GDP 
through a leverage effect. According to the 2015 COSME work programme, a budget of 
€264 million will finance 27 actions under the Programme’s four objectives, namely: 
i. improving access to finance for SMEs in the form of equity and debt; 
ii. improving access to markets, particularly inside the Union, but also at a 
global level;  
iii. improving framework conditions for the competitiveness and sustainability of 
Union enterprises, particularly SMEs, including the tourism sector; 
iv. promoting entrepreneurship and an entrepreneurial culture. 
Employment and Social Innovation (EaSI) 
Resources for the industry sector will also be provided by the EaSI programme (the 
proposed budget amounts to €815 million for the 2014-2020 period), which integrates and 
extends three existing programmes, namely Progress (Programme for Employment and 
Social Solidarity), EURES (European Employment Services) and European Progress 
Microfinance Facility48.  
Additionally, under the heading of Sustainable Growth (see Figure 8 above), the European 
Union will direct around €373.2 billion of its budget to exploiting the potential of its 
environmental goods and to helping industries to become more sustainable. A very 
significant share will be dedicated to the First Pillar of the Common Agriculture Policy (CAP), 
but a share will also be dedicated to SMEs in rural areas and in the fisheries sector (through 
the European Agriculture Fund for Rural Development (EAFRD)49, and the European 
Maritime and Fisheries Fund (EMFF), respectively).  
Lastly, the overall picture should be completed by mentioning the significant means 
available from the European Investment Bank (see Box 7 below).  
                                                                                                                                       
of EUR 3.6 billion these sub-programmes have been helping the start-up and growth of SMEs throughbetter 
access to finance, offering business support services, creating a favourable environment for SME cross-border 
cooperation and promoting innovation. 
48  They will be allocated 61%, 18% and 21% of the budget, respectively. 
49  74% and 23% of the sustainable growth budget, respectively. 
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Box 7.  The contribution of the European Investment Group 
The European Investment Group – including European Investment Bank and the European 
Investment Fund – significantly stepped up its financial support in 2013 to promote growth 
and jobs in Europe. It provided around EUR 75.1 billion (an increase of 37% compared to 
2012). Access to finance was significantly enhanced for SMEs. The European Investment 
Bank signed loans worth EUR 18.5 billion for SMEs and mid-caps, while at the same time 
the European Investment Fund committed EUR 3.4 billion. This allowed the Group, together 
with private investment partners, to mobilise more than EUR 50 billion to support SMEs. 
Overall, a total of 230 000 companies employing 2.8 million people across Europe received 
direct or indirect support through EIB Group activity. In addition, the EIB Group focused on 
research and innovation, providing EUR 17.2 billion in financial support to increase the 
competitiveness of Europe’s economy. Also, in July 2013, the EIB launched a dedicated 
youth employment programme “Skills and Jobs – Investing for Youth” to complement 
Europe’s fight against youth unemployment. The programme had an initial lending volume 
of EUR 6 billion. 
Focusing on the European Investment Bank alone, it is worth noting that in 2013 there was 
project financing of EUR 72 billion in support of the objectives of the European Union, of 
which EUR 64 billion in the Member States of the Union and EUR 8 billion in the partner 
countries. The EIB provided around EUR 5.5 billion to industry and EUR 25.9 billion to credit 
lines.   
Source: http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_BEI-14-33_en.htm, http://www.eib.org/projects/loans/. 
3.2.2. Regulatory power 
To create a better environment for its manufacturing industry and to boost its 
competitiveness, the EU makes use of several regulatory binding instruments in different 
policy fields including: competition policy, internal market, research and innovation, 
trade policy, energy policy, and enhancing the business environment.  
Competition policy 
Both industrial and competition policies share the same objective of improving the 
competitiveness of the industrial sector. Since the first policy communication, EU industrial 
policy has always emphasised the principle of market competition; on the other hand, the 
target of the competition policy – which is primarily the responsibility of DG Competition 
within the European Commission - is to protect the competition order favourable to 
industrial development. State aid prohibition, merger control5051 and antitrust policy5253 are 
the main instruments of the EU competition policy to enable companies to innovate and to 
increase their productivity and thereby to improve their position in the global market.  
                                           
50  Council Regulation (EC) No. 139/2004 of 20 January 2004 on the control of concentrations between 
undertakings (the EC Merger Regulation), Official Journal L 24, 29 January 2004, pp. 1-22. 
51  Consolidated version of Commission Regulation (EC) No. 802/2004 of 21 April 2004 implementing Council 
Regulation (EC) No. 139/2004 on the control of concentrations between undertakings (Text with EEA 
relevance) (the "Implementing Regulation") and its annexes (Form CO, Short Form CO, Form RS and Form 
RM) (Official Journal L 133, 30 April 2004, pp. 1-39), as amended by Commission Regulation (EC) No. 
1033/2008 (Official Journal L 279, 22 October 2008, pp. 3-12) and by Commission Implementing Regulation 
(EU) No. 1269/2013 of 5 December 2013 (Official Journal OJ L 336, 14 December 2013, pp. 1-36), more 
recent changes made to the text of the Implementing Regulation and to three of its annexes (the Form CO, 
Short Form CO and Form RS) as part of the Commission's Merger Simplification Package, which came into 
force on 1 January 2014.  
52  Between actual or potential competitors operating at the same level of the supply chain. 
53  Between firms operating at different levels, i.e. agreement between a manufacturer and its distributor. 
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State aid control, regulated under Arts. 107 and 108 of the TFEU, has an important bearing 
on the form an EU industrial policy takes, since it prohibits targeted public support. It is 
intended to avoid distortions in the Single Market and to ensure that subsidies promote the 
competitiveness of sectors and companies. The European Commission has strong 
investigative and decision-making powers in this field. To implement the Aid measures, 
Member States must indeed follow a notification procedure - except in certain instances54 - 
which requires the approval of the Commission. An ambitious state aid reform programme 
was set out by the European Commission in May 2012 in the “Communication on State Aid 
Modernisation (SAM)” which introduces reforms of state aid rules to foster the internal 
market and promote economic growth. Its objectives also include increasing the focus on 
those cases with the largest impact on the internal market, streamlining the rules and 
accelerating the decision-making process. The Commission proposed identifying common 
principles for assessing the compatibility of aid with the internal market and revising a 
series of state aid guidelines and regulations in order to make them consistent with those 
common principles, including rules concerning investments in research, development and 
innovation by SMEs and rules regulating SMEs’ access to finance55. The SAM initiative and 
its objectives are strongly supported by the European Parliament, which, in January 2013, 
adopted a resolution on state aid modernisation. The latter underlines the need for less but 
better targeted state aid that will support the shift to a knowledge economy. The resolution 
also called on the Commission to provide detailed criteria for distinguishing between 
important and less important state aid cases.  
Internal market 
Since Maastricht, the Internal Market has constituted a key instrument for achieving a 
competitive Europe. The Commission provided new impetus to market integration across 
the EU through the Single Market Acts I and II and initiatives such as the market 
surveillance and product safety package. In particular, the Single Market Act II put forward 
four actions56 to foster the development of maritime, air and rail transport, as well as an 
initiative to strengthen the implementation and enforcement of the Third Energy Package to 
liberalise and integrate European energy markets.  
The fact that the internal market is not fully integrated (especially in terms of services) is 
considered to be an important factor holding back productivity gains. In this regard, it is 
worth stressing that in order to foster the smooth functioning of the internal market, the 
European Commission obliged Member States to implement the Service Directive57 by 28 
December 2009. The Service Directive for European industrial competitiveness is relevant 
because the simplification measures foreseen by the Directive significantly facilitate life and 
increase transparency for SMEs and consumers when they want to provide or use services 
in the Single Market.  
                                           
54  These include: aid covered by a Block Exemption (giving automatic approval for a range of aid measures 
defined by the Commission), de minimis aid not exceeding €200,000 per undertaking over any period of three 
fiscal years (€100,000 in the road transport sector), aid granted under an aid scheme already authorised by 
the Commission).  
55  Other revisions include: rescue and restructuring aid; regional aid; agriculture; environmental and energy aid; 
promotion of important projects of common European interest; broadband; aviation guidelines; general block 
exemption regulation; enabling regulation; de minimis regulation.  
    See:http://ec.europa.eu/competition/state_aid/modernisation/index_en.html. 
56  Developing fully integrated networks in the Single Market; Fostering the mobility of citizens and businesses 
across borders; Supporting the digital economy across Europe; Strengthening social entrepreneurship, 
cohesion and consumer confidence. 
57  Directive 2006/123/EC of 12 December 2006 on services in the internal market.  
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Box 8. The implementation of the Service Directive 
As reported by a European Commission working document58, the implementation of the 
Service Directive has been challenging particularly because of its broad scope. It covers 
around 65% of service activities within the services sector. The activities covered represent 
around 45% of total EU GDP and employment. In addition, the Services Directive required 
Member States not only to assess and where necessary adjust their laws in many areas, 
but also to take very concrete and practical steps such as setting up Points of Single 
Contact and making administrative procedures available in electronic form. Significant 
progress has been made in this regard, but efforts still need to be stepped up to finalise the 
required changes in legislation and to set up fully operational Points of Single Contact.  
Source: Authors. 
The proper functioning of the Single Market is one of the objectives pursued by DG Internal 
Market and Services and DG Enterprise and Industry within the European Commission. 
While the former is entrusted with policies concerning the protection of intellectual property 
rights, the services sector and public procurement, the latter is committed to managing 
measures ensuring the free movement of goods in the internal market (required by arts. 34 
to 36 of the TFEU, which prohibit Member States from maintaining or imposing barriers on 
intra-EU trade in goods). 
 
                                           
58  European Commission (2012), Detailed Information on the Implementation of Directive 2006/123/EC on 
Services in the internal Market. Accompanying the Communication from the Commission to the European 
Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions on 
the implementation of the Services Directive. Brussels, 8 June 2012, SWD(2012) 148 final. A partnership for 
new growth in services 2012-2015 
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Box 9. The implementation of Single Market rules by Member States 
Single Market rules can have their intended effects if they are completely and correctly 
transposed into Member States’ national law by the agreed deadline. The figure below 
shows the results of the proper functioning of the Single Market as recorded by the 
monitoring of transposition on the basis of five indicators, namely: 1) the transposition 
deficit (the gap between the number of Single Market directives adopted at EU level and 
those in force in Member States); 2) progress over the last six months (measuring changes 
in outstanding directives); 3) number of directives overdue by two years or longer; 4) 
delay in terms of transposition of overdue directives; and 5) the compliance deficit 
(number of incorrectly transposed directives). 
As shown in the figure below, countries such as Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, Romania and 
Slovenia still have deficits in the transposition of directives concerning the Single Market. 
Major delays in the transposition of directives are recorded by Belgium, Bulgaria, Ireland, 
Hungary, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Poland, Slovenia and Finland. In terms of 
compliance, under-performances are recorded in Italy, Poland, France, Spain, Czech 
Republic, Bulgaria and Belgium. 
 
Single market review: Performance overview 
BE BG CZ DK DE EE IE EL ES FR HR IT CY LV LT LU HU MT NL AT PL PT RO SI SK FI SE UK EU
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[5] 15 15 15 35 25 25 25 25 15 15 15 35 35 35 25 25 35 35 25 15 25 35 25 25 25 35 25 25
[1] Transposition deficit (in %) [2] Progress over the last 6 months (change in the outstanding directives)
[3] Number of directives two years or more overdue [4] Transposition delay on overdue directives (in months) [5] Compliance deficit (in %)
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15 Under Performance 25 Caution zone 35 Good Performance n/a  
Source: Authors’ processing59  
The latest traffic light chart shows that there are Member States that are still 
underperforming  in key Single Market policy areas, such as public procurement (see chart 
below). Only a few countries, including Denmark, Germany, Luxembourg, Finland and 
Sweden, record a performance above the average of the countries observed. 
 
Traffic light chart: public procurement 
BE BG CZ DK DE EE IE EL ES FR HR IT CY LV LT LU HU M T NL AT PL PT RO SI SK FI SE UK IS LI NO
25 25 15 35 35 25 25 15 25 25 15 15 15 25 35 15 25 25 25 15 15 15 15 15 35 35 25 35 35 35  
15 Below average 25 Average 35 Above average  
Source: Authors’ processing60 
                                           
59   http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/scoreboard/performance_by_governance_tool/transposition/index_en.ht
m Note: Indicator [1]: Measures the level of fulfilment with the 1% target established by the European 
Council: transposition deficits above 1% were rated as "red", those below or equal to 1% were "green"; no 
"yellow" designation. Indicator [2]: An increasing number of outstanding directives were given a "red" rating, 
with an unchanged number rated as "yellow" and a decreasing number as "green". Indicator [3]: Measures the 
level of fulfilment with the 0% target established by the European Council for directives overdue by two years 
or longer: one or more long overdue directives were rated "red"; those with no long overdue directives were 
rated "green"; no "yellow" rating was designated. Indicators [4] and [5]: An average (+/- 10 %) score was 
rated as "yellow"; a score below it as "red" and a score above it as "green". 
60  http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/scoreboard/performance_overview/index_en.htm. 
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Enhancing the business environment   
There are many business environment initiatives adopted by the European Commission to 
enable access to finance, support to new market openings and the boosting of 
entrepreneurship, skills upgrading and innovation. The Small Business Act for Europe 
(SBA) – launched in June 2008 and monitored by DG Enterprise and Industry - is one 
example. At the heart of the European SBA is the idea that achieving the best possible 
framework conditions for SMEs depends mostly on the recognition of entrepreneurs by 
society. Therefore, the aim of the SBA is to improve the overall policy approach to 
entrepreneurship, to irreversibly anchor the “Think Small First” principle in policymaking 
from regulation to public service, and to promote SMEs’ growth by helping them tackle the 
remaining problems that hamper their development. The “Think Small First” principle 
specifically calls for legislation to take into account the needs of small businesses and 
dedicates particular attention to micro-enterprises and the specific challenges they face 
especially during the start-up phase. It lays down real, binding, legal rules, such as three 
days and EUR 100 to set up a business, 30 days to obtain a trading permit, and shorter 
deadlines for recovering debts.  
Box 10. The ten principles of SBA 
1. Create an environment in which entrepreneurs and family businesses can thrive 
and entrepreneurship is rewarded 
2. Ensure that honest entrepreneurs who have faced bankruptcy quickly get a 
second chance 
3. Design rules according to the “Think Small First” principle 
4. Make public administrations responsive to SMEs’ needs 
5. Adapt public policy tools to SMEs’ needs: facilitate SMEs’ participation in public 
procurement and better use State Aid possibilities for SMEs 
6. Facilitate SMEs’ access to finance and develop a legal and business environment 
supportive of timely payments in commercial transactions 
7. Help SMEs to benefit more from the opportunities offered by the Single Market 
8. Promote the upgrading of skills in SMEs and all forms of innovation 
9. Enable SMEs to turn environmental challenges into opportunities 
10. Encourage and support SMEs to benefit from the growth of markets   
Source: Authors. 
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Box 11. SME performance review 
The recent SME Performance Review 2013/201461 recognises that specific measures for 
improving the SME business environment play an important enabling role in ensuring that 
SMEs are able to reap the full benefits of a return to solid and sustainable macroeconomic 
growth. However, there are still key issues and challenges currently faced by SMEs, which 
hamper their growth and competitiveness. Amongst the 10 principles of the Small Business 
Act, SMEs find significant challenges in meeting requirements in terms of Accessing 
Finance, Entrepreneurship, Responsive Administration, Skills and Innovation. Under Access 
to Finance, credits or loans and the excessive bureaucratic procedures to access EU funds 
have been identified as the main barriers. As far as Entrepreneurship is concerned, the lack 
of financial support measures was the main underlying barrier, which also correlates to the 
Access to Finance. For Responsive Administration, the main challenge is the administrative 
burden, and more specifically the difficulty in managing all of the administrative 
requirements and requests from various authorities. Finally, issues related to the Skills and 
Innovation principle focused on the lack of strategic support in converting an innovative 
idea into a commercial product/process/service. 
Most challenging SBA principles to SMEs at national level – EU28 
49%
35%
46%
32%
66%
12%
46%
16%
42%
51%
65%
54%
68%
34%
88%
54%
84%
58%
0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100%
Entrepreneurship
Second Chance
Responsive Administration
State Aid and Public Procurement
Access to Finance
Single Market
Skills and Innovation
Environment
Internationalisation
% Yes-significant challenge % No-significant challenge  
Source: Authors processing of European Commission data (2014) 
Overall, the number of SBA-related policy measures adopted/implemented during 2013-
2014 in EU28 was slightly higher than the previous reference period (422 measures), but 
still lower than the 2011-2012 reference period, during which 735 measures were 
adopted/implemented. The highest policy progress was recorded for measures related to 
Access to Finance (116), followed by Entrepreneurship (83), and Skills & Innovation (57), 
while Single Market and Second Chance were the two laggard principles, with only 8 and 
15 measures, respectively. 
If reporting the total number of measures adopted/implemented for each SBA principle (by 
dividing with the number of existing sub-measures), it is worth noting that Access to 
Finance (13) still remained at the top, followed by Internationalisation (10), 
Entrepreneurship (8.3), Skills and Innovation (8), and Responsive Administration (6).  
On the basis of the challenges and issues recognised above, it should be pointed out that 
during the 2013-2014 reference period Access to Finance, Entrepreneurship, Skills & 
Innovation, Responsive Administration and Internationalisation had the highest 
implementation rate. 
 
                                           
61  European Commission (2014), A Partial and Fragile Recovery: Annual report on European SMEs 2013/2014. 
SMEs performance review 2013/2014. http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/policies/sme/facts-figures-
analysis/performance-review/files/supporting-documents/2014/annual-report-smes-2014_en.pdf  
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Number of policy measures adopted/implemented in EU28 per SBA principle 
2011/2014 
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4. Responsive Administration
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7. Single Market
8. Skills and Innovation
9. Environment
10. Internationalisation
2011/2012 2012/2013 2013/2014   
Source: Authors processing of European Commission data (2014) 
Source: Authors 
 
As part of the simplification process, in October 2013 the European Commission launched 
the ‘Regulatory Fitness and Performance Programme’ (REFIT)62, whose aim was to 
simplify and reduce regulatory burdens in existing legislation, with a particularly focus on 
supporting SMEs. Overall 100 actions were identified and are currently being implemented. 
Examples include the introduction of a standard EU VAT Declaration,63 the improvement of 
the European small claims procedure64, the amended Directive on recognition of 
professional qualifications (facilitating access to information), a new legal framework for 
public procurement65 (including shorter deadlines for procedures, the possibility of 
modifying contracts, better access for SMEs, etc.), and the intellectual property rights 
Regulation (EU Regulation 608/2013). Several legislative changes have been introduced to 
facilitate the access of enterprises, particularly SMEs, to finance. The Late Payments 
Directive66 is one example. Additionally, there are the Capital Requirements Regulations 
including a correcting factor lowering the capital requirements related to credit risk on 
exposures to SMEs; the revised Market in Financial Instruments Directive (MiFID) aimed at 
creating dedicated trading platforms labelled "SME growth markets"; the revised 
Transparency Directive abolishing the requirement to publish quarterly financial 
                                           
62  European Commission (2014), Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, 
the European Economic and Social Committee of the Regions. Regulatory Fitness and Performance Programme 
(REFIT): State of Play and Outlook (SWD, 2014, 192 final).  
63  European Commission (2013), Proposal for a Council Directive amending Directive 2006/112/EC on the 
Common  System of Value Added Tax as regards a Standard VAT Return, Brussels, 23 October 2013, 
COM(2013) 721 final.  
64  European Commission (2013), Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council 
amending Regulation (EC) No. 861/2007 of the European Parliament and the Council of 11 July 2007 
establishing a European Small Claims Procedure and Regulation (EC) No. 1896/2006 of the European 
Parliament and of the Council of 12 December 2006 creating a European order for payment procedure, 
Brussels, 19 November 2013, COM(2013) 794 final.  
65  The existing public procurement legislation (Directive 2004/17/EC) has recently been revised. The new 
directives (Directive 2014/24/EU, Directive 2014/25/EU) were voted by the European Parliament on 15 
January 2014 and adopted by the Council on 11 February 2014. The Member States have until April 2016 to 
transpose the new rules into their national law (except with regard to e-procurement, where the deadline is 
September 2018). 
66  European Directive 2011/7/EU on combating late payment in commercial transactions of 16 February 2011. 
The directive requires debtors to pay interest and the reasonable recovery costs of the creditor if they do not 
pay for goods or services on time. The limits are 60 days for businesses and 30 days for public authorities.  
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information; and the new rules on European Venture Capital Funds and European Social 
Entrepreneurship Funds creating a special EU passport for fund managers investing in start-
up SMEs and social businesses. 
Box 12. Member State reforms in the area of business environment 
The EC report on the implementation of EU industrial policy67 confirms that Member States 
are continuously implementing reforms in the area of business environment and 
entrepreneurship. Roughly 771 reforms took place over the period 2001-2008 and 351 
over the period 2009-2011. More than a third of these reforms concern administrative 
regulation (including measures to rationalise and reduce costs, improve quality and 
promote e-government) which have increased over recent years (by an annual average of 
44% over the period 2009-2011). However, a significant increase was recorded also for 
measures concerning access to finance (+25% annual average growth 2009-2011), 
followed by measures supporting businesses. 
Yearly average number of Member States’ reforms in the business environment 
and entrepreneurship 
 Annual 
average 
2001-2008 
Annual 
average 
2009-11 
% change  
Administrative regulation 35.3 44.7 26.7% 
Access to finance 8.5 25.0 194.1% 
Business support services 15.4 14.3 -6.8% 
Business taxation 12.6 11.3 -10.2% 
Reducing administrative burdens for start-ups 8.0 8.0 0.0% 
Access to finance for start-ups 10.3 5.0 -51.2% 
Efficiency of the legal system 2.9 3.7 72.5% 
Rules for a second start 2.1 3.7 72.5% 
Transfer of ownership 1.4 0.7 -51.5% 
Total 96.4 117.0 21.4% 
 
Source: Authors68. 
Intellectual property rights 
Also, optimising the regulatory environment for research and innovation can enhance 
the international competitiveness of EU industry. There are a number of EU regulatory 
instruments aimed at fostering the competitive advantage of EU enterprises and increasing 
profitability in global markets. The most emphasised and successful one is Intellectual 
Property Rights (IPRs) protection. These rights include patents, trademarks, design rights 
and copyrights. As of 1 January 2014 the relevant legal framework applicable for the 
customs enforcement of intellectual property rights is covered by EU Regulations 608/2013 
(basic regulation establishing the legislative framework for the enforcement of IPR) and 
1352/2013 (implementing regulation, establishing the forms to be used to request the 
enforcement of IPR by the customs authorities). DG Enterprise and Industry has launched 
                                           
67  European Commission (2013), Commission Staff Working Document, Industrial Performance Scoreboard and 
Member States’ Competitiveness Performance and Implementation of EU Industrial Policy: A European 2020 
initiative, Brussels. 
68  based on European Commission (2013), Commission Staff Working Document, Industrial Performance 
Scoreboard and Member States’ Competitiveness Performance and Implementation of EU Industrial Policy:  
A European 2020 initiative, Brussels. 
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different initiatives in the field of intellectual property rights (e.g. support to national 
intellectual property offices, improving their business support services for IPR, etc.)69.  
Trade policy 
The EU Trade policy conducted by DG Trade of the European Commission is designed to 
prevent the building of barriers to European exporters. Trade defence instruments, such as 
anti-dumping or anti-subsidy duties70, are ways of protecting European production against 
international trade distortions. With the aim of creating a favourable external competition 
environment for the manufacturing industry, the EU is pushing for the formation of 
industrial standards and the extension of Single Market rules to neighbouring and other 
countries71. Supporting SMEs’ economic activities outside the EU is also embedded in the 
Union’s overall competitiveness strategy as outlined in the Europe 2020 Communication on 
Industrial Policy and the EU 2010 Trade, Growth and World Affairs strategy72. The European 
Union is currently negotiating the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) 
with the United States with the aim of tackling the barriers behind the customs borders, 
such as differences in technical regulations, standards and approval procedures. 
Energy policy 
Pressure for a 'greener' industrial policy arises from the 20/20/20 energy goals and 
from the roadmap for 2050, which sets European goals to reduce greenhouse gases by 
80%-95% by 2050. There is some debate about whether environmental standards are an 
obstacle for a competitive manufacturing sector, or a potential driver of growth. Reducing 
greenhouse gas emissions, increasing energy efficiency and changing the energy mix from 
carbon based to "clean" energy (solar/wind) have become top priorities in the EU and these 
endeavours take on many different forms, including for instance: the Kyoto protocol, 
emission trading regimes, research programmes, the subsidisation of firms and households, 
energy taxes, taxes on the carbon content, and joint research programmes.  
3.3. Concluding remarks  
This chapter shows how the development of an EU industrial policy is characterised by a 
sort of path-dependency effect in which past strategic choices still have a bearing on 
present decisions. It appears clearly that the development of an industrial policy has not 
been on the EU policy agenda for long, and the relatively recent surge in interest is not 
matched by a corresponding purposive strategy. That said, the EU appears to have 
                                           
69  http://www.ipeuropaware.eu/ European Commission (2014), DG Internal Market and Services Management 
Plan 2014, http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/internal_market/docs/management-plan_en.pdf. According to the latest 
management plan of DG Internal Market and Services a major priority for the coming year in the area of 
intellectual property will be to finalise the review of the EU copyright system on the basis of in-depth 
preparatory work and legal and economic analysis.  
70  Council Regulation (EC) No. 1225/2009 of 30 November 2009 on protection against dumped imports from 
countries not members of the European Community; Council Regulation (EC) No. 597/2009 of 11 June 2009 on 
protection against subsidised imports from countries not members of the European Community.  
71  In this regard, a new Regulation on European Standardisation came into force on 1 January 2013 with direct 
applicable effects on Member States. Standardisation is seen as a key tool for achieving a more integrated and 
harmonised internal market and also for facilitating international trade and strengthening the competitiveness 
of SMEs, by facilitating the free movement of goods and services, network interoperability, means of 
communication, technological development and innovation.  
72  Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and 
Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions – "Trade, Growth and World Affairs – Trade Policy as a 
Core Component of the EU's 2020 Strategy", COM (2010) 612 final, 9 November 2010. Brussels: European 
Commission. 
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considerable resources at its disposal – both in financial terms and non-pecuniary – to 
contribute to restoring the competitiveness of its industrial basis. If taken separately, the 
initiatives reviewed show reasonable evidence of relative efficiency and effectiveness, the 
issue at stake is whether they form a whole triggering synergies able to make a difference 
in the definition of EU competitiveness level and growth paths. The next chapter takes the 
views of stakeholders and identifies their positions in this respect.  
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4. OPTIONS AND SCENARIOS 
KEY FINDINGS 
 The stakeholders interviewed acknowledge the fundamental importance of keeping a 
strong industrial basis in Europe as a source of development and resilience. 
However, the target of an EU industrial policy should not be too narrow; rather, it 
should encompass whole value chains and related sectors.  
 Business associations recognise the fundamental role that the EU plays in terms of 
“levelling the playing field”. By contrast, the added value of EU action put forward 
by EU policy stakeholders is when the EU fulfils the role of knowledge-broker, or 
knowledge platform. 
 Some stakeholders suggest better aligning conceptual underpinnings and 
intervention logics at the basis of policy developments in some areas, including, for 
example, environmental policy and other initiatives aimed at fostering 
competitiveness. Some initiatives are considered to be under-funded (e.g. the SME 
instrument) and achieving a critical mass is generally called for. 
 The notion of Smart Specialisation put forward by DG Regio is often endorsed by 
other policy stakeholders as a potentially pertinent model to underpin the 
development of an EU industrial policy. 
 The majority of respondents believe that a proper mandate in the field of industrial 
policy should be more clearly defined at EU level. 
 Member States are characterised by distinct socio-economic institutional features 
determining different growth paths, and contributing to shaping specific policy 
responses to varying types of challenges. This constitutes different incentives for 
Member States to take part in an active EU industrial policy. “Peripheral” Member 
States place high expectations on an EU industrial policy. 
 
This chapter explores options and identifies possible scenarios for the future development 
of an EU industrial policy. To this end, it turns to the interests at stake, and the institutions 
where these interests are mediated, and casts the analysis at the level of the perception 
that the main stakeholders have of an EU industrial policy. The hypothesis is that besides 
rational arguments defended by economists, experts and informed observers, the positions 
of relevant stakeholders determined by the perceived gains and losses expected from policy 
shifts, are fundamental factors impinging on the future development of an EU industrial 
policy.  
The chapter will browse a schematic and concise (not exhaustive, but representative) 
conceptual map of the positions defended by the main categories of stakeholders: 
policymakers and business associations at EU level, Member States, experts and informed 
observers. The purpose is to provide readily accessible information on the perceptions and 
positions held by these stakeholders in the wider debate on EU industrial policy, and thus 
pave the way for the identification of a possible scenario for the future.  
4.1. Stakeholders’ perceptions 
This section reviews the positions of the main stakeholders at EU level, i.e. business 
organisations, business support organisations and policymakers at the European 
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Commission, and in other EU institutions (see the Annex for a full list of the stakeholders 
consulted).  
4.1.1. What does industry encompass? 
On the issue of what “industry” encompasses, there is a wide consensus among the 
stakeholders reviewed. 
There is, first, a strongly converging assessment of the importance of manufacturing as a 
fundamental element at the heart of economic growth and resilience to external shocks. It 
was noted that a solid manufacturing basis is the best antidote to withstand the effects of 
the crisis. On these grounds, the goal set by the new president of the European 
Commission for manufacturing’s share of GDP to reach 20% by 2020 is generally endorsed. 
At the same time, there is also general agreement on adopting a broad definition of 
manufacturing, or on encompassing different elements. This is expressed in different ways, 
which reveal some contrasting positions beyond the consensus.  
First, the role of services and their growing link to manufacturing is emphasised. There is a 
common view that industry is already embedding services, and that what is sold on the 
market is increasingly a set of services rather than a simple manufactured product, or in 
other terms, a solution. “To be competitive in Europe today means not just producing a 
good, but rather selling a solution, which of course comprises giving services to customers 
as well” (UEAPME).  
A step forward in this respect is made by those who refer to the ‘servitization of industry’, 
or the fourth industrial revolution, which clearly goes beyond manufacturing per se to 
include services in the concept of industry itself. “Fast-expanding business services are 
already dominant in manufacturing. A wide and growing range of companies – both 
manufacturing and service – are now involved in designing and delivering new generations 
of business services. New technologies make services still more relevant to manufacturing.” 
(EESC Opinion of the Consultative Commission on Industrial Change (CCMI) on the Impact 
of Business Services in Industry (own-initiative opinion)).  
Second, the dematerialisation/digitalisation of the economy is invoked as accompanying – 
not substituting - re-industrialisation. The issue of industry becoming more innovative is 
often seen as manufacturing involving digital and dematerialised components. The influence 
of digitalisation is acknowledged, both on manufacturing and on creating new needs and 
products.  
Third, the notion of the value-added chain is often put forward. It is probably appropriate to 
adopt an approach that distinguishes between the different segments that make up the 
manufacturing sector and that participate in the “value-added chain”. In this respect, a thin 
dividing line emerges between those who focus their attention on the higher end of the 
value chain and those who are in favour of a balanced approach in which Europe would also 
concentrate on some strategic traditional and less technologically developed sectors. 
Among the latter are business associations; for example Business Europe insists on the 
need for Europe to nurture a diversified manufacturing sector, comprising both basic, raw 
material industries and higher value added activities. It is not a matter of choice: while the 
framework conditions must be set to keep the former in the EU, the latter are also to be 
promoted. On the face of it, others think that the primary objective is to keep those parts 
of the production process with the higher value-added in Europe. Focusing on innovative 
and creative industries, smart specialisation and high value-added sectors is one of the 
ways in which Europe can try to be competitive and assure the good quality jobs its citizen 
want.  
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4.1.2. A general aversion to a sectoral approach  
Another point of convergence among stakeholders and across categories (business 
associations and policymakers) is the rejection of what is considered to be a feature of past 
industrial policies, namely a sectoral approach. Most respondents underline that an EU 
industrial policy should not target specific industries or sectors as indeed, “picking winners” 
might be risky. The “old” approach to industrial policy was abandoned, it is argued, 
because it was often associated with state interventionism and protectionism. A “silos” 
approach is blind to fruitful cross-fertilisation arising from cross-sectoral relations (CoR). 
According to DG Regional and Urban Policy (DG Regio), industrial policy should no longer 
be organised along sectoral lines, it is not top-down and it is not about picking winners. 
Industrial policy should be horizontal and technology neutral (CEMEET).  
Yet, there are different nuances, and a number of stakeholders point out some 
developments that correspond to “soft” forms of sectoral approaches. For example, it is 
indeed justified and necessary to identify strengths and weaknesses, and to carry out 
foresight analyses. Also, although essentially cross-sectoral, Key Enabling Technologies 
have been identified as “enabling the development of new goods and services and the 
restructuring of industrial processes needed to modernise EU industry and make the 
transition to a knowledge-based and low carbon resource-efficient economy”. The 
Specialised partnerships (see Chapter 2) developed on the initiative of the European 
Commission are also a way of taking sectoral considerations into account.  
Finally, some successful examples of sectoral approaches are (timidly) put forward; for 
example, in the automobile sector with the (successful) introduction of environmental 
standards (Euro 4, 5, 6) or in the shipping and space industries.  
The table below summarises the promising sectors that should be promoted according to 
the stakeholders overviewed.  
Table 3. Examples of promising sectors – or areas of policy intervention 
identified by stakeholders 
  
DG Enterprise and industry Construction, upscaling cars, steel 
DG research and innovation Big data, 3D printing 
CEMEET Clean production, advanced manufacturing, 
smart grids, energy efficiency, digitalisation  
EBN Not just creative industry and virtual part of 
the Digital Agenda  
ERRIN Advanced manufacturing and knowledge 
economy  
Infrastructure, logistic, training, education, 
clustering 
Committee of the Regions Climate change and clean technology. 
Industrial policy and climate policy, e.g. 
Smart city integrated agriculture, bio-
economy 
4.1.3. European added-value 
On this basis, the EU is expected to develop a policy aimed at putting in place the right 
conditions for industries to develop, taking into account market opportunities and needs. 
Unlike in the past, public authorities should only intervene to set a level playing field, 
fostering a conducive business environment and coordinating actors. This approach was 
paralleled by one of the interviewees to a new economic writing strand: while the issue was 
once to find the optimum allocation of resources on markets (shifting and rearranging of 
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rights), now it is increasingly one of finding the best way to solve a problem. Equilibrium 
does not exist in reality; it is about probabilities and the adoption of a systemic approach 
putting in place the right framework conditions for the system to work optimally.  
The business viewpoint 
The key issues for the business associations are a level playing field and business-friendly 
environment that is conducive to private investments. In general Europe should contribute 
to generating an attractive area where both private European and foreign investors would 
find it interesting to start new businesses (or bring businesses back from other 
geographical areas through re-relocation).  
Before dealing with initiatives to foster competitiveness, the first step should be how to 
ensure that present policies do not harm it. In particular, the notion of competitiveness 
proofing (or mainstreaming competitiveness) is put forward by all the business 
associations interviewed. Some differences lay in the identification of which EU policies 
have a potentially detrimental effect in this respect. For example, there is much concern 
about environmental regulations/policy, which is often invoked as a potential factor raising 
the (already high) cost of energy and is implemented at the expense of the survival of 
some (polluting) industries. Another example mentioned is the EU attempt to establish a 
complementary pension scheme. The solution would be to carry out impact assessments 
applied to all new legislation.  
Business associations systematically referred to the Single Market. They see it as a major 
driver of growth and a powerful instrument to ensure homogeneous access to European 
markets. There were calls for its completion in all areas, especially in the fields of services 
and energy, but also in the labour market. When comparing production costs between 
Europe and other geographical areas, the two striking differences are those of labour and 
energy costs. Competition based on labour costs is not considered realistic in general 
(Europe has to maintain the value-added parts of the value chain so that high quality jobs 
can be offered to its citizens), and it was thought that more should be done at EU level with 
regard to energy costs.  
By the same logic, access to third markets and the mobilisation of trade policy was 
generally called for by business associations. One European strength is when negotiating a 
(trade) partnership with third parties. Europe should be capable of claiming respect for 
certain standards from those countries that want to sell on its market, e.g. regarding labour 
or the environment. In this respect, the completion of the Transatlantic Trade and 
Investment Partnership (TTIP) is an issue where there is not shared agreement, since it is 
viewed both as an opportunity and a threat for European SMEs. “The TTIP has many 
positive elements, but we shall keep high those standards where Europe is at the top. The 
US and EU will also provide standards to all other economies” (CoR). 
“Taking the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership as an example, it is clear that 
trade negotiations should be undertaken by Europe on behalf of its Member States. A single 
common voice will be stronger in setting “level playing fields”, i.e. competing under the 
same rules, meaning that competitors wanting to sell in Europe should be ready to accept 
European rules on labour protection and safety, and on environmental standards” (EESC). 
Skills and education is also an area where the business community expects the EU to 
contribute by providing framework conditions conducive to business development. A 
number of interviewees drew attention to the need to have enough skilled people in order 
to nourish the knowledge economy and the high value-added industries Europe is deemed 
to be competitive in. To this end, European policies in the field of education can play a role. 
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In particular, reference is often made to the need to remedy a current (and future) lack of 
skills in the STEM disciplines (Science, Technology, Engineering, and Mathematics).  
Finally, one area where Europe should act is in the creation of a new mindset in the 
European private sector, or set the conditions for this to arise. Historically, European 
companies have been very much risk-averse, partly because of a culture in which failure 
was perceived negatively. The change of mentality is also envisaged at a more general 
level, when speaking about new technologies whose development is sometimes hindered in 
the view of some respondents because of a too strong precautionary principle. Media and 
communications have a role to play here. 
“There is a strong stand in Europe with the precautionary principles: even if people want to 
innovate sometimes they’re stopped because of the risk of negative impacts. The 
precautionary principle should be balanced with an innovation principle: whenever you 
develop a policy or initiate a legislative action, you have to look at the effects on 
innovation” (Business Europe).  
Policymakers’ vision of a conducive environment  
The policymakers interviewed broadly endorse the mission assigned to the EU to deal 
primarily with framework conditions and to secure a favourable environment. But they have 
a slightly different interpretation of their mission in this respect and they acknowledge a 
more active definition of the EU role.  
For a start, the EU is expected to ensure complementarity and cooperation between 
different countries and regions. Instead of duplicating efforts, the objective is to cooperate 
on the basis of territorial specificities. One facet of this is the distinctive role of 
“knowledge platform” that the EU can play. Indeed, Europe has at its disposal a huge 
mass of information that should be used to benchmark, make studies, forecast, identify and 
diffuse best practices. 
“One unexplored area, where Europe could do a lot is that of information sharing on smart 
specialisation and value chains across countries.” (ERRIN) 
In turn, the role of knowledge-broker brings together relevant stakeholders, and can help 
to reach a critical mass. Innovation and technological development, which are crucial 
factors for competitiveness, are examples where EU intervention can indeed help to 
develop scale economies. The main value-added of an EU industrial policy is that it can 
reach the critical size needed for expensive or risky technologies to develop. Clustering and 
joining people together are areas in which Europe has already demonstrated its potential 
should be developed further.  
“The role of Europe is identified as that of a coordinator, a hub for national and 
interregional learning, making international connection easier. It has to facilitate different 
companies and research centres in different regions to generate a larger critical mass to 
join forces and pull together resources to become collectively more competitive at an 
international level.” (DG Regio).  
In the same vein, the EU is seen as a catalyst. Besides bringing together stakeholders and 
diffusing knowledge, a critical mass can also be reached by leveraging other types of 
funding from other administrative levels or from private actors who decide to invest 
because they share the risk. 
The EU role is also to overcome fragmentation and ensure all countries speak with a single 
voice, for example in areas like international trade agreements, patenting, the labour and 
energy markets.  
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Finally, a recurrent argument put forward by policymakers – which, interestingly, tends not 
to be echoed in the business community - concerns the different roles that the public and 
the private sector have to play. They think that the EU should promote a new public-
private partnership. Setting up good policies is not enough if the private sector is not 
involved. This is true in terms of bottom-up development, for example, where clusters and 
new technological domains should be supported only when market conditions pre-exist. It 
is true for investments: public funds should leverage private funding and act as a catalyst 
(see above). And it is also valid for policy development in general: companies should be 
aware of and participate in the whole policy development process. Consultations are held in 
some areas, but sometimes the views of small companies are not represented, also 
because it is difficult to find suitable representation channels.  
“A factor hindering a really successful industrial policy is the scarce participation and 
political awareness of companies themselves, also because of their difficulty in creating a 
critical mass, their being small and micro-enterprises in the majority of cases. They should 
be supported in this activity, as well as in R&D, internationalisation, clustering” (ERRIN). 
This concept of a renewed public-private partnership goes much further than consultation 
to become involvement, and expands beyond policy formulation to policy implementation. 
The idea is that the public sector does not know best how to place public money in the 
economy, and it has to work hand-in-hand with the private sector and with knowledge 
institutions to place the money more effectively. Constant interaction is needed, based on 
trust and transparency. While business people know how the market operates and risk their 
own money, public authorities should ask “Would you invest if I invest? What would you 
need to invest more in this risky area if we back you up as the public sector? How do you 
build international alliances? How do we create an ecosystem which facilitates technological 
take-up?” (DG Regio).  
Another dimension of such a public-private partnership is the practice of public 
procurement. Comparisons between Europe and the USA were made several times during 
the interviews. This does not necessarily mean that interviewees envisaged a reproduction 
of the US situation in Europe, since conditions are clearly different. It helps, nonetheless, to 
reflect on specific instruments and possibly adapt some European practices to more 
competitive policies. Innovative pre-commercial public procurement is an interesting 
instrument (CoR). In general, it is a matter of political will.  
4.1.4. Multi-level governance 
Relations between the EU and Member States  
There is agreement across categories of stakeholders in acknowledging that the role of the 
EU is reduced or hampered by the prerogatives of Member States - and this is generally 
considered to be an undesirable state of affairs. Member States are a “weak link” in this 
respect. Different reasons are put forward, however, depending on the viewpoint (business 
associations or policymakers).  
One specific concern expressed by business associations is whether Member States will 
contravene the efforts of the EU in providing harmonised conditions to undertake business 
activities throughout MS. Decisions taken by country Ministers, at the European Council 
level, might then not be respected or enforced by Member States. Examples are the SBA or 
the Youth Guarantee. Member States are also considered to be by themselves a source of 
inhomogeneous business conditions, for example in terms of labour costs and associated 
taxation systems. Another example is SME’s access to finance. Many sources are available, 
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for example from the ECB, but the information is missing because Member States are not 
diffusing it.  
Deciding on common measures at the European level is therefore considered to be 
insufficient. It is necessary either to force Member States to comply (this is possible only if 
sanctions are used, and in turn this requires that budgets be engaged), or to raise 
awareness at the political level and create a momentum to mobilise national and local 
actors. In this respect, there should be political support (UEAPME). Business Europe also 
invokes a risk of gold-plating “MS should grant a uniform and proper implementation of 
what is suggested/decided at EU level”. An absence of common standards in fields such as 
patents, training, service markets and IPR is regretted, and calls for smart regulation.  
From the perspective of policymakers, the EU is generally expected to deal with horizontal 
measures of industrial policy and to establish instruments to support clusters, innovation, 
SMEs, etc., but it is the responsibility of Member States and Regions to implement those 
policies in a coherent way. Europe can provide high level objectives and directions, but 
actors at national, regional and local levels have to take up such guidance and adapt the 
use of support to their situation and needs. In this respect, the fact that Member States 
keep pursuing individual industrial policies/agenda/strategies is considered to be an 
obstacle (see below). The EU cannot solve all problems in the face of national specific 
circumstances.  
Regions 
The Regions are unevenly identified as critical actors. According to policymakers (DG Regio 
especially, but to some extent also DG Enterprise), they should be able to create high 
quality development strategies capable of integrating EU support such as the European 
Regional Development Fund for Smart Competitiveness, or H2020 research funds (see 
below), which respect local specificities and comparative advantages. In a way, there is a 
need for local industrial policies as well, based on the excellence of Regions, and on the 
possibility of creating clusters and collaboration between different business sectors and 
between different geographical areas, too (smart specialisation). That said, without 
coordination, Regions might develop competing or overlapping strategies. Cross-Regional 
cooperation is called for by some respondents (CoR).  
On the face of it, business associations at EU level rarely refer to this level of governance 
as a pertinent level of action. This feature unveils the potential conflict of objectives 
between territorial and business strategies (respectively attracting or preserving business in 
a given territory, and characterised by a somewhat “footloose” approach). 
“The basic need is, of course, the alignment of European, Member States’ and Regional 
policies on industry, clarity is needed on who does what, transparency is needed in policy 
development, and stability of policy is needed for companies to understand their 
environment and invest accordingly” (ERRIN). 
4.1.5. DGs’ perspective: looking for a vision 
Among the DGs of the European Commission, the view of DG Enterprise and Industry 
(DG ENT, significantly renamed DG Internal Market, Industry, Entrepreneurship and SMEs 
or “DG Growth” in the new European Commission) is probably the closest to the Business 
views. It focuses on the Common Market and the notion of “scalability” that goes with it 
(i.e. the exploitation of scale economies around an initial public investment), as well as on 
entrepreneurship. It advocates a systemic approach in the sense that it aims to establish 
the right framework for the system to work. It refers to industrial systems and networks as 
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appropriate units of analysis, and proposes an approach that is both horizontal (SBA, Refit, 
Think Small First, innovation funding) and sectoral.  
“(..) there is another (..) important priority: the single market, which is the biggest unused 
European asset, where there are a lot of low hanging fruits. It has to be completed and 
improved, making it fully operational. Scalability is a key concept here; new technologies 
need scalability to be developed. Innovation and competitiveness are concepts that are 
more traditionally mentioned, they are complex areas which require a lot of conditions to 
be put in place, including scalability.” (DG ENT).  
DG Enterprise bridges the different perspectives on industrial policy and endeavours to take 
into account input from other DGs, for example DG Regio in terms of smart specialisation, 
for which there is room in the notion of industrial system.  
“An industrial policy which focuses on costs abatement is a fragile, not committed and short 
term one: once others realise lower costs than Europe then we have lost our position. 
Flexibility is more important than costs, and scalability with it. The innovative thought in 
industrial policy is the need to develop a business-conducive environment, to think about 
all the actors in the value chain: customers, suppliers, business services, logistics… Europe 
has to put in place a real industrial system where all players nicely coordinate with each 
other, feeding their own needs. It is this network of relations that allow an industry to 
thrive and root it in a specific environment. This is the opportunity; the creation of clusters 
is the way in which you keep industries in a territory since you create a network you can’t 
disentangle. The coordination element is an argument for industries to stay where they 
are.” (DG ENT).  
DG Regional and Urban Policy takes the perspective of local/regional development and 
formulates a very sui generis approach to forging an EU industrial policy. For DG Regio 
industrial policy is seen through the lens of the so-called place-based approach; it is cross-
sectoral, based on generic technologies, and operationalised through clusters. The place-
based approach, which lies at the basis of the smart specialisation strategy, promotes 
bottom-up dynamics and rests on initiatives developed at the regional level. The role of 
proximity is underlined around the notion of clusters, bringing together different 
stakeholders (finance for technological development, companies and MNCs, the public 
sector, incubators, universities, etc.). DG Regio proposes moving away from an approach 
where single SMEs are supported to an approach where the objective is to generate and 
maintain an innovation “ecosystem” – building on proximity. DG Regio particularly stresses 
the need for a new relationship between public and private actors, sharing and exchanging 
knowledge, which facilitates technological take-up and develops know-how about how 
markets operate.  
DG Research and Innovation focuses on research and its link to business. The current 
European research programme, H2020, raises high expectations in terms of procedural 
improvements with better involvement of business, and because of a stronger focus on 
companies’ needs. As such, it is about industrial competitiveness and technological 
development.  
“Europe is very good in research, but not in bringing the products of research to market. 
Industries and SMEs should be much more involved, since they have the incentive of 
commercialising the products of research. There has to be a real cooperation with 
universities and not just a façade to justify research funds by having industries in the 
consortia. The SME instrument is promising in this sense: technologies already have to be 
at a certain stage of development in order to receive funding, a business model has to be 
prepared to have business angel models and go for venture capital, in a logic of long-term 
sustainability, products on the market and profitability.” (G. Huemer) 
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The SME instrument is generally positively valued, but a dissenting view considers that in 
the face of considerable expectations, it might produce deceptions and frustration. True, 
the instrument was designed to reward excellence. Perhaps, this is telling of the fact that 
the real needs of SMEs are not sufficiently grasped (ERRIN).  
Overall, there is some convergence among policymakers at the EC level around notions 
such as smart specialisation, industrial system, eco-system and proximity. These are 
considered ways of embedding businesses in networks of stakeholders, which are part of 
the value chain – or eco-system – and thus of anchoring companies and avoiding their re-
location. This level is also thought to be best for dealing with the coordination of different 
existing instruments and funds and for synergies to be obtained.  
4.1.6. Who’s in charge? Governance and horizontal coordination  
There is broad agreement about the lack of a clear mandate in the field of industrial policy. 
DG Enterprise (now DG Growth) is a natural candidate for such a role, but industrial policy 
instruments have been developed by other DGs who have a vision of the matter, such as 
DG Regio (with its Smart Specialisation Strategy), DG Research and Innovation, as well as 
many other DGs or agencies (DG CNECT etc.).  
Despite some timid examples73, there is clearly a lack of leadership and coordination. This 
leads to fragmentation, which is detrimental to coherence and impedes reaping synergies 
between policies, programmes and instruments.  
“ERDF and H2020 are a bit disconnected with each other, they are built on different visions 
and do not have the same beneficiaries. Research programmes are interesting for 
foresighting the dematerialised industries of the future maybe, but in the meantime things 
happen in the regions. There is a need for a leverage effect on the basis of these two large 
funding programmes; otherwise we will never reach the re-industrialisation objective. 
These programmes are just catalysts for other administrative levels and private actors to 
invest in. Some regions link them in a fruitful and effective way, but it is only on the basis 
of their local capacity. The optimum ecosystem is one in which all funds are used in a 
coordinated manner, the EC should push for regional authorities to integrate policies. 
Management authorities are sometimes disconnected with some people dealing with 
economic development and others dealing with research” (EBN).  
Achieving a critical mass requires the strategic coordination of different interventions to 
overcome fragmentation. Many underline how the proliferation of many small initiatives is 
not sufficient and a more strategic approach should be adopted. It is important to scale up 
the importance of interventions (EBN) and ensure the critical size of support. The SME 
instrument and Knowledge Alliance (DG EAC), for example, are deemed by different 
interlocutors to be examples of underfunded initiatives. 
However, such alignment and scaling up should not happen at the expense of flexibility, i.e. 
it should take place without leading to excessive centralisation. Examples are: EASME was 
identified as not so effective because it centralises too much control of funds without 
specific knowledge of the sectors of application; and the EEN was criticised on similar 
grounds. Nor should it be at the expense of transparency: on the contrary, information 
should be made more visible and available to citizens and companies (CoR).  
From an operational viewpoint, “on the ground”, this translates into a lack of harmonisation 
of procedures, which should be imposed as a minimum. 
                                           
73  For example, a steering committee on Smart Specialisation is at work that involves all the DGs. Also on H2020, 
a Formal Programme Committee groups together all the stakeholders from other DGs allowing for wide 
consultation. 
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Overall, a common request from the concerned actors was for clarity of responsibilities 
across the different DGs at the European level, which should function in a more coordinated 
and transparent way. 
Evaluation and policy competence 
In general, the issue of the (policy) competence needed to carry out an effective industrial 
policy is often mentioned. First, it is necessary to learn from mistakes (e.g. Youth 
guarantee, SBA). For example, more assertiveness for Europe is advocated in terms of 
quality of spending of available funds, something which may have been learnt via the 
Structural Funds, and that may be leveraged for other funds, for example in relation to 
research and SMEs.  
It is also necessary to acquire and master the necessary knowledge (of local conditions, of 
relevant markets, etc.) at EU, national and especially regional/local levels. Importantly, this 
does not only concern public policymakers, but also private entrepreneurs. The capacity of 
entrepreneurs to undertake organisational change and carry out innovation management is 
fundamental in this respect (EBN on entrepreneurship).  
Finally, speed is called for (CoR): policy should be reactive and adapt rapidly to new 
challenges. There is too much planning and too little experimenting. This should correspond 
in the public sphere to the imperative of “speed to market” that companies face.  
4.1.7. Concluding remarks 
Overall, there is some consensus about the need for a long-term EU industrial policy, 
beyond a mere response to the crisis. It is also seen as a necessity in the face of 
heightened worldwide competition and the policy practices of major competitors (USA, 
Japan, China, etc.).  
There are some converging views about the main weaknesses of the current arrangements, 
namely a lack of clear mandate and of coordination between DGs resulting in fragmentation 
and missed opportunities for synergy. Interestingly, business representatives join EU 
policymakers in considering the Member States level as a source of potential difficulties for 
carrying out an EU industrial policy, while the regional level is unevenly acknowledged as 
an appropriate level of action. Finally, there is some uncertainty concerning the thrust 
guiding the development of the EU industrial policy. While there is a clear and shared 
aversion for anything that could resemble a sectoral approach across the different 
stakeholders reviewed, business representatives seem to be particularly interested in 
keeping a level playing field, whereas unsurprisingly, policymakers have a more active 
vision of their role in promoting a favourable business environment, as a knowledge-broker 
for example. It is also worth noting that the notion of Smart Specialisation put forward by 
DG Regio is often endorsed or taken over by other policy stakeholders as a potentially 
pertinent model to underpin the development of an EU industrial policy.  
4.2. The perspective of Member States 
This sections draws lessons from an analysis of industrial policy carried out in six Member 
States (UK, France, Italy, Greece, Poland and Germany – see Annex for a full account) 
chosen for their representativeness74. It describes the main characteristics, similarities and 
                                           
74  The countries chosen for the country fiches are representative of the diversity or ‘policy space’ in terms of 
geography and institutional makeup of the current EU Member States. Represented are the North (Germany, 
Poland and the UK)-South (Greece and Italy) and East (East Germany and Poland)-West (France, Italy, 
Greece, West Germany and the UK) differences; differences between the continent and the British Isles; and, 
last but not least, differences in economic systems ranging from the mixed economies of Poland and France, to 
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differences in industrial policy in the selected countries and underlines determinants of 
policy preference and policy spillovers in each Member State. The purpose is to indirectly 
reveal the preferences of Member States for strengthened collaboration in the area of EU 
industrial policy, also captured through interviews with stakeholders, such as industrial 
confederations and ministries. 
4.2.1. Different approaches to industrial policy and the main drivers 
Even though the collected data is qualitative in character, what emerged was the following 
ranking of countries on the relative weight of using a horizontal or sectoral approach: 
Figure 10: Dominant objective of industrial policy in the six countries studied 
Horizontal ------------------------------------------------ Sectoral 
 
Germany Greece  UK Italy  Poland  France 
Source: Country fiches 
This was revealed through studying a combination of factors, such as the budget assigned 
for different areas (when available), emphasis on direct support to sectors (here support to 
the energy sector in Germany is seen as a horizontal policy since it feeds into overall 
energy sustainability and actually hampers industry in terms of cost competitiveness), the 
underlying motives for attracting investors to clusters or via economic zone type policies, 
and also official communications and statements made by governments on their web pages 
and in government documents.  
It is also important here to add that the sector emphasis in both Poland and France comes 
mostly from a combination of how they have used their place-based policies and the fact 
that state ownership is most prevalent in these two Member States at present.  
It can be seen then that there is no direct relationship between the relative preference or 
dominant approach to industrial policy and the competitiveness ranking of the countries 
studied (see below)75.  
Figure 11: Relative competitiveness ranking of the six countries studied 
Germany---- UK-------- France----- Poland------ Italy----- Greece 
5th place         9th place 23rd place 43rd place 49th place 81st place 
Source: Country fiches. 
 
At present there are a number of other major influences on industrial policy-making in the 
EU. One is the fundamental economic system of each country (including federal 
arrangements) which, not surprisingly, has a rather strong bearing on how economic policy, 
including industrial policy, is carried out. This is especially true for the relative preference 
for using the horizontal or sectoral approach. The mixed economies are more likely to have 
a sectoral approach. Germany, as a social federation of Lander, has an administrative setup 
that appeals more to horizontal policies overall. Northern Italy seems much more similar in 
its economic system to Germany, whereas Southern Italy has an entirely different 
economic system. The large spread in economic systems and economic development across 
the EU (also related to innovation, see below) should be considered as one of the main 
                                                                                                                                       
the social economic model of Germany, the entrepreneur-based system of Northern Italy, the Anglo-Saxon 
model of the UK, and the Mediterranean economies of Greece and Southern Italy.  
75  In this relative competitiveness ranking Italy in reality is situated at either end if separated into North and 
South, and East Germany is closer to Poland.  
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barriers to developing a common EU industrial policy. There is a clear historical lineage in 
industrial policy in these countries, only occasionally interrupted by periods of stronger 
coordination or synchronisation during periods of crisis. A common policy would at least 
have to be adaptable or flexible with regard to such differences. 
Another influence is the level of development, or how much each country depends relatively 
on indigenous innovative capacity (West Germany, France, the UK and Northern Italy) vis-
à-vis technology transfer through trade and foreign direct investment (Greece, Poland, East 
Germany and Southern Italy). 
However, there are also signs of policy convergence and spillovers from the technology-
leading countries to the technology-dependent and policy-following countries (the latter 
often also more dependent on EU funding for their industrial policies, such as Poland, 
Greece, Southern Italy and East Germany). This can be seen by comparing the 
chronologies of industrial policy in the countries studied. 
A certain synchronisation of industrial policy appears to have occurred at certain points in 
time. This is especially true during or after a crisis (such as the oil crises of the 1970s and 
1980s and the present global financial crisis) when most of the Member States have found 
themselves in a similar situation of declining competitiveness, though currently with 
Germany as the positive outlier and Greece as the negative outlier. One example is the 
move towards horizontal policies, which was initiated by Thatcher’s reforms right after the 
UK became a member of the EU (and could be interpreted in fact as a reaction to that 
decision by the previous government). There are also most likely national imprints on 
particular EU industrial policies during a particular country’s governing periods in the 
Council of Ministers (such as the possible influence of German national policy on the move 
towards subsidising SMEs in the EU). Hence, spillovers could occur from one Member State 
to another, from a Member State to the EU-level and from the EU-level back to another 
Member State. 
4.2.2. Domains and instruments 
Table 4 below shows the main initiatives in place in each country, divided up according to 
the main policy domains covered by the various arrangements and measures. It shows that 
both horizontal and sectoral objectives inform industrial policy-making across all the six 
country cases studied. 
The most important domains covered in industrial policy are: 1) Key Enabling Technologies, 
2) place-based policies and 3) barriers to innovation with SMEs. Some domains are lagging 
behind or are almost entirely neglected at present, the domain of labour in particular. A lot 
of initiatives under the product market domain belong under the Single Market and are not 
mentioned here as they are the same across all Member States. The presence of the three 
similar initiatives mentioned above (Key Enabling Technologies, place-based policies and 
barriers to innovation with SMEs) across almost all the six countries studied suggests that 
besides those pertaining to the Single Market, there is already a significant element of 
common and evolving industrial policy in the EU. This is most likely due to the influence of 
Cohesion Policy on industrial policy and general policy spillovers. 
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Table 4. Comparing specific industrial policy initiatives in the six countries by 
objectives and domains 
Type of initiative Motivated by horizontal 
objectives 
Motivated by sectoral 
objectives 
R&D tax incentives 
(the domain is technology) 
UK 
France 
Germany 
Italy 
 
Place-based policies  
(the domain is land or place) 
UK (24 zones) 
Greece (Structural Funds) 
Italy (triple helix 
coordination) 
France (competitiveness 
clusters) 
Poland (SEZs with 
elements of sectoral 
strategy) 
East Germany (clusters 
with a sectoral focus) 
Key Enabling Technologies, 
energy 
(the domain is 
systems/institutions) 
Germany (energy) 
Greece 
Italy (five cross-sectoral 
priority areas) 
UK (some cross-sectoral) 
France (some of the 34 
sectors) 
 
 
Barriers to finance and 
innovation with SMEs 
(the domain is capital 
markets and 
systems/institutions) 
Germany 
France 
Poland 
Greece 
Italy 
UK 
 
Creating national champions 
in particular industries 
(the domain is product 
markets) 
UK and Poland conduct their 
independent exchange rate 
and monetary policy 
UK (car industry, 
aerospace) 
France (some of the 34 
sectors) 
Programmes that target skill 
gaps 
(the domain is labour 
markets) 
UK (skills programme, but 
lowest minimum wage) 
Germany (highest minimum 
wage for unskilled labour, 
long contracts) 
 
Source: Country fiches 
There are two areas of policy in which there is an almost complete overlap among the high 
innovation performers: the first is in R&D tax incentives (rarely used in the non-innovation 
performing economies such as Poland and Greece), and the second is across all six 
countries in the area of land development through special zones or cluster initiatives (even 
though the underlying objectives that motivate these policies vary significantly). The real 
difference comes mainly in the spending patterns, which tended to show (when figures 
were available) that budgeting gives a stronger preference to traditional industrial policies 
(e.g. in France), or to specific and also quite traditional national priorities  
(e.g. in Germany).  
4.2.3. Concluding remarks 
Overall, the findings from Member States lead to the observation that industrial policy-
making in the EU appears to be driven by the high innovation performing economies of 
Germany, France, the UK and Italy, and that policy preference is first and foremost driven 
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by their economic systems. In the more technology-dependent parts of Europe (including 
South Italy and East Germany) policy seems currently to be driven by general spillovers 
and Cohesion Policy. These regions appear to be weaker-positioned in terms of capability 
for developing their own internally coherent industrial policies (including setting up systems 
for evaluating these policies).  
Another observation is that these particular patterns of policy preference and spillovers 
drive the domains covered by current industrial policies. The most prominent mechanisms 
are R&D tax incentives (emanating from the emphasis on innovation in the policy-leading 
economies), entrepreneurship policies (again emanating from the policy-leading 
economies) and, finally, place-based policies (emanating partially from policy preference or 
tradition in some economies such as the UK and France, combined with a heavy emphasis 
on Cohesion Policy in the EU). 
The interviews indicated that the policy-leading countries currently have a low stake in the 
formulation of a common EU industrial policy because they are already formulating their 
own version. Instead, the policy-following countries have a very high stake and interest in 
making the relative influence over such initiatives more even. Their relative dependency on 
EU funding for industrial policy-spending suggests that they are not likely to take a lead in 
changing the present situation either via their own national policies or through the EU 
institutions. In this respect, a recent initiative led by France to bring together “Friends of 
Industry” (i.e. Italy, Greece, Spain, Bulgaria, Luxembourg, Belgium, Czech Republic, UK) 
shows the relative inertia characterizing the positions of Member States76. They called for a 
more active EU industrial policy, but their initiative had no specific concrete influence and 
no further developments took place.  
4.3. The view from outside: scholars and experts  
This section summarises the results of a mini-survey on certain features of the current EU 
industrial policy and perspectives for possible development conducted with a Delphi-like 
approach77 among nine industrial policy experts and scholars worldwide
78
. 
4.3.1. Two schools of thought? 
As far as their analytical framework is concerned, respondents can be broadly classified into 
two groups: a) followers of the EU approach and, conversely, b) those that, to varying 
degrees, are critical of it because it is deemed too biased towards supply-side 
considerations. In oversimplified terms, those with a neo-liberal economic bias maintain 
that industrial policy can be justified only in the case of market failures, because otherwise 
it would disrupt the efficient allocation of resources. Others point to the fact that there is a 
need to have an industrial policy in place precisely to redress the “missed growth” failures 
produced by the neo-liberal approach itself and its insufficient recognition of the factors 
behind growth. Those belonging to the first group agree with the current paradigm, but 
note that more should be done to monitor progress in key enabling technologies (including 
eco-innovation) and to foster synergies with education and research policies. They 
therefore emphasise the lack of a clear overall vision supported by appropriate 
compensatory measures where necessary (e.g. investing in energy efficiency to 
compensate for the US advantage with fossil fuels). 
                                           
76  Initiative led by France, including Italy, Greece, Spain, Bulgaria, Luxembourg, Belgium, the Czech Republic and 
the UK (October 2013). 
77  It is a “Delphi-like” survey inasmuch as it does not aim to establish a consensual position among the experts.  
78  The survey was carried out between 14 and 30 October 2014 and its aim was to identify areas of agreement 
and disagreement among respondents through a quantitative scoring mechanism and a qualitative section 
where scores could be elaborated upon. See in Annex the list of participants.  
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The criticism of the second group is much more radical and can be summarised in the 
following terms. The approach followed by the EU is the product of the dramatic mistakes 
of the 1970s when demand management policies totally neglected the supply-side. Now the 
problem is the fact that the current policies are conceptualised in purely supply-side terms. 
So, if problems remain unsolved despite policy intervention, this spurs the need for even 
more of a supply-side approach, which would only aggravate problems in the long run, in a 
sort of vicious circle. According to this second group, the current strategic approach is 
lacking an analysis of the reasons behind the failures of past policies (both demand-side 
and supply-side driven) as a starting point for new thinking. In the words of one 
commentator, to get out of this conundrum a new articulation of industrial policy language 
and concepts would be required, because the current one - based as it is on the old supply-
side demand-side debate - is intrinsically misleading, or at least, exceedingly one-sided.    
4.3.2. Strategy and governance 
Respondents generally give a low score to the overall quality and clarity of the strategy and 
related governance aspects, although they might differ substantially in their underlying 
assessment of the main reasons why. Assessments differ depending on whether the 
respondent is broadly aligned with the EU approach so far (see Chapter 2), or a supporter 
of a more radical paradigm shift and a fresher approach. In both cases it is noted that 
several policy areas that are relevant for setting up a proper industrial policy are being 
tackled separately within the Commission and the Council of Ministers, which leads to 
evident inconsistencies. Not only does this extend to obvious examples such as climate 
change, innovation and taxation, but also to crucial monetary policy aspects (interest and 
exchange rates) that can represent a sort of precondition for putting any industrial policy in 
place, because there is general agreement that no industrial policy whatsoever can fix 
wrong monetary policy framework conditions. 
Respondents tend to concede that industrial policy at the EU level is too biased towards 
horizontal approaches and exceedingly neglects more targeted sector- or segment-based 
instruments that would allow for more targeted and effective interventions. In current 
conditions, there seems to be a certain consensus that any horizontal strategy is bound to 
be vague and limited in the results it can achieve, although, as noted above, any move 
towards more analytical approaches would require skills not always to be found at the 
national/local level and therefore faces serious capacity constraints. Ideally, the right 
balance between horizontal and vertical policies depends on the territorial peculiarities of 
the different regions, their strengths and weaknesses and their underlying strategic 
industries, and should be assessed at the local level if the right capabilities are available. 
Dissenting views more aligned with the supply-side approach insist that the purpose of 
policy intervention should be to build enabling conditions and support innovation, although 
some concede that interventions specifically targeted at certain emerging technologies or 
specific clusters could possibly be justified, even if the OECD itself has acknowledged a lack 
of “robust tools to measure whether or not such policies are successful” and warned that 
Governments should limit support to existing and emerging clusters rather than trying to 
create them where they do not already exist. There were also instances, as previously 
noted, where the horizontal-vertical dichotomy was deemed poorly framed and in need of 
fresh rethinking, and actually a part itself of the problem to be solved. This 
horizontal/vertical distinction can be blurred in cases where nominally horizontal support 
has de facto vertical effects – and vice versa. For instance, while support for research and 
development (R&D) is available to all sectors of the economy, at the end of the day it 
ultimately flows mainly to R&D-intensive sectors. 
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4.3.3. Policy instruments 
The distinction between the two schools of thought identified above can be found in the 
perceived degree of adequacy of the industrial policy tools currently available. While 
scholars and experts supportive of the current approach deem them fully adequate and 
may comment on the way they have been implemented or even suggest more focused 
education-related tools, critics of the “supply-side biased” policies would like to strengthen 
and widen the range of tools available that are currently too biased towards horizontal 
measures, and to reform current competition/state aid regulations as enshrined in the 
Treaties, by allowing ways to provide more support to strategic/high growth/high potential 
sectors and industries.  
The main constraint to this more proactive approach is recognised to be the lack of a clear 
theoretical framework to guide European policymakers in creating entrepreneurial 
possibilities, and the lack of experience of most EU Member States in building 
organisational capabilities to advance their production capacity, compared to other global 
competitors. This would require a deep knowledge of production systems - including inter-
European production links - and of the strategies to develop distinguished production 
capabilities that only the public can provide, as financial institutions in the private sector 
are not skilled at due diligence to identify early stage technology development activities, 
and venture capitalists do not have the scale to support the crafting of sector strategies. 
So, more generally speaking, tools and active policies would be required to improve the 
capabilities of economic actors to participate in competitive dynamics. 
The current support instruments are conceived in response to perceived specific market 
failures and therefore cannot (or should not according to others) address systemic 
challenges. Moreover, the various aids to enterprises tend to have different effects 
depending on the sectors they are applied to and it can therefore be difficult to make 
generalisations. While much stronger evidence from evaluations than is currently available 
would be needed to draw solid conclusions, it appears that the effectiveness of access to 
finance and of policies to support apprenticeships and support to labour mobility is believed 
to be greater than that of cluster policies or innovative procurement, particularly as far as 
SMEs are concerned. In contrast, support to exporting companies is generally deemed the 
least effective of all possible instruments. 
In one notable dissenting opinion, support to exporting companies is deemed by far the 
most effective at the firm level, because it encompasses all the others. Getting firms into 
exporting indirectly supports a wide-ranging set of actions that improve innovation and 
productivity, as there are significant barriers to entry into exporting. Radically diverging 
views were recorded on matters such as the potential effectiveness of social and eco-
innovation and indirect support measures such as the establishment of marketplaces to 
attract venture capital or publicity for inventors and creative firms. According to some, 
these measures simply do not address the fundamental problem that public support is 
needed until the risk/return metrics of a given activity are sufficiently clear to the private 
sector and deemed financially affordable. So any support provided at the margin of this 
threshold is irrelevant. 
Although with small variations, most respondents agree that mainstream support instru-
ments such as support to access to finance, support to innovative SMEs, innovative pro-
curement and support to exporting companies, are broadly provided in line with needs and 
justified by available evidence of their effectiveness or, in the worst of cases, slightly un-
derfunded in the light of the peculiar current crisis conditions. In any case, nobody feels 
that there is any need for a substantial strengthening of purely horizontal and untargeted 
measures.  
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There are more radically diverging views as to the appropriateness of the financial effort 
devoted to cluster policies and support to apprenticeships and labour mobility. While also in 
these cases the majority agrees that the right level of effort has been broadly reached in 
the light of available evidence, there remain radically diverging opinions as to whether 
these policies are substantially underfunded or, conversely, substantially overfunded 
compared to perceived needs. 
4.3.4. Framework conditions 
There is a general, but not unanimous, consensus that the greatest potential for a 
transformative strategy today probably lies in making EU energy and climate policies more 
competitive-oriented, although this does not mean there is underlying agreement on the 
direction these should take. Another area of substantial agreement can be found in 
assessing the potential for industrial growth provided by a deepening of the European 
Single Market as lower than the potential possibly offered by opening up foreign markets 
and removing existing barriers to trade.  
There remains a minority of respondents who maintain that the impact on manufacturing of 
any trade-related policy – both internal and external to the EU - would, at this stage, be 
almost negligible. Needless to say, radically diverging judgments are given to the potential 
for industrial growth hidden in a reformed state aid and competition policy. While this is 
deemed almost non-existent by those aligned with the current EU practice, the others see 
the need for a more radical reform in this area. Again in an oversimplified form, state aid 
regulation should be much lighter on strategic industries with potential for growth and 
substantial investment risk and, unlike in the past, based on European rather than national 
champions. The difficulties that the current EU definition of SME would create in fine-tuning 
policies are generally deemed as slightly overstated and a political argument rather than a 
real policy concern. However, also in this case, there is a radically diverging opinion 
maintaining that a change in the definition of SME would be one of the key and more 
urgent reforms to put in place as soon as possible as a precondition for improving the 
effectiveness of industrial policy in Europe.  
4.3.5. Multi-level governance 
It is often noted that it is not so much the balance between the different levels of 
policymaking per se that matters, but rather the existence of conflicting or contradictory 
goals between them. However, most respondents believe that too much is left to Member 
States’ interventions and some failures in using available instruments – for instance in the 
field of Structural Funds or support to labour market mobility – are not really addressed. 
This creates a very unbalanced condition where certain States or Regions can silently 
manage quite effective industrial policies and have developed good capacities to do so, 
while others are increasingly lagging behind. The conundrum here, however, is that without 
local involvement industrial policies have little chance of success, but many local or even 
national governments appear simply not up to the task. 
As already noted above, a minority of respondents object to any European intervention on 
subsidiarity grounds and would like to reduce EU competencies in this area. This is even 
more so after the 2008 economic crisis showed the ineffectiveness and slowness of 
European interventions and related decision-making process and led some to regret that 
Member States had been left more sovereignty on matters such as industrial policy.   
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4.3.6. Specific issues 
Realism and feasibility of the Europe 2020 objectives 
Most respondents agree that the Europe 2020 objective of getting back to a 20% share of 
manufacturing in GDP is hardly realistic or feasible in current conditions. Both increases in 
labour productivity and shifts in demand towards services are generally assumed to 
continue as a structural trend over the next few years, which would make the achievement 
of the target extremely unlikely or eventually possible, in the best of cases, only under a 
very broad definition of manufacturing also inclusive of business services downstream and 
product development upstream. To this end, the identification of the target itself appears 
exceedingly driven by the need to convey the message politically, but not adequately 
supported by a rigorous underlying analysis and quantification of a suitable set of measures 
to reach this aim. A clearer and more elaborate assessment would be needed of the impact 
of the share of manufacturing on the economy, as well as of the extent of the interventions 
required to reach the 20% target (a real Copernican revolution in the words of one 
commentator), as it would allow for better strategic understanding and overall steering of 
the process.  
Moreover, it is also noted that capacity constraints in implementing such a Copernican 
revolution are poorly appreciated and taken into consideration when setting targets. For 
instance, so far no EU industrial policy document has tackled the issue of governance 
capabilities and of the highly diversified and sometimes limited range of skills and tools 
available within industrial policy agencies to manage such a daunting effort across Europe. 
While the majority of respondents seem to agree that a set of European Industrial Policies 
to achieve that target would ideally be highly desirable and they therefore endorse the 
underlying political message, a minority either casts serious doubts on the very need to 
have a target for manufacturing alone, or challenges the policy on subsidiarity grounds and 
maintains that an EU goal does not make much sense as it would depend on a number of 
very heterogeneous situations at the national and local levels, which an EU strategy can 
hardly cover. 
Need for a specific EU policy initiative aimed at reshoring industrial 
activities 
Most respondents share the opinion that specific programmes aimed at attracting back 
manufacturing activities lost to China and other emerging countries in the last decade (so-
called reshoring) and broadly mirroring the contents of the US Make it in America 
programme would not be desirable or feasible in Europe. The prevailing view is that such 
an approach would be backward-looking or even counterproductive, since it would distract 
the policymakers’ attention from the need to invest in industries with a high potential for 
growth and in more promising technologies, irrespective of whether reshored or not. 
Moreover, some maintain there is no proof that this type of programme meets a concrete 
and actual demand and nor that it would not end up subsidizing businesses that would in 
any case reshore their activities, as this would require a much deeper analysis and 
understanding of current competitive dynamics and the incentives available elsewhere 
(rarely disclosed) than presently available.      
There is a minority view strongly supportive of replicating something similar to the Make it 
in America programme in the EU, because this would provide a common framework of 
action for Member States who are allegedly trying to achieve the same objective through 
various fiscal measures and are driven to fiscal competition to achieve this aim. Hence, 
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some kind of coordination could help in mobilizing all European countries towards the same 
goal by providing a common reference framework and a development path. In the 
dissenters’ view such a programme could be justified in terms of market failure by 
addressing and somehow balancing the growing IPR management and security concerns 
Europe faces in off-shoring too much of its technological base. 
The merits of technological foresight and randomised experiments. 
The vast majority of respondents continue to see the merits of basing policies on foresight 
exercises, following trends in research and spotting key emerging technologies as a basis 
for identifying strategic sectors or segments of the economy, although one radically 
dissenting opinion was recorded. 
The recently proposed new industrial policy approach based on randomized trial and error 
experiments (see Chapter 1) not supported by any other preliminary consideration aimed 
at identifying strategic priorities, remains deeply divisive among respondents and elicits 
either strong support, or deep scepticism. 
4.3.7. Concluding remarks 
Participants in the exercise emphasised different key messages, which were not always 
compatible. These can be broadly summarised and highlighted in the following terms: 
 There is little point in discussing EU industrial policy, unless the Treaty is changed. 
 There is a widely unrecognised capacity problem in devising industrial policy based 
on smart specialisation, and there is little the EU can do to redress this, as it 
depends on uneven Government skills at the local level. 
 Industrial policy is wrongly conceptualized in terms of market failures, while it 
should be understood in terms of the risk/return metrics the public or the private 
sector can bear. 
 Competition rules at the EU level should be eased and conceived in EU strategic 
terms. 
 Industrial policy should not be seen as a substitute for a GDP growth strategy, but 
as a tool to orient the economy towards desirable socio-environmental goals. 
 Discuss industrial strategy with industrialists, and improve knowledge of their 
working conditions and competitive dynamics worldwide. 
 Experiment new industrial policy tools including sector-specific education policies; 
 The paramount importance of education, R&D support and finance of innovation 
strategies better declined at the sectoral level. 
 Improve evaluation and knowledge of what is working. 
 Increase complementarity between industrial policy and other policies. 
The overall vision ahead is that the EU has rightly moved away from its previous 
exceedingly horizontal approach towards the current smart specialisation strategy, although 
there can be serious – and still poorly recognised - capacity constraints in its 
implementation. To a notable share of respondents this recent move is, however, far from 
being enough unless the key aspect of managing state aid and competition policy in a more 
proactive and strategic-oriented way is tackled. Interestingly, the so-called new industrial 
policy approach elicits some consensus across the different schools of thought and 
ideological orientations, while programmes specifically aimed at facilitating reshoring of 
manufacturing activities do not. Few indications emerge from the exercise of the need to 
reorient the effort devoted to the various industrial policy tools so far, but there was a 
request to focus even more on the human capital component by investing in apprenticeship 
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and support to labour mobility instruments. All in all, this appears – in spite of the recent 
financial crisis - a more important strategic tool than improving access to finance. 
4.4. Conclusion 
One main message emerging from this chapter is the seemingly scant room for manoeuvre 
left to policymakers at EU level to develop an EU industrial policy in the traditional sense. 
Caught between competition policy seriously constraining state aid, on the one hand, and 
Member States’ prerogatives and heterogeneous conditions and challenges, on the other, 
the development of an industrial policy at EU level in a top down and centralised fashion 
seems to be difficult. In addition, the lack of a clear mandate and of coordination is noted, 
together with the absence of a shared strategic vision. Yet, there is an emerging agreement 
around a set of principles and notions such as Smart Specialisation or  
(eco-)systems which could contribute to the formulation of a prevailing paradigm guiding 
the development of a decentralised EU industrial policy.  
Policy Department A: Economic and Scientific Policy 
 
PE 536.320  69 
5. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
This report provides an overview of the different initiatives and policies devised at EU level 
to foster competitiveness and growth, and their assessment by selected stakeholders and 
experts. In the absence of dedicated evaluations dealing with EU industrial policy as a 
whole, this report deliberately relies on this qualitative information. Furthermore, the 
hypothesis is that such positions and opinions are also part of the policy process, so it is 
important to take them into account to gauge where such a process is headed. A set of key 
findings emerges from this analysis, and some recommendations are formulated on this 
basis.   
5.1. Key findings 
In order to extract key findings from the wealth of material collected for this study, we find 
it useful to distinguish between ideas, institutions and interests, which are key variables 
characterising the policy-making process in the field of industrial policy at EU level.  
5.1.1. Ideas 
There is renewed interest in industrial policy in general, and at EU level in particular, but 
there isn’t always a clear-cut and explicit account of what purpose an EU industrial policy 
would serve. In particular, there seem to be general references to objectives such as 
competitiveness, growth and jobs, but sometimes without explicit mention of possible 
tensions or overlaps between such objectives and how exactly an industrial policy can help 
achieve these very objectives.  
For example, it is no coincidence that such a “renaissance” of interest takes place 
concomitantly with the current crisis and the dramatic impact it has been having on the EU 
manufacturing industry. At the same time, it is generally acknowledged that an EU 
industrial policy should not provide short-term responses to the crisis, but more structural 
and long-term objectives, such as a contribution to reshaping the specialisation profile of 
the EU towards higher value-added activities where the “good” jobs are. In the short term, 
this process of structural change could even cause adjustments with negative 
consequences on employment.  
Also, progress in productivity and competitiveness might not be good for jobs if it is 
obtained through technological developments substituting labour with capital, or through 
relocating part of the production process abroad. In this respect, it might be a good idea to 
be clear about the very objective of an industrial policy: is it higher productivity/better paid 
jobs, or employment in general, including low skilled jobs? 
In this report, the argument put forward in favour of a focus on manufacturing is that this 
is where the good jobs are, besides being a fundamental source of innovation and 
productivity. The stakeholders (and other evidence) reviewed generally point to the 
importance of keeping a strong industrial manufacturing base as a key factor of resilience 
and development. The latter is indeed necessary to apply technological developments, 
which in turn is a learning opportunity calling for further technological development, etc. 
Evidence shows the risk inherent in a strategy concentrating efforts on how to move up the 
value-added chain, promoting R&D intensive activities, if this is disconnected from the 
manufacturing base.  
At the same time, an exclusive focus on manufacturing could bypass possible alternative or 
complementary sources of growth and competitiveness, for instance in some services 
characterised by high productivity. A certain degree of deindustrialisation seems to be 
inevitable (thanks to structural trends in the share of manufacturing, which is becoming 
more capital- and less labour-intensive in general, especially for low-skilled labour), and is 
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actually welcome if it corresponds to a relocation of low-skilled jobs towards more 
productive areas of the economy. What counts is the overall picture and whether the 
productivity of the economy follows an upward trend (corresponding to a most efficient 
allocation of resources towards higher wages and higher productivity jobs).  
Overall, there is a vast consensus among stakeholders that the target of an industrial policy 
should indeed be manufacturing, but in its relationship to the value-added chain upstream 
and downstream. There must be considerations upstream for R&D input, but also raw 
material or energy costs, and downstream for marketing services, not to mention business 
services that contribute to the production process right across the value-added chain. This 
accounts for the fact that the boundaries between manufacturing and services are 
increasingly blurred.  
As such, the term “industrial policy” appears to be a misnomer if it is taken literally: by 
suggesting an exclusive focus on industry, one risks losing sight of the broader picture and 
objective of improving the overall levels of productivity of an economy. Other names for an 
industrial policy could indeed be: innovation policy, growth policy, competitiveness policy, 
productive development policy, structural transformation policy, etc79. 
In parallel with some uncertainty around the very notion of industrial policy – its definition, 
objective and target - there are novel theoretical developments suggesting alternative 
frameworks of analysis that question old schemes and dichotomies. Indeed, theoretical 
developments and recent practices point to new units of analysis and action frameworks for 
outlining an industrial policy, such as industrial systems, production chains, networks, 
global value chains, “eco-systems”, smart specialisation, etc. They are all notions that offer 
an opportunity to overcome old dichotomies at the origin of seemingly irreducible and 
unproductive controversies characterising the debate between proponents of an industrial 
policy and critics. In particular, they question the validity of the opposition between 
horizontal and sectoral approaches to industrial policy (also reconciled through a “matrix” 
approach), and between top-down and bottom-up policy developments.  
In this context, new paradigms are proposed like the “new industrial policy” advocated by 
D. Rodrik. In contrast to the “old” approach characterised by top-down initiatives pursuing 
clearly defined (sectoral) priorities, the new industrial policy is implemented through a 
process of trial and error, implying institutionalised dialogue between public authorities and 
private agents, pragmatic public–private partnerships, and the ability of policymakers to 
learn from mistakes (which in turn requires monitoring and evaluating). The capacity of 
both policymakers and businesses acquires a special relevance in this context.  
5.1.2. “Institutions”: the policy framework  
The recent surge in interest in an EU industrial policy relies on a policy framework that the 
stakeholders reviewed in this report characterise in the following way.   
Considerable resources are mobilised, and the policy coverage is extremely wide. This calls 
for better integration of initiatives and programmes in order to take advantage of 
synergies. In particular, some suggest better aligning conceptual underpinnings and 
intervention logics at the root of policy developments in some areas, including, for 
example, environmental policy and other initiatives aimed at fostering competitiveness. It 
is acknowledged that, for a long time, competition policy has been providing a prevailing 
conceptual model influencing policy developments at EU level, which is still at work 
nowadays, but there is actually little call for a radical overhaul in this respect. Some 
                                           
79  See the presentation of Dani Rodrik at the First Industrial Economics Day organised by the European 
Commission on 15 December 2014.  
Policy Department A: Economic and Scientific Policy 
 
PE 536.320  71 
initiatives are considered to be under-funded (e.g. the SME instrument) and achieving a 
critical mass is generally called for. Also, concerns arise from some strategic decisions like 
those not to allocate additional funds to technological development or to downsize the 
budget for the Connecting Europe Facility programme in the current Multiannual Financial 
Framework80. Finally, the majority of respondents believe that a proper mandate in the field 
of industrial policy should be more clearly defined at EU level.  
5.1.3. Interests  
Stakeholders appear to place quite distinct expectations on an EU industrial policy. Business 
associations acknowledge the fundamental role that the EU plays - and could further play – 
in terms of “levelling the playing field”. Another added value of EU action put forward by EU 
policy stakeholders is when the EU fulfils the role of knowledge-broker, or knowledge 
platform. This might be not as anecdotic as it may appear at first sight in a context where 
the competence and capabilities of policymakers at all levels, and also of businesses (who 
need to be able to manage technological change and innovation) are decisive.  
As to Member States, a review of practices and approaches in six of them shows quite 
distinct positions. It is no surprise to see how distinct socio-economic institutional features 
determine different growth paths, and contribute to shaping specific responses to varying 
types of challenges. The impact this has on the chance of developing an effective EU 
industrial policy should not be underrated as this constitutes different incentives for 
Member States to take part in an active EU industrial policy. “Peripheral” Member States 
dependent on Cohesion Policy, for example, place high expectations on an EU industrial 
policy. The fact that these countries were hit hardest by the crisis and that they are 
experiencing relatively more rapid de-industrialisation calls for specific attention and 
possibly distinct approaches in their cases.  
5.2. Recommendations 
There is undoubtedly a renewed political commitment in favour of industrial policy at EU 
level. The objective is not to miss this opportunity. Based on interviews with stakeholders 
and other evidence collected in this report and briefly summarised above, some 
suggestions on how to make the most of the current policy framework are proposed in 
what follows.  
An important initial remark inferred from the report’s findings is that how to do things 
appears to have some importance, perhaps even as much as what to do.  
As far as the EU is concerned, it should fully endorse its role of knowledge-broker and 
facilitator of interaction: this is not a retreat or a sign of weakness, but, on the contrary, a 
way to stress the real added-value of the EU action. Replicating a centralised model at EU 
level does not fit well with the multi-level governance design lying at its heart, nor with the 
very prerogatives and specificities of Member States in this field. It is also not very much in 
line with trends in the “new” industrial policy. Instead, the EU could use its ideal position of 
a platform as leverage for exchange and learning. It could start by making the most of the 
mechanisms already in place. For instance, the promotion of pragmatic public-private 
partnerships could acquire greater and institutionalised importance following the example 
of the Specialised Partnerships set up in the context of COM 2012 ‘A stronger European 
industry for growth and economic recovery’. These Specialised Partnerships should be 
strengthened and multiplied. They aim to bring together relevant stakeholders from 
different horizons in areas defined along the lines of: sector, market, production chains, 
                                           
80  It is worth clarifying that the stakeholders were interviewed prior to the confirmation by the new President of 
the European Commission of an Investment Plan worth more than €300 billion.  
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industrial system, or a specific transversal theme, at the most appropriate level of analysis 
and action (trans-regional, transnational, cross-border, multinational, EU-wide, etc.). They 
should address issues at 360° where appropriate, from regulatory issues to energy costs, 
from trade issues to pertinent policy instruments, etc. This report illustrates other examples 
of initiatives promoting effective public-private partnerships, generally on a small or local 
scale (reflecting the local conditions for successful industrial policies) but, if pertinent with 
respect to the issues addressed, these networks could also be extended to a larger scale.  
Another area where the EU could improve current practices is in the field of monitoring and 
evaluation. There is a lot to be learnt from the experience accumulated through the 
implementation of Cohesion Policy, which could be extended to the field of industrial policy.  
A proper governance setting should be in place at EU level. There is a need to remedy the 
lack of mandate identified by the stakeholders interviewed. For example, more could be 
made of the newly established vice-presidency for “Jobs Growth Investment and 
Competitiveness”. His office could ensure optimal coordination among the concerned DGs 
by extending and multiplying the mechanisms identified in this report and building on the 
synergies and complementarities between programmes and initiatives. Efforts should be 
made to ensure that this also has a counterpart “on the ground” where these programmes 
are implemented.  
A Strategic Document could be adopted. It would not be so much about what to do, but 
about how to do it. This Document could make explicit the mission of a facilitator endorsed 
by the EU, indicate clearly who’s in charge, spell out the adopted approach and method, 
clarify the preferred overarching strategic options, and delineate possible specific priorities 
or policy domains where appropriate actions should be decided at relevant levels of action 
(i.e. not in the Document itself). In this way, such a Document would propose a sound 
strategic and action framework as well as a menu of possible areas of initiatives or 
priorities, which would be picked up by relevant stakeholders at appropriate levels of 
actions. It is important that the Document puts forward the conceptual underpinnings of an 
EU industrial policy and the implications this has in policy terms. What is its overarching 
objective: Innovation? Employment? And what consequences does this have, for example, 
in terms of economic, social and territorial cohesion? In particular, the Document should 
take a clear position with respect to the very distinct national expectations placed on an EU 
industrial policy and the differentiated needs of Member States. It is also necessary for the 
Document to explain how the current policies, programmes, initiatives and arrangements at 
EU level articulate and form a coherent policy system contributing to the overarching 
objective. As to specific priorities, these could range from eco-innovation, to digital 
infrastructure, to SME support, to innovation financing, etc. (the stakeholders interviewed 
for this report actually identify a set of around 10 areas of interest).  
This Document would be the result of an intense consultation process bringing together 
different stakeholders, in particular Member States, business organisations, trade unions 
and other non-governmental organisations. It is very important that these stakeholders not 
be exclusively from the EU level, but also from the national, regional, transnational, cross-
regional and local levels. Such consultation should generate and benefit from general 
awareness, as well as political visibility. It should foster ownership around the strategy. It 
is conceivable that a process of ramification, comprising a series of related Documents 
deepening issues in some of the identified policy domains, could be adopted at relevant 
levels of action, following a variable geometry.  
The European Parliament should validate the Main Document and scrutinise its 
implementation (which entails the formulation of a monitoring/evaluation process). The 
European Parliament should also be actively involved in monitoring the progress achieved 
through specific actions.  
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Without relinquishing their prerogatives, and while pursuing their own strategic lines, 
Member States should acknowledge the added value of the EU action thus defined in the 
area of industrial policy. They should endorse the EU mission, which they themselves 
contributed to forging and validating, indeed a necessary condition for an EU industrial 
policy to develop and be successful. They should also throw their weight behind the recent 
investment plan decided at EU level to foster public and private investment.  
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ANNEXES  
List of stakeholders and experts consulted  
Business associations: 
1) EU 
- Business Europe 
- European Association of Craft Small and Medium- Sized Enterprises UEAPME 
- European Employers’ organisation representing companies of the metal engineering 
and technology-based industries CEEMET 
2) EU / others 
- European Regions Research and Innovation Network ERRIN 
- European Business Network EBN  
3) Member States 
- GR - SEV Hellenic Federation of Enterprise 
- IT – Confindustria 
- FR – Confédération Générale du Patronat des Petites et Moyennes Entreprises 
CGPME 
- POL – Lewiatan 
- DE – Zentralverband des Deutschen Handwerks ZDH  
Policy makers: 
1) EU – European Commission 
- DG Regional and Urban policy  
- DG Enterprise and Industry  
- DG Competition  
2) EU –others 
- European Economic and Social Committee EESC 
- Committee of the Region CoR 
3) Member States 
- IT – Ministry of Economic Development 
- FR – Direction Générale des Entreprises 
Experts 
1) Delphi-like:  
K. Ainginger, Austrian Institute of Economic Research Wifo 
M. Best, Massachusetts Institute of Technology MIT 
S. Labory, University Ferrara 
L.Schrefler, Centre d’Etudes et de Prospective Stratégique CEPS 
E. Cohen, Institut d’Etudes Politiques de Paris Sciences Po 
R. Stehrer  The Vienna Institute for International Economic Studies WIIW  
M. Di Tommaso University Ferrara 
D. Ciuriak C.D. Dowe Institute 
S. Schweitzer University of California Los Angeles  
 
2) Others: S. Coulter (London School of Economics), M Czarzasty (Warsaw School of 
Economics).  
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Country fiches 
France 
Key competitiveness indicators  
Rank in the World Economic Forum’s 2014 
Competitiveness Report: 
23rd place 
Industry in GDP (OECD, 2014): 12.5% 
Investment rate (WB, 2014): 20% 
Manufactures of merchandise exports (WB, 
2014): 
77% 
Hi-tech products of exports (WB, 2014): 25% 
Top three manufactured exports (UN, 2013): Machinery and transport 
equipment, chemicals, and food 
and beverages 
Most important export activity (UN, 2013): Machinery and transport 
equipment 
Total national state aid in 2012 (EC, 2013): EUR 14.9 billion 
Budget allocation for 2020 regional and 
cohesion policy (over 7 years) (EC, 2014b): 
EUR 15.9 billion 
Main policy challenges and guiding principles underlying the formulation of an 
industrial policy 
French industrial policy after the Second World War can be divided into three periods.  
The golden period of industrial policy in France coincides with the fifth republic and the late 
post-war period (under the De Gaulle, Pompidou and Giscard d’Estaing governments). In 
particular Pompidou’s rule is exemplary of the state-centred or mixed economy model that 
was dominant in this period coinciding with quite heavy state intervention in some capital-
intensive manufacturing sectors such automobiles and more traditional state monopolies 
such as energy, infrastructure and telecommunications (Gregory and Stuart, 2004). Grand 
projects that involved public procurement to serve the needs of the national markets were 
formulated by the state in nuclear power in 1969, telecommunications in 1974, and high 
speed rail in 1976 (Cohen and Lorenzi, 2000). In this period the state played the triple role 
of shareholder, regulator and strategist (Buigues and Sekkat, 2009), following the model 
that is also sometimes termed Colbertist sometimes called ‘state capitalism’ (Groenewegen, 
1997). 
Austerity hit French industrial policy for the first time in the late 1980s and 1990s (under 
the governments of Mitterand and Chirac) and there was a significant retreat from the 
former state interventionist model. Public spending related to productive economic activity 
in industry was rolled back by at least 50% in the early 1990s (OECD, 1998). The role of 
the state as a shareholder was also significantly reduced as some waves of privatisation 
occurred in this period (Megginson and Netter, 2001), even though the state was known to 
retain control, or a so-called golden veto option, in many strategic enterprises (Pezard, 
1995, Bortolotti and Faccio, 2009). Hence, with the shift from sectoral towards horizontal 
policies there was also an attempt to gradually withdraw the state’s ownership stakes in the 
enterprise part of the economy. 
In this period sectoral and export aid was reduced to more than half its previous size (from 
around 51% of the state budget to around 22%), whereas horizontal initiatives such as 
support for R&D, regional development and SMEs was increased from 21% to around 73% 
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of public support towards private enterprise or state aid (Buigues and Sekkat, 2009). There 
was also a complete shift in focus away from dirigisme and a strategising role of the state 
towards a very strong focus on competition policy as the main regulating force (Cohen and 
Lorenzi, 2000). 
With France’s new industrial policy from the mid-2000s, however, there was renewed 
interest in the active role of the government in the area of industrial policy (Beffa, 2005). 
What had formerly been achieved in the area of privatisation or state withdrawal was partly 
reversed under recent governments. This stance has only escalated with the Global 
Financial Crisis (Montebourg, 2013) and many of the new industrial policy initiatives 
launched back in the mid-2000s under Sarkozy have been scaled up, especially since 2013 
(EUROACTIV, 2013). Government funding for private enterprise and/or direct involvement 
via state ownership has made a significant come back, especially now in the aftermath of 
the Global Financial Crisis and due to bailouts directly or indirectly via the banking system. 
Principal measures and arrangements  
The new industrial policy was introduced in France around the mid-2000s according to Beffa 
(2005). Currently it comprises five pillars, the last two having only recently been added 
with the ambitious 34-plan programme.  
The first pillar focuses specifically on innovation policy and in recent years has had a 
renewed focus on new industrial development. To some extent this is overlapping and 
complementary to the latest addition and the fourth pillar on public procurement in 
emerging technologies. Instruments targeting innovation policy include special types of 
finance for SMEs, but otherwise it is focused mostly on incentivising private R&D (EC, 
2014). The French system for innovation support has traditionally had a distinctive focus on 
so-called hi-tech industries and/or focusing on higher value-added activities. 
The second pillar has a regional aim, which to some extent coincides with regional aid 
under the cohesion objectives of the EU. Since 2000 France has operated quite an 
extensive scheme for land development in combination with industrial policy objectives 
named the ‘Pôles de Compétitivité’ (see below for more details). 
The third pillar concerns support for small and medium-sized enterprises. Initially the aim 
was to break down barriers to financing among this group of firms. However, recently there 
has been a strong overlap between the first and third pillar whereby similar instruments are 
being used by large enterprises and already existing R&D spenders. Recently R&D tax 
incentives that were typically focused on the larger firms have been extended to include 
SMEs under the ‘Young Innovative Companies’ initiative (Lelarge, 2008). 
According to some observers, in terms of spending, the first three pillars are still moderate 
elements of the new industrial policy. For example, Buigues and Sekkat (2009) explain how 
a lot of aid in France is still sectoral rather than horizontal, that it supports de facto cost-
cutting rather than innovative activities and that often, in practice, it is paid out to large-
scale not small-scale enterprises. 
The fourth pillar, in contrast, has an entirely sectoral aim and is very much a continuation 
of past public procurement policies, but in the realm of new emerging industries and 
potential future key enabling technologies. The 34-plan programme consists of a very 
ambitious plan for industrial renewal in a partnership between the private and public actors 
(Ministry of Economy, 2013, 2014). The fourth pillar is balanced by a fifth pillar that 
emphasises the regulatory role of the state.  
Overall France conducts both horizontal and sectoral both horizontal and sectoral industrial 
policy. In one sense the current system is a reflection of a gradualist revision strategy and 
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a very difficult political economy that has left France today with a dual industrial policy 
reflecting the ideals of both the mixed and market economic systems  
(Buigues and Sekkat, 2009). 
Example of a relevant policy initiative 
The initiative on competitiveness clusters in France was first announced in 2002 officially 
launched with a call for prospective investors in 2004 (Brette and Chappoz, 2004). The 
budget for the first three-year phase was €4.5 billion (Fontagné et al. 2010). According to 
the official website: A competitiveness cluster brings together large and small firms, 
research laboratories and educational establishments, all working together in a specific 
region to develop synergies and cooperative efforts. Other partners may be brought in, 
such as public authorities, either local or national, as well as firms providing business 
services. The aim of the cluster initiative is to foster innovation by building collaborative 
ties and synergies among different actors in the innovation system – bridging the so-called 
triple helix of collaboration across industry, universities (including research institutes) and 
local government. 
Originally the intention was to build 15 focused clusters. However, due to the political 
economy of regional development, the funds have been diluted into what have become in 
practice 66 different poles or clusters across France. Basically, selection took place via a 
two-step system of self-selection (Fontagné et al. 2010). While the initiative aims mainly to 
be a place-based type of policy, targeting land development combined with place-based 
aspects of the economies of innovation, such as externalities and public goods, it is clear 
that this type of policy often ends up having a sectoral aim due to its planning character of 
targeting specific activities towards locating in particular areas in a top-down manner.  
This is also very much true of the French cluster programme. Martin et al. (2011) offer an 
initial ex-post evaluation of the cluster initiative. Their study suggests that the 
competitiveness clusters are generally located in regions of industrial decline and benefit 
overtly ailing firms, and that the policy has not been able to meet productivity (innovation) 
targets, although there has been some effect on employment. However, the research does 
not address innovation outcomes explicitly, which would appear to be the main objective 
behind the policy. 
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Germany  
Key competitiveness indicators  
Rank in the World Economic Forum’s 2014 
Competitiveness Report: 
5th place 
Industry in GDP (OECD, 2014): 25.8% 
Investment rate (WB, 2014): 17%  
Manufactures in merchandise exports (WB, 
2014): 
82.5% 
Hi-tech products in exports (WB, 2014): 16% 
Top three manufactured exports (UN, 2013): Machinery and transport 
equipment, chemicals and goods 
classified chiefly by material 
Most important export activity (UN, 2013): Machinery and transport 
equipment 
Total national state aid in 2012 (EC, 2013): EUR 11.9 billion 
Budget allocation for 2020 regional and 
cohesion policy (over 7 years) (EC, 2014b): 
EUR 19.23 billion 
Main policy challenges and guiding principles underlying the formulation of an 
industrial policy 
Germany, like the rest of Europe has its own variant of capitalism allowing for a type of 
competitiveness based on high wages and social cohesion policies (Streeck, 1997). The 
state is described as facilitating rather than directly intervening in most aspects of 
industrial policy. The production system that accompanies this is labelled as one of 
diversified quality production (Vitols, 2004). But Germany still has a somewhat strong 
policy tradition in this area even though it is more difficult to spot due to the high level of 
decentralisation that accompanies the state’s facilitating role and that exists in terms of 
policy implementation in the federal system of semi-independent states (Buigues and 
Sekkat, 2009). A specific characteristic of the German variant of capitalism are the special 
industrial relations that are based relatively more on long contracts (for workers) or long 
contractual borrowing schemes via a bank-based system (for capital or finance) (Gregory 
and Stuart, 2013, Vitols, 1997). Another distinctive feature of the German system is the 
low wage (and productivity) dispersion between skilled and unskilled workers compared to 
the Anglo-Saxon variant of capitalism. Different issues are worth considering as background 
information to understand the German position vis-à-vis industrial policy. 
The first issue is horizontal industrial policy-making at the state or Länder level. The states 
themselves are budgetary units for most of the horizontal initiatives. Typically decisions are 
taken at the federal level, but the responsibility for implementation rests with the Länder. 
The special division of power in Germany is based on a cooperative form of Federalism. This 
is very much driven by the philosophy that a bottom-up approach to many of the schemes 
under the horizontal initiatives gets the incentives right. One example is finance for SMEs 
where there are considerable differences across states in Germany (Buigues and Sekkat, 
2009). This state-level system for horizontal support to enterprise is amongst Europe’s 
oldest in the realm of industrial policy. In many ways it replaces the need for local land-
development schemes except in the case of the new Länder in East Germany (see below). 
The second issue is Germany’s green party politics and the push for sustainable solutions 
via policies such as industrial policy. Germany was at the forefront of thinking when in 2011 
it took the final decision to dismantle its nuclear-powered parts of the energy sector and 
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instead placed a high priority on sustainable solutions based on natural and everlasting 
energy resources such as water, wind and sun (Ren21, 2013). Since 1997 the red-green 
coalition has pushed for an ambitious renewable scheme whereby Germany is expected to 
run on 50% renewable energy by 2050 (Lauber and Mez, 2004). 
The third issue is German unification and the break that unification caused with some of 
Germany’s established traditions in the area of industrial policy. German unification is of 
interest to anyone in understanding the clashes, differences and potentials that exists also 
in the greater scheme of European unification today. In principle Germany is a mini-
experiment for understanding the long term benefits of having East and West work 
together in a greater industrial plan. One of the big problems has been that West German 
institutions are often not transferable in any direct way to the East (Wiesenthal, 2003). At 
the same time East and West Germany are also different. In particular it is labour rather 
than capital mobility that has been the main driving force behind the unification adventure, 
which had very high initial adjustment costs but today must be considered a tremendous 
success.  
However, in some respects there are also losers, e.g. the new Länder in East Germany 
have been left behind and are today somehow caught between the traditional German 
Länder system and Poland’s move to market economy. The new Länder now take an 
approach to land development that is in fact closer to the Polish than the traditional 
German state level model. Other losers include the old plants (that were located in the new 
Länder in East Germany), with this also followed a massive migration of the most skilled 
human capital from East to West. 
Principal measures and arrangements  
Most of Germany’s current measures on industrial policy fall under the horizontal approach 
at the decentralised or state level (Buigues and Sekkat, 2009). Recent figures from the 
Ministry of Finance (2014) suggest that this is continuing, however, with a stronger weight 
on tax breaks over time and especially tax breaks that actually relieve businesses from 
paying electricity duty. A new budget rule that was made binding in 2011 puts a ceiling on 
new borrowing for subsidies at 0.35% of GDP (Ministry of Finance, 2014). Together the 
implementation of the budget rule and the increasing duties on energy explain the large 
shift towards tax breaks in the German system. In the overall subsidy structure the most 
recent figures show that two-thirds of all public support is via tax breaks and only one third 
via subsidies that are actually paid out (Ministry of Finance, 2014). It is also estimated that 
tax breaks make up around 5%-6% of the total tax base in Germany. 
At the heart of this approach is a three-legged system of rendering support to all firms 
regardless of the industry, size or background in terms of alleviating their constraints in 
factor markets for capital (first leg) and skills (second leg). The third leg aims to overcome 
barriers to private R&D spending mainly through state provided subsidies for innovative 
activities. Often these schemes have a particular aim of fostering R&D with start-ups and 
hence provide for venture capital. In practice these support systems make up a rather 
small amount of the total budget – e.g. in the region of maximum 2%-3% of all public 
support tax breaks (Ministry of Finance, 2014). Funds are channelled via Germany’s two-
tiered banking structure where local co-operative banks play a central role in lending to 
SMEs under the support schemes (Deeg, 1998). However, as previously mentioned, in the 
reporting from the Ministry of Finance these horizontal policies only take up a minor part of 
the total budget for ‘Trade and Industry’. It is interesting to note that a relevant share of 
tax breaks go towards alleviating energy duties levied by the state. Hence, the energy 
policy directly or indirectly absorbs the majority share of the German budget for industrial 
policy. A significant part of the budget also goes towards the German Länder Thanks to the 
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effective reunification policies combined with EU Structural Funds, the East German Länder 
have an entirely different economic basis than they had 22 years ago, where SMEs now 
dominate the economic landscape (Ministry of Interior, 2012). However, some regions have 
had very high adjustment costs, which is why there is a need for continued support and 
new measures and policy experiments such as developing clusters (Dohse, 2007). 
Example of a relevant policy initiative 
One of Germany’s main strategies in the area of incentivising the production and usage of 
renewable energy equipment is the focus on solar panels. In principle this is a strategy that 
aims to create a so-called lead market (Von Hippel, 1986, Beise, 2004) for an emerging 
technology where there are identified bottlenecks in the system for technology 
development, adoption and exploitation. The main barriers to technology development are 
the economies of time, whereby subsidising an infant industry can become efficient 
because of learning and externalities. The main barrier for adoption is systemic and can 
only typically be alleviated by the state supplying new institutional solutions that can 
secure the transition from one type of technology to another. Finally, the main barrier to 
exploitation lies more in the commercial perspective of the private investor who needs to 
see a business case before exploiting the technology in commercial terms, e.g. it could be 
households that go from being only users to both users and producers of energy in the 
renewable energy system. In the latter perspective it is often necessary also to offer a 
support price leading to excess profits before all the combined bottlenecks are overcome 
and a de facto market-based system will take off. The German renewables system aims to 
alleviate all three bottlenecks and is arguably modelled very much according to the 
experiences of the Danish windmill industry, which came prior to the development of solar 
panels as a commercial and viable technology (Hansen et al., 2003).  
In the solar panels sector, producers have been subsidised via the Länder-based horizontal 
support system, a system for buying up and distributing solar-based energy has been 
established, and a market support price is offered to supply potential investors with a 
relatively lucrative business case (Gawel and Purkus, 2013). However, weak points are the 
facts that Germany is not the optimum location for exploiting the solar panel option in 
renewables from a production efficiency viewpoint and other very strong producers have 
been fast to emerge and take over most of global production in a very short space of time. 
For example, over a five-year period China moved from producing almost no solar panels 
for export, to serving 80% of the world market for solar panels (Ren21, 2014, 
www.ft.com/globaleconomy.). 
However, solar panels have features that other types of renewable energy sources do not 
have, because the panels can be exploited for both consumption and commercial purposes 
by individual households. Therefore, solar panels offer entirely different types of business 
models for future electricity consumption. Furthermore, the acceleration in all the 
aforementioned relationships (development, adoption and exploitation) makes Germany the 
lead market in all aspects except production (which has been taken by China, see Ren21, 
2014). Some estimates suggest that solar panels are about to take off as 100% market 
viable and may lead to supplying 30% of energy consumption in Germany within the next 
two years. Added to that is the very sizeable reduction in cost (mainly due to subsidized 
production from outside the EU), which now promises to make the technology more viable 
overall than initially anticipated (Schleicher-Tappeser, 2012). In 2014 renewables were 
estimated to supply Germany with 24% of its energy needs, the majority derived from 
windmills and solar panels (Ren21, 2014).  
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Greece 
Key competitiveness indicators  
Rank in the World Economic Forum’s 2014 
Competitiveness Report: 
81st place 
Industry in GDP (OECD, 2014): 14.2 % 
Investment rate (WB, 2013): 13% 
Manufactures in merchandise exports (WB, 
2013): 
32% 
Hi-tech products in exports (WB, 2013): 9% 
Top three manufactured exports (UN, 2013): Medications, goods “not elsewhere 
classified” and aluminium plates 
Most important export activity (UN, 2013): Transportation and travel 
Total national state aid in 2012 (EC, 2013): EUR 1.9 billion 
Budget allocation for 2020 regional and 
cohesion policy (over 7 years, EC, 2014b): 
EUR 15.5 billion  
Main policy challenges and guiding principles underlying the formulation of an 
industrial policy 
The prolonged economic and financial crisis in Greece has made industrial policy subject to 
several rounds of revision (see below). The main challenge for Greece has been to maintain 
competitiveness whilst adopting the Euro. The underlying cause for this is that following the 
breakdown of the Bretton Wood system in 1972, Greece resorted to devaluations of the 
drachma as a way to regain short-term competitiveness (Lazaretou, 2003). From a 
structural viewpoint this has left Greece in a very weak competitiveness situation that is too 
focused and reliant on price competitiveness and lacks an orientation towards the 
innovative potential of the country and its industry (EC, 2014).  
The concentration of industry around the capital and the port of Piraeus has been one of 
the main challenges for industrialisation in Greece in the twentieth century. Greece has 
built a relatively successful base around the country’s tourism industry, which today is the 
main contributing factor to a positive trade balance in services (UN, 2013, WTO, 2014) and 
overall balanced trade. However, dependence on economic activities that are more 
vulnerable to crises and to exchange rate movements, such as tourism, has recently 
pushed Greece to consider measures of selective intervention aimed at reindustrialisation 
(OECD, 2011). Thus, traditional industries such as food and machinery have been on the 
rise during the crisis. Despite this, there has been a constant and quite significant decline in 
manufactured exports especially since 2009 (WB, 2014). The fastest growing export items 
during the crisis were natural resources such as oil, fish and agriculture (UN, 2013). 
The country is in a situation where temporary measures are sought that can help to put 
momentum into building a stronger and more export-oriented manufacturing base. 
Manufactured food products, pharmaceutical products, textiles and machinery for 
traditional industries such as food and textiles, are some of the areas that Greece can build 
on and seek to upgrade (WTO, 2014).  
Principal measures and arrangements  
The most important measures of industrial policy are: 1. to reduce energy costs in Greek 
industries; 2. to enhance the business environment for entrepreneurs; and 3. to connect 
scientific research with the production side of the economy (GL Digest, 2012). For example, 
business sector R&D is among the lowest in the EU (OECD, 2010). Another important 
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contemporary initiative concerns the introduction of spatially targeted and differentiated 
investment subsidies. This initiative was also followed up by the new Investment Incentives 
Law (see below).  
Some of the above measures are implemented through the following investment 
incentives: 
1. A general 100% tax break for all entrepreneurs irrespective of sector. 
 
2. Regional cohesion aid for up to 70% of the investment (maximum allowance)  
(see also below). 
 
3. Technological aid for up to 80% of the investment.  
 
4. Youth entrepreneurship (20-40 years old) is supported by 100% of the investment 
and by up to €1 million for the first five years. 
 
5. Large investors are subsidised by up to 60% of the investment. 
 
6. Initiatives targeting the technological, administrative, organisational and business 
modernisation of existing enterprises are supported by up to 100% of the 
investment. 
 
7. Partnership and networking initiatives leading to the formation of clusters (at least 
five or ten firms depending on the region) can also seek support for up to 100% of 
the investment (GoGreeceNow, 2014). 
 
In short, very generous investment subsidies are available for almost any type of business 
investment, whereas tax incentives in Greece currently target only entrepreneurs.  
The recent trends and initiatives related to industrial policy in Greece suggest that the 
country is seeking to align its policies with the horizontal policy stance of other EU 
countries, where the emphasis is on the areas of capital, land and institutions, related to 
entrepreneurship policies and alleviating barriers to finance among SMEs.  
If policy has been selective in Greece it has been towards activities within the areas of 
technology and energy in particular. 
Example of a relevant policy initiative 
Greece’s new investment incentive law includes a plan for regional cohesion. Given that 
Greece has been a long-term recipient of EU Structural Funds since becoming a member of 
the EU in 1981, this should be seen rather as a revised version of old cohesion plans and 
investment subsidies than a new initiative (Filippaios and Kottaridi, 2004, see also OECD, 
2011 for an initial assessment)).  
Greece offers a graduated scheme by both investor size (small, medium and large) and by 
region (A, B and C development level). Subsidies through these two dimensions vary 
typically from 15% to 50% of the investment. The ceiling for maximum allowable public 
support is 70% of the total investment for re-investors and 80% for new investors. The 
target group for subsidies under this scheme is investors that address local needs or 
capitalise on local competitive advantages. 
In relation to this initiative focusing on regional cohesion, Greece has applied to the EU 
Commission to be allowed to adopt a policy similar to the Polish and British, using special 
economic zones as leverage in the endeavour to attract more investment into the country. 
However, it is uncertain whether the EU Commission will allow Greece to adopt the zones 
policy. It seems the present allowance discussed above towards regional cohesion and 
clusters is based on investment subsidies alone, whereas a tax incentive scheme as applied 
for would make public support a more permanent or built-in feature of the system. 
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Despite the generous public support for investment in Greek regions, over time the results 
of the incentive schemes have often been quite modest (Filippaios and Kottaridi, 2004). 
This also suggests that the current and revised plan for creating more regional cohesion 
with the new law of 2011 is likely to be futile unless it is combined with new and more 
radical plans for solving some of the fundamental problems of investors such as their need 
for transparency, rule of law and better provision of public goods including infrastructure 
(EC, 2014). 
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Italy  
Key competitiveness indicators  
Rank in the World Economic Forum’s 2014 
Competitiveness Report: 
49th  
Industry in GDP (OECD, 2014): 18,4% (2012 figure) 
Investment rate (WB, 2014): 17% 
Manufactures of merchandise exports (WB, 
2014): 
82% 
Hi-tech products of exports (WB, 2014): 7,07% 
Top three manufactured exports (UN, 2013): Machinery and transport 
equipment, goods classified chiefly 
by material, miscellaneous 
manufactured 
Total national state aid in 2012 (EC, 2013): 5,7 bn euro 
Budget allocation for 2020 regional and 
cohesion policy (over 7 years) (EC, 2014b): 
44 bn euro 
Main policy challenges and guiding principles underlying the formulation of an 
industrial policy 
During the 1950s and 1960s, the North of Italy faced a period of rapid growth – the so 
called “economic miracle” – during which the industrialisation process started. The leading 
instruments for Industrial Policy included state-owned enterprises, public holdings (in the 
1950s) and a (government controlled) credit system in the 1960s (Rota, 2013). In 
particular, the development model in the South was characterised by the establishment of 
capital-intensive and large-scale (state-owned) industries (e.g. chemicals and metallurgy), 
which – due to their size and product specialisation – remained isolated entities and only in 
a few cases were able to create links with local SMEs. In the Centre-North the development 
of the mechanical and metallurgical industries allowed for a more diversified and balanced 
structure with small firms able to compete and cooperate thanks to a flexible organisational 
structure that facilitated their coordination, such as the district.  
At the end of the 1960s dramatic changes affected the country in terms of the prices of 
labour, raw materials and energy. The South suffered most because of the inability of large 
firms to react quickly to external shocks. In contrast, the Centre-North was able to adapt to 
the new macroeconomic scenario thanks to the flexibility of the SME system.  
In the 1970s while the other advanced European countries’ strategies and merger alliances 
were creating large conglomerates able to compete in the oligopolistic European markets, 
the priorities of Italian industrial policy were to support firms in crisis and to enlarge the 
sphere of public sector intervention. This approach also continued in the 1980s.  
In the 1980s and 1990s, the indications of the EC (e.g., the creation of a competitive 
environment with minimal government intervention and horizontal measures) had a 
significant impact on the way in which industrial policy was formulated in Italy. The Italian 
productive system experienced a deep regulatory reform from the 1990s onwards, 
characterised by a large privatisation programme (Bianchi Labory 2011)81. Also, direct 
subsidies and state aid decreased over the period 2002-2011 by around 70%  
                                           
81  On this occasion, the Institute for Industrial Reconstruction (IRI) was closed down. It was founded by the 
fascist government in the 1930s and played the role of a holding, owning most of the industrial system.  
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(Di Maio, 2013)82 while the objectives pursued by state aid changed over the years, by 
shifting from supporting the accumulation of capital to promoting R&D and 
internationalisation activities.  
The current approach recognizes different weaknesses of the industrial system that should 
be addressed:  
1) the size of firms: Italy has a strong prevalence of micro-companies of fewer than 10 
employees (46.1% of employment, compared to the EU average of 28.7%, see EC, 
2013), a source of concern since firm size is strongly correlated with export-
orientation and innovation.  
2) the financial structure of SMEs, which are less capitalised than in other countries, a 
factor limiting SMEs dimensional growth and their capacity to make investments in 
new products and technologies.  
3) the relatively underdeveloped Italian venture capital and private equity market, 
forcing SMEs to rely more on short-term borrowing than in other countries.  
Principal measures and arrangements  
Only recently has a structured national vision for industrial policy been developed in Italy, 
with the “Industria 2015” programme. Launched in 2006, the programme has brought to 
the forefront some issues reflected in the communications and initiatives recently adopted 
by the European Commission, such as the central role of the manufacturing sector and of 
technological innovation, as well as the aggregation and the creation of networks. The two 
specific objectives of the Programme are: i) to develop industrial activities in the field of 
high technology; and ii) to upgrade and strengthen SMEs through research and technical 
development, reduction in costs, promotion of investments, and increase in size. The two 
main pillars of the strategy are: 1) the deregulation of the service sector (e.g. insurance 
companies, banks, distribution, etc.) with the objective of promoting more competition in 
those sectors and improving productivity, 2) a national innovation policy strategy whose 
objective is to coordinate the policies of each region and to create five areas of economic 
activity (see below). The “Industria 2015” programme makes use of three innovative 
instruments: 1) Projects for industrial innovation; 2) Networks of enterprises; 3) Innovative 
finance.  
At the end of 2013 the Italian Court of Audits declared the failure of the “Industria 2015” 
programme83. Six years from its launch only three projects (Energy Efficiency, Sustainable 
Mobility and Made in Italy) - out of the 303 presented - had received funds. Only 3%  
(€24 million) of resources allocated to the programme (around €800 million) had been 
spent. According to the Court’s Assessment, the success of the programme was 
encumbered by administrative burdens (23-25 months to get an admission decree), the 
instability of the programmes (continuous changes of schedule), and the scarcity of 
necessary resources (inconsistency between technical and administrative data). Further 
challenges to the implementation of the programme included the economic crisis and 
institutional instability. The programme has faced a reduction of available resources 
(around €663 million reduced to €200 million) under the present government and is 
currently ‘frozen’. 
                                           
82  Di Maio, M. (2013), Industrial Policy in Italy: History, Results and Future Challenges. 
83    http://www.ilsole24ore.com/art/notizie/2013_12_23/industria_2015_corte_conti_boccia_fondo_la_competitivit
a e sviluppo  154247.shtml?uuid=ABvl2nl. http://www.ict4executive.it/pmi/approfondimenti/industria-2015-i-
numeri-di-un-progetto-mai-decollato_43672152463.htm. 
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In addition to “Industria 2015”, there other measures worth mentioning including the 
Italian Investment Fund (Fondo Italiano d’investimento)84 created in 2010 in order to 
support the capitalisation of SMEs, and the Central Guarantee Fund (CGF), introduced in 
2000 with a loan guarantee programme to provide guarantees for SME loans granted by 
banks or Mutual Guarantee Institutions.  
Example of a relevant policy initiative 
The Mechatronics Technological Cluster in the province of Bari is a successful example of 
implementation of a place-based approach in Italy. It develops out of a long-standing 
industrial tradition in precision mechanics. Having identified mechatronics as a promising 
path to increase the competitiveness of Apulian firms, in 2007 the independent agency 
ARTI promoted the establishment of the Mechatronics Technological Cluster, a body named 
MEDIS. MEDIS involves private enterprises and universities that collaborate for the 
development of pre-competitive enabling technologies that are sufficiently generic to find 
application in a variety of sectors (from automotive to biomedical, among others), and that 
do not directly lead to commercially exploitable results. For the period 2011-2015 MEDIS 
decided to focus its activities on specific intervention areas, selected after a consultation 
process with its members and ensuring coverage of all their activities. MEDIS received in 
2007 a first grant of €3 million from the Italian government for university research. In 2011 
and 2012 the central government approved a further €50 million contribution. The projects 
started in 2012 and involve both public and private members. They are expected to be 
concluded by the end of 2015.  
Existing quantitative evidence about the number of spin-offs generated and the number of 
patents and utility model applications submitted (changes in the functionalities of already 
existing processes or products), suggest that significant progress has been made since 
2005 (Florio et al. 2014). One of the lessons drawn from this initiative is that the 
development of Key Enabling Technologies (KETs) - cross-cutting pre-competitive 
technologies, which in principle could be applied to a variety of sectors - favours the 
diversification of the industrial basis and maximises the utility of generated knowledge. The 
types of technology on which to focus the research and innovation efforts should be driven 
by the local industrial tradition, and selected through a participatory approach. This 
happened in the case of the Apulian mechatronics cluster, thanks to the initial important 
role of facilitator played by the regional agency ARTI. 
                                           
84  http://www.dt.tesoro.it/en/news/attivita_2011.html. 
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Poland 
Key competitiveness indicators  
Rank in the World Economic Forum’s 2014 
Competitiveness Report 
43rd place 
Industry in GDP (OECD, 2014) 24.6% 
Investment rate (WB, 2014) 19% 
Manufactures in merchandise exports (WB, 
2014) 
77% 
Hi-tech products in exports (WB, 2014) 7% 
Top three manufactured exports (UN, 2013)  Parts for cars, Cars and TV sets 
Most important export activity (UN, 2013) Transportation and Travel 
Total national state aid in 2012 (EC, 2013) EUR 2.7 billion 
Budget allocation for 2020 regional and 
Cohesion Policy (over 7 years) (EC, 2014b) 
EUR 89 billion 
Main policy challenges and guiding principles underlying the formulation of an 
industrial policy 
Polish industrial policy in recent times can be divided into three periods. The first period 
was under socialism leading up to Poland’s transition from a centrally planned to a market-
based economy in 1990. The second was under the new market economy until Poland 
became a full member of the EU in 2004. The last period is post-EU membership. Each 
period is marked by turbulence and shifting priorities due to the forthcoming changes that 
are overshadowing the investment climate and hence also the business environment within 
which industrial policy is conducted. Only very recently could Poland be described as having 
reached a stable political environment and market economy within which a modern 
industrial policy can be meaningfully formulated.   
It is against the historical background of a centrally planned system that we should try to 
understand the reformation of industrial policy and in particular industrial relations in 
Poland. In some respects the 1990s and early 2000s took Poland very suddenly from a 
centrally planned economy to a market-driven economy (Poznanski, 1993). In this period, 
industrial policy was caught between different currents that moved Poland de facto more 
towards a mixed type of economic system with quite heavy state ownership in some 
sectors. Thus Poland came to resemble France in its industrial system and relations, 
Germany in terms of trying to decentralise decision-making to the regional level, and the 
UK in its austerity, central banking and financial systems (Gregory and Stuart, 2013). In 
terms of industrial policy, there was very heavy emphasis on attracting foreign direct 
investors (Jensen, 2001). It is the foreign investors and not the state that are starting to 
pick the winners in Poland. At the same time the problem for indigenous ownership and 
development is that there are very few capable local industrialists with the necessary 
capital and know-how to privatise the rest of the firms. This is one reason why the state 
prolonged the privatisation process for many of the industries that are considered either to 
be failing or declining or, at the other extreme, some of those considered to be Poland’s 
most strategic (e.g. in particular natural monopolies and those related to the financial 
sector) (Baltowski and Mickiewicz, 2000). This new economy and entirely market-based 
system was fully cemented or stabilised only in 2004 when Poland’s EU membership 
became a reality. The country was then considered prepared to compete fully on the free 
Internal Market. EU accession provided Poland with access to new avenues of funding for 
industrial policy such as the Structural Funds.  
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Some of the main challenges facing Poland today are the very low employment rate and 
the continuous significant structural bottlenecks in the labour market. Other challenges 
include insufficient market competition and heavy barriers to entrepreneurship (EC, 2014). 
Many industries are also marked by the extensive and continuous involvement of the state 
(such as networked industries or natural monopolies) either via prolonged privatisation 
procedures or golden veto provisions (Egert and Goujard, 2014). Further challenges are 
strengthening competition policy and improving public procurement procedures. The old 
debates on industrial relations have resurfaced with the financial crisis (Czarzasty and 
Owczarek, 2012). The innovation system is also characterised by different weaknesses. 
Poland is specialised in specific segments of industry which typically include a strong focus 
on past industrial strengths, cost structures and large investors, while relatively less 
attention is paid to SMEs, upgrading of past strengths and the emergence of new ones via 
innovation (Jensen and Winiarczyk, 2014, Wyznikiewics, 2012). There is now a debate 
about the more strategic need for an industrial policy to push such concerns. However, the 
EU seems to be the main driver due to the significant weight of structural funding in 
Poland. 
Principal measures and arrangements  
Besides continuous state ownership or golden veto provisions in some sectors of the 
industry, the principal measures and arrangements in Poland regarding active industrial 
policy take two forms that are not directly related to specific government formulated plans 
for an industrial policy85. The first main measure that can be identified is Poland’s monetary 
and exchange rate policy, where the principal aim of NBP (nbp.pl) has been to keep the 
exchange rate competitive, maintain low inflation and also keep increases in labour costs to 
a moderate level. The other principal measure is related to Structural Funds spending in 
Poland. Typically, local, provincial or state government will be actively involved in co-
investment related to Structural Funds spending. Hence, the priorities established for the 
Structural Funds programmes for Poland in the previous and present budget period (as set 
out in the partnership agreements between the EC and each Member State, e.g. as in EC, 
2014c for Poland) de facto are the main investment factor contributing to industrial policy 
in Poland (see also Sluzarczyk, 2009 for a presentation of horizontal policy under Poland’s 
first budget period 2007-2013; it is clear that this is entirely driven by the EU priorities in 
the area of industrial policy). 
Example of a relevant policy initiative 
The Special Economic Zones (SEZ) policy was first introduced in Poland in 1994 (Jensen 
and Winiarczyk, 2014). The SEZ policy was typically targeted at high unemployment 
regions at the outset of transition. The ad hoc construction of SEZs came about to help 
alleviate the situation and attract new employment opportunities, new technologies and 
investment, with the aim of building a new export base. The Special Economic Zones Act of 
1994 set out the following policy objectives: 1) to develop the designated areas of 
economic activity, 2) to facilitate technology transfer to the zones, 3) to boost exports from 
the designated areas, 4) to increase the competitiveness of the goods and services 
produced, 5) to develop the existing industrial make-up and upgrade the economic 
infrastructure, 6) to create new places of employment and 7) to facilitate the adoption of 
sustainable technologies and energy sources. 
                                           
85  This strategy has yet to be finalised and published, but it is expected to be closely related to the forthcoming 
partnership agreement with the EC under the Cohesion Policy.  
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Over time the policy has been subject to many revisions including a constant enlargement 
in territorial terms, changes in specific rules concerning tax incentives, and changes in the 
transitory regime when the policy is expected to be phased out. Just recently the original 
deadline of 2017 for when the incentives had to be phased out, which was established upon 
Poland’s joining the EU, was extended to 2026. For example, the initial idea of keeping the 
zones strictly concentrated to the very localised and originally designated areas was 
rejected in 1997, mainly for political reasons (KPMG 2009, Gwosdz et al., 2008). 
Subsequently, local governors, including zone administrators and also, in some cases, 
indirectly the foreign investors themselves, have been able to bargain for the policy to be 
applicable to areas adjacent to the original zones, thus over time the zones have become 
mobile. In other words, a supply-side policy, in terms of locations offered to potential 
investors with special incentives, developed into a policy that became dominated more by a 
set of demand-side processes, and the geographical delineation of the SEZs became fuzzy.  
What was originally seen as a redundant supply of industrial land for development changed 
into a de facto demand for incentives to develop land (and sometimes now inclusive of 
existing state-owned enterprises) that was otherwise under threat of becoming redundant. 
Finally, with Poland’s accession to the EU in 2004 many of the same regions became 
eligible for EU Structural Funds. The issue is whether SEZ policies and Structural Fund 
policies will lead to stand-alone development once the policy and public support scheme are 
phased out. Jensen and Winiarczyk (2014) document how the zones policy has been 
moderately successful in some of its development objectives such as new business 
formation and attraction of FDI. 
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United Kingdom 
Key competitiveness indicators  
Rank in the World Economic Forum’s 2013 
Competitiveness Report: 
9th place 
Industry in GDP (OECD, 2014): 14.6 % 
Investment rate (WB, 2013): 15% 
Manufactures in merchandise exports (WB, 
2013): 
66% 
Hi-tech products in exports (WB, 2013): 22% 
Top three manufactured exports (UN, 2013): Machinery, cars, goods not 
elsewhere classified, and chemicals 
Most important export activity (UN, 2013): Machinery and cars 
Total national state aid in 2012 (EC, 2013): EUR 4.9 billion  
Budget allocation for 2020 regional and 
cohesion policy (over 7 years): 
EUR 12 billion  
Estimated dependency ratio: 0.3 
 
Main policy challenges and guiding principles underlying the formulation of an 
industrial policy 
The UK is now very actively involved in the formulation of an industrial policy or what the 
UK government announces as the country’s official ‘industrial strategy’ (BIS, 2014, House 
of Commons, 2014). The revival of industrial policy in the UK in the aftermath of the 
financial crisis can be seen as a reflection of lessons learned from past waves of industrial 
policy in the UK (Crafts and Hughes, 2013).  
A series of labour governments in the 1950s and 1960s left the country with the perception 
of a history of picking winners that had gone wrong. Margaret Thatcher phased out the 
selective policies in the 1970s and horizontal policies were also downsized with 
privatisation, the main priority in the 1970s and 1980s. A renewed focus was placed on 
more traditional measures of competitiveness, such as monetary and exchange rate policy 
(Griffiths and Wall, 2004).  
After EU membership in 1973 state aid fell considerably from 3.8% of manufacturing GDP 
to less than 1% (Crafts and Hughes, 2013). With EU membership also followed a 
strengthening of competition policy and an abandonment of protectionism. Labour 
governments since the late 1990s have introduced strengthened measures of R&D policy 
intact to the Thatcher stance of minimalist horizontal industrial policy combined with 
traditional monetary and exchange rate policy (Griffiths and Wall, 2004). Investments in 
public goods vital to private enterprise suffered the most during these decades. In the 
twenty-first century there has been a strong shift towards emphasising innovation and 
SMEs in the UK, and in particular targeting their barriers to growth via factor markets 
(access to finance and skills) (Crafts and Hughes, 2013, EC, 2014). 
In recent years and especially in the aftermath of the financial crisis, the main challenge for 
UK competitiveness has been a slowdown in productivity, investment, trade and the overall 
growth of the business sector. Impetus, in terms of employment growth and innovation, is 
described as having shifted from larger firms to SMEs over the period of transition towards 
the UK opening up to much freer competition on world markets  
(BIS, 2012a). Hence, a particular challenge for policy seems to be the redirection of 
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initiatives to the new population of firms that drive growth. In this respect a major problem 
in the UK is the relative decline in business sector spending on R&D, making the UK the 
second lowest performer in R&D intensity in the G7 (BIS, 2012a, EC, 2014). This has 
encouraged the UK put a strong focus on R&D tax incentives for businesses in an initiative 
that is described in more detail below. 
Principal measures and arrangements  
The aim of the current industrial strategy in the UK is to build confidence in the UK 
economy and to secure investment and growth. Specifically the government has the 
following objectives (BIS, 2014, House of Commons, 2014): 
i. to develop strategic partnerships between government and industry;  
 
ii. to support emerging technologies; 
 
iii. to improve access to finance for businesses; 
 
iv. to work with businesses to help them develop the skills businesses need; 
 
v. to publish government contracts (e.g. for public procurement) in order to provide 
confidence for business investment. 
 
The key documents that spell out these strategies are: The Plan for Growth (BIS, 2011), 
the Growth Review (BIS, 2010), and Lord Heseltine’s report on UK Competitiveness entitled 
‘No Stone Unturned’ (BIS, 2012b). Most of the above measures work by using direct 
subsidies, creating improved finance access schemes, education or developing public-
private partnerships. Subsidies are estimated to be a minor element except for land and 
industrial development in the more rural areas. The exact size of the budget for this type of 
state aid is unknown. Overall state aid in the UK is at the low end of spending in the EU at 
around 0.3% of GDP. 
A specific report spells out the priorities related to the more sectoral aspects of the current 
UK industrial strategy (BIS, 2012c). Sectors under priority for government subsidies, 
investments and private-public partnerships include advanced manufacturing activities such 
as aerospace, automotives and life sciences, knowledge-intensive trade services, and 
enabling sectors such as energy and construction. 
Most of these measures are horizontal in character and broadly target the different domains 
of industrial policy. In addition there is a specific R&D tax incentive scheme in place in the 
UK (as described below) that is administered by the Department for Revenue and Customs 
(RC, 2014), and the initiative of April 2012 to build special economic zones in the UK 
(Communities, 2014).  
The zones initiative focuses on the domain of land development in relation to securing 
regional cohesion in the UK, whereas the other horizontal initiatives residing under the BIS 
economic zones initiative are organised by the Department for Communities and Local 
Government. The specific instruments used in relation to the zones initiative involve various 
tax reliefs, the most important being up to 100% business rate discount for the first five 
years, and in addition up to 100% enhanced allowances on initial capital expenditures 
(Communities, 2014). 
Example of a relevant policy initiative 
Since the late 1990s the UK has operated a scheme of R&D incentives that targets both the 
intensive (existing R&D spenders or large firms) and extensive (new R&D spenders or 
SMEs) margin of innovation (RM, 2014) 
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As of April 2012 SMEs can apply for a super deduction with up to 225% relief (up from 
150% since 1 April 2008) from corporate taxation owing to R&D expenditure. In practice no 
minimum or maximum applies. The SME scheme (under this scheme a firm is considered 
an SME as long as it has fewer than 500 employees) has higher rates of relief. Effectively 
this means that for every £100 of R&D expenditure the company can save up to £225 in 
income tax. In some circumstances a credit is also payable, but at a maximum of £25 per 
£100 spent on R&D, and if the firm is making a loss. 
If the company is not an SME it can apply for a super deduction (but never a credit) under 
the large company scheme. Large companies have to spend at least £10,000 a year on 
qualifying R&D costs. The rate has been 130% for large companies since 1 April 2008. 
Losses can be carried forwards and back. 
To benefit from the R&D tax relief the company applying for it must make the case that the 
R&D investment is de facto targeting scientific and technological advance or innovation that 
goes beyond the firm itself, e.g. the investment should qualify in principle as an innovation 
that is new to the world and thus contributes to an advance in the global stock of scientific 
and technological knowledge. If the company receives a subsidy or grant towards meeting 
the R&D expenditure it will typically not be eligible for R&D tax relief on the same 
expenditure.  
An official evaluation of the UK tax incentive scheme was conducted for the first time in 
2010 (HMRC, 2010). The findings suggest that public spending via tax incentives crowd in 
R&D investment by a factor of 2. However, the evaluation found no evidence of specific 
R&D projects that were started up because of this particular channel of funding. Another 
positive finding was that 30% of the firms surveyed were newcomers to the group of small 
and medium-sized firms that spend money on R&D. Moreover, 90% of these companies 
were found to belong to the hi-tech start-up category. The same report estimates that the 
total annual budget for R&D incentives in the UK amounts to around 0.08% of national 
GDP. Hence, this can be considered to be an indirect form of state aid that makes up 
around 20% of the total UK budget for state aid before counting funding received from the 
EU (EC, 2013).  
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